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Abstract 
This thesis has examined the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
controversy in Korea in terms of civic epistemology conceptualised by Jasanoff. The 
Korean BSE controversy occurred as a result of uncertainty over BSE being 
mobilised within complex political and economic contexts between Korea and the 
US, particularly over the issue of the import of US beef after 2003. The complexity 
of the interests impeded the Korean government from adopting a clear position on 
BSE risk in beef, and thus led to public distrust and massive public protests in 2008. 
The controversy demonstrated what I have called an authoritarian character of 
civic epistemology in Korea, such as the dominance of the government in knowledge 
production, public accountability limited to procedural form, and dependence on 
foreign authority. It can be ascribed to the traces of the development process which 
had been led by a powerful state and which relied on importing advanced countries’ 
knowledge and skills. However, simultaneously, the controversy showed that this 
civic epistemology is in transition, challenged by a growing civil society and an 
increasing demand for public participation. In light of this, rather than a one-off 
phenomenon, the BSE controversy in Korea could be defined as a symptom of 
tension caused by friction between the ingrained approach to policy-making and 
increasing public awareness of democracy. This pattern of civic epistemology, I 
suggest, is a distinctive outcome of Korea’s status as a latecomer country which has 
achieved compressed economic growth and recent political democratisation. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and research aim  
This thesis considers the controversy in South Korea (hereafter Korea) regarding 
potential Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risks associated with the 
importation of US beef.  
 
Summary of the controversy  
In 2008, Korea saw massive public protests in opposition to the newly formulated 
regulations for imported US beef. The Korean government, which had allowed only 
boneless muscle meat from cattle younger than 30 months since 2006, made an 
agreement with the US government to import beef from cattle older than 30 months 
and some by-products such as bone and intestine which had previously been 
prohibited. Public outrage was sparked by a TV program which criticised the 
government for allegedly allowing beef products with potential risk of BSE. Indeed, 
this led to scare and panic over BSE spreading rapidly through the country. Online 
discussion boards of major internet portal sites represented the main places where 
BSE-related information was disseminated and rallies organised. Candlelight rallies 
calling for the beef agreement to be scrapped swept the entire country, lasting more 
than 2 months. According to the Korean National Police Agency, 2,398 assemblies 
were held, whilst approximately 1 million people participated in demonstrations 
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from 2
nd
 May to 15
th
 August 2008.
1
  
 
Figure 1 Downtown Seoul full of candlelight on 10
th
 June 2008 (ⓒ Nam Soyeon, OhmyNews) 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal cattle disease which is known 
by its popular name ‘mad cow disease.’ When BSE first emerged in British cattle in 
the 1980s, it was a completely unknown disease. British policy-makers and scientists 
did not have clear information regarding where the disease had originated from, how 
it should be treated, or whether it posed risks to humans. The British government set 
up scientific advisory bodies and promoted regulatory policies on BSE (e.g. cull of 
infected cattle, ban on ruminant protein feed for ruminant animals, removal of risky 
materials in human food chain). There were voices which criticised the government 
for being complacent over the introduction of beef regulations and requested more 
precautionary regulations. However, the UK government argued that the policies 
were grounded on purely scientific evidence and independent experts’ 
recommendations. It also reassured the public that beef was safe to eat despite the 
                                                 
1
 Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ office, White Paper on Illegal Violent Demonstrations Objecting 
US Beef Import, 2009. 
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potential presence of BSE, and that the disease would not be transmitted to humans. 
Nevertheless, in Britain, tens of thousands of infected cattle were slaughtered every 
year in the 1990s whilst approximately 170,000 BSE cases were confirmed 
cumulatively by 1996.
2
 The tragedy peaked when the UK government stated in 
March 1996 that the deaths of a number of young people in the UK were due to a 
new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) and that this disease was suspected to 
have resulted from the consumption of BSE-contaminated beef products. More than 
ten years of assurance from the UK government regarding the safety of beef ended 
with the mass slaughter of cattle and the death of hundreds of people. The trust in the 
government as well as the beef market seriously collapsed.  
With this said however, following the tragedy in the 1990s in Europe, BSE 
incidence diminished drastically with world-wide risk control measures in place. 
Regulatory standards on BSE are proposed and monitored world-wide by the World 
Organization for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE). The 
disease is now recognised as having entered a controllable stage, in spite of the 
remaining uncertainties.  
The Korean government claimed that US beef was safe to eat due to the fact that 
new beef sanitary requirements were based on science and international standards. 
However, the safety claims could not resolve the public concern regarding BSE risk 
in beef, though they were generally supported by the scientific community. The 
trustworthiness of official assurances regarding the safety of US beef was 
                                                 
2
 OIE, “Number of Cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Reported in the United 
Kingdom,” http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-data/number-of-cases-in-the-
united-kingdom/. 
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undermined by the earlier policy, namely the import of only boneless beef from 
cattle under the age of 30 months in 2006. Fundamentally speaking, the import of 
US beef was always politically sensitive issue in Korea. US beef meant a threat to 
domestic agriculture, and the Korean government’s regulatory policy on US beef was 
always mixed with its consideration of the beef industry. BSE had been linked to US 
beef issues since the detection of BSE-infected cattle in the US in 2003, whilst 
political and economic considerations of the Korean government such as the 
domestic livestock industry and the US-Korea alliance complicated the beef issue.  
Korean civil organisations raised dissenting accounts regarding BSE risk in US 
beef against the government’s safety claims. Contradictory claims about BSE and 
beef safety raised by the government and the dissenters presented ‘scientific truth’ as 
a solution to the controversy. However, scientific discussions could not resolve the 
controversy. Public protest ended when the government stepped back, reintroducing 
the ban on beef from cattle over the age of 30 months.  
 
Previous studies of the Korean controversy 
Studies examining the Korean BSE controversy have mainly concerned politics 
and the political implications of the massive civil protests. The views on the public 
protests are different according to commentators’ political positions. Conservative 
groups argued that distorted media reports, the spread of false information through 
the Internet, and the intervention of anti-government groups caused irrational public 
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responses.
3
 On the other hand, opposition parties and progressive groups argued that 
the protests were the expression of a demand for the correction of policy failure, and 
focussed on the candlelight vigils as a new type of social movement highlighting the 
participants, Internet mobilisation, or drawbacks of old party system in Korea.
4
 
Although the scientific disputes about BSE and vCJD were central to the controversy, 
these studies considered scientific knowledge as given, fixed thing, and consequently 
failed to pay attention to the scientific disputes.  
Studies by certain Korean STS scholars have paid attention to the uncertainty of 
BSE risk. Bak’s criticism centred on Public Understanding of Science, specifically 
that the Korean government and the conservative press ignored the ability of the 
public to learn scientific knowledge and considered the BSE issue as a scientific 
problem which should be decided by experts.
 5
 He argued that public anxiety about 
US beef and distrust of the government’s safety claims were not caused by the public 
deficit of scientific knowledge, but instead the uncertainty of BSE knowledge, and 
thus the public anxiety and panic should not be disparaged as irrational. Kim 
examined how oppositional experts formed and consolidated their expertise during 
the BSE controversy. He argued that alliance of dissenting experts in various 
disciplines, such as veterinary science, public health, law and international trade, 
                                                 
3
 Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ office, White Paper on Illegal Violent Demonstrations Objecting 
US Beef Import. ; Sung-gi Hong, “A Look at the Changes in Debate Structure in Korea through the 
Candlelight Vigils”, Korea jornal 50, 3 (2010): 100–127. 
4
 Kisuk Cho, “The Ideological Orientation of 2008 Candlelight Vigil Participants : Anti-American, 
pro-North Korean Left or Anti-Neoliberalism?,” Korean Political Science Review 43, no. 3 (2010): 
125–148.; Suhong Chae, “The Candlelight Protest and the Politics of the Baby Stroller Brigades,” 
Korea Jornal 50, no. 3 (2010): 71–99.;Chul-Kyoo Kim, “Teenage Participants of the 2008 
Candlelight Vigil: Their Social Characteristics and Changes in Political Views,” Korea Jornal 50, no. 
3 (2010): 14–37.; Won Koh, “The Party Politics, a Hot Potato of Candlelight Vigil”, Citizen and the 
World 14 (2008): 165–174.  
5
 Heeje Bak, “The Controversy over American Beef and Rationality in Public Perceptions of Risk : A 
Perspective of Public Understanding of Science,” Phenomena and Cognition 109 (2009): 91–116.  
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formed ‘hybrid expertise’ during the BSE controversy, and the hybrid expertise of 
the dissenting experts was more powerful than the government’s only science-
dependent claims, because political and economic interests were mixed up with 
health concern.
6
 Jung and Sung argued that the Korean government neither 
understood the public health concerns nor managed BSE risk issue, because it did 
not recognise the political aspects of risk such as public acceptance of risk or trust in 
the government.
7
  
All these studies noted that the risk issue over US beef was a hybrid area in which 
both social and scientific considerations were needed and the scientific knowledge 
was uncertain. However, they simply used the uncertainty of scientific knowledge 
about BSE to support the authority of counter-claims from dissenters or to criticise 
the government for its ignorance regarding the precautionary principle. In the above 
studies, scientific claims presented by the government were downgraded as flawed, 
and the policy making process within the government did not receive attention. 
However, the regulatory policy on US beef of the Korean government cannot simply 
be regarded as the result of the government’s ignorance or intentional distortion of 
scientific knowledge. Each country has different regulatory policies regarding BSE 
and beef safety (as will be shown in Chapter 4). Indeed, the application of a 
‘precautionary principle’, which was frequently cited as grounds for criticism of the 
government’s claims is constructed in different ways in different countries according 
                                                 
6
 Jongyoung Kim, “Construction of Oppositional Know Ledge: Hybrid Expert Alliance and 
Development of Oppositional Logics in the 2008 Candlelight Movement,” Korean Journal of 
Sociology 45, no. 1 (2011): 109–152. 
7
 Byung-Kul Jung and Jie-un Seong, “Politicized Risk and Failed Management of Technological 
Risk,” Journal of Science and Technology Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 27–56. 
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to the character of the issue and the context of each society.
8
 As such, it is necessary 
to examine how the Korean government reached its regulatory policy decision and 
what factors were involved in the policy-making in order to develop a better 
understanding of the BSE controversy in Korea.  
The study of Ha focussed on BSE risk as a socio-technological construct.
9
  He 
examined the disputes over the definition of Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) and 
the difference in genetic vulnerability to vCJD among different ethnic groups, which 
were raised during the Korean controversy. He showed that the disputes originated 
from the implicit complexity and uncertainty embedded in risk assessment practice. 
According to him, different experimental methods (tissue infectivity and 
pathogenesis) detected BSE-infectivity in different bovine tissues, and different 
‘styles of scientific practice’ (prevention epidemiology vs. general laboratory 
research style) resulted in different interpretations of the causation between 
polymorphism of genotype and occurrence of vCJD. His study explained the internal 
complexity and uncertainty of BSE knowledge, but it could not explain why the 
socially-constructed uncertainties regarding BSE, which were not problematic in the 
other countries, brought about huge conflict in Korean society.  
Studies from STS perspective noted the uncertainty and the socially constructed 
nature of BSE risk, but they failed to consider the internal policy process of the 
                                                 
8
 Wiener and Rogers (2002) showed the application of precautionary principle of EU and US to beef 
related risk were issue-specific, unlike the traditional concept that EU is more precautious than the US. 
Europe has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while the US has been more 
precautionary about mad cow disease (BSE) in beef and blood donations. Jonathan B. Wiener and 
Michael D. Rogers, “Comparing precaution in the United States and Europe”, Journal of Risk 
Research 5, 4 (2002): 317–349. 
9
 Dae-Cheong Ha, “The Social Construction of BSE Risk: SRM as a Socio-Technological Construct 
and MM Type in the ‘Styles of Scientific Practice,’” The Korean Association For Environmental 
Sociology 15, no. 2 (2011): 225–268. 
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Korean government and the underlying knowledge ways which will be addressed in 
this thesis.  
 
Research questions  
Risk issues - which are defined as harmful and how the risk should be avoided - 
are differently framed in different countries. The regulation of BSE risk belongs to 
the domain of what Sheila Jasanoff called ‘regulatory science’, which demands 
intervention of non-scientific factors to achieve policy aims.
10
 The appraisal of BSE 
risk and the formulation of the regulatory policies are constrained by practices within 
the government and institutional, political and cultural frameworks as well as 
scientific evidence. Therefore, the importance of the Korean BSE controversy does 
not lie only in the scale of public protests, but also in the fact that many of the 
fundamental problems which characterised the ways in which the Korean authorities 
dealt with BSE were also inherent in the ways in which the Korean government dealt 
with numerous other science-based risk policy challenges.  
Accordingly, the central research questions of this thesis are: ‘what caused the 
huge BSE controversy in Korea in 2008 when the disease seemed to be controlled 
and not threatening?’, ‘how was the risk and uncertainty of BSE addressed?’ and 
‘what was the character of the Korean response?’ From these questions, a number of 
subsidiary questions arise. They can be grouped together and will structure the 
chapters of this thesis. Firstly, Chapter 3 deals with the questions designed to 
                                                 
10
 Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Harvard University Press, 
1990). 
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facilitate an understanding of the nature of BSE and its implications: ‘what is BSE 
and what is the current situation of the disease?’, and ‘what happened in the UK in 
the 1980-1990s and what caused the policy failure?’ In order to understand the 
broader context of the Korean BSE controversy, Chapter 4 focusses on the following 
questions: ‘what are the characters of Korean political culture and how has the 
relationship between science and politics been developed in Korea?’ and ‘how is 
BSE risk controlled internationally and in Korea?’ Chapter 5 aims to address the 
policy process for US beef and BSE risk within the Korean government with the 
following questions: ‘what were the interests and background logic involved in the 
Korean government’s decision making on beef regulation?’, ‘how were the advisory 
bodies operated, and what was their role in policy-making?’ Chapter 6 addresses the 
following questions: ‘how were the public scare of BSE and the serious public 
protest in 2008 formed?’ and ‘how did the claims of the government and the counter-
claims confront each other?’ Finally, Chapter 7 aims to identify the particularities of 
the Korean ways in which scientific knowledge was dealt with, and as such focusses 
on the following question: ‘what were the ways in which scientific knowledge in the 
policy area was produced and presented for policy making in Korea and how were 
they different from those of the UK?’ Through these questions, I will explore how 
claims regarding BSE and US beef issues were made and challenged during the 
Korean BSE controversy, including the way in which the Korean political and 
administrative systems managed BSE risk and the uncertainty. This will facilitate the 
identification and description of the national pattern of civic epistemology in Korean 
society. 
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1.2 Methodology 
With regard to obtaining data, the main method employed involved the studying 
of official and non-official documents. The documents examined included official 
documents of the government, stenographic records of the standing and the special 
committees at the Korean National Assembly, documents submitted to the Assembly 
by the Korean government, and press releases and promotional materials of the 
government. Indeed, generally speaking, the Korean policy process is a closed affair, 
and minutes of the governmental advisory committee meetings are not open or 
accessible. However, as the BSE controversy was accompanied by serious public 
outrage, I was able to secure many documents submitted to the Assembly and open 
to the media. Regarding the knowledge of BSE and the regulatory measures in place, 
research papers and documents of international organisations such as the World 
Organization for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE), European 
Commission (EC), and the “Trust in Animals and Food Safety” (TAFS forum, a 
Switzerland-based international non-profit organisation) were examined. 
In addition to official documents of the government, I collated information 
presented by dissenting organisations; interview articles and opinions expressed by 
scientists, politicians and civil servants, industry and dissenting activists; and 
materials presented at the related conferences. Contemporary news reports were 
searched by using a newspaper archive and a TV program archive at the Korean 
National Library as well as the databases of the Korea Press Foundation and 
NAVER (a Korean Internet portal site). I used ‘BSE’ and ‘Mad cow disease’ (in 
Korean) as keywords during my searches. I was not directly concerned with the 
 19 
political orientation of newspapers as the political orientation of media and reporting 
had been widely recognised during the controversy, and several media studies had 
already addressed the issue. I nevertheless summarise these orientations where 
relevant.  
Evidence from documents was supplemented by interviews. A total of 15 
interviews were conducted with the government’s advisory scientists, civil servants, 
and journalists. Interviews were conducted during the second and third year of this 
PhD in 2011 and 2012. I used a semi-structured interview approach. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face or by telephone. The interviews were recorded when 
interviewees consented, and in cases where consent was not given I took notes 
during the interviews, also with interviewees’ consent. The interview recordings and 
notes were analysed thematically with documents I collected. I identified certain 
frequently mentioned reasons and phrases, which I then grouped together. 
The interviewees were chosen following documentary research on the Korean 
controversy. Of those who were interviewed, three were research scientists who were 
chosen because they had served or are currently serving on the government advisory 
body. Three other academic scientists participated in the press conferences of the 
government or of the scientific communities during the controversy. Two civil 
scientists at the National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS)  
were interviewed to gain an insight into the workings of BSE research and the risk 
assessment process in NVRQS. Civil servants at the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF) and the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology were also selected, due to the fact that they had been in charge of the 
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beef policy or involved with the issue during the controversy. In order to understand 
views outside the government and scientific community, journalists were included in 
the interviews: A list of these interviewees can be found in Appendix 1 with details 
of the questions listed in Appendix 2. 
The main constraint was that scientists and civil servants were generally reluctant 
to be interviewed. The BSE controversy was very recent and had led to serious 
political conflict in Korea, thus meaning that they were concerned about the political 
sensitivity of the issue. I did promise anonymity to interviewees who said that it 
would be necessary. In addition, I had difficulty in contacting certain people who had 
been promoted to higher positions (e.g. vice minister or presidential secretary). 
 
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter provides an 
introduction to the thesis, setting out the background and aim of the research.   
In Chapter 2, I review existing work in the fields of STS, shedding light on the 
relationships between science, policy-making and the public. In particular, Jasanoff’s 
concept of civic epistemology is presented as a tool with which to understand and 
explain the general features of national political culture regarding the uses of 
scientific knowledge in policy areas.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of BSE and the BSE crisis in the UK in the 1980-
1990s. This chapter shows that BSE remains a controversial disease with continuing 
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uncertainty, despite the seemingly controlled status. Political and cultural factors in 
British society shaped the crisis, increasing its controversial status above and beyond 
the uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge.   
Much like the BSE crisis in the UK, the BSE controversy in Korea must be 
understood in a wider political and cultural context as well as within the international 
regulatory regime which was established after the BSE crisis in the UK. Chapter 4 
outlines the political culture of Korea and in particular the relationship between 
science and politics in the country. Following this, a description is provided of the 
regulatory regime put in place for the control of BSE in Korea as well as the 
international conditions.  
The following two chapters examine the BSE controversy in Korea. Chapter 5 
traces the Korean government’s policy-making over BSE risk and US beef. This 
chapter discusses the Korean government's strategies for beef import from the US, as 
well as the role of scientific advisory bodies within the policy process. I provide 
chronological accounts of events and an analysis of the government's policy change, 
identifying specific factors involved along the way. Chapter 6 looks at the public 
controversy over BSE and US beef as it developed in 2008, eventually forcing the 
Korean government to revert back to its more precautionary policy. In this chapter, I 
investigate the disputes over BSE risk in US beef as well as the strategies used by 
the government and dissenters to achieve the authority of their claims.  
Chapter 7 pulls together the evidence and arguments presented in earlier chapters 
in order to answer the overall research questions. I summarise the Korean BSE 
controversy, before comparing and contrasting the ways in which science was 
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addressed in the Korean and the UK policy process. Following this, I attempt to 
identify the particularity of the ways in which scientific knowledge was produced 
and presented during the Korean BSE controversy. Specifically, I propose a Korean 
‘civic epistemology’ which may well help STS scholars understand science-based 
controversies in South Korea.  
The final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes this thesis by summarising each preceding 
chapter, considering the wider implications, and identifying lines of further research.
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2 Theories and Frameworks 
2.1 Introduction  
The BSE controversy has a variety of characteristics: it is a case of science-based 
public controversy and a regulatory policy-making issue related to risk of beef. This 
chapter provides an overview of literature which can aid the understanding of these 
various features of the BSE controversy and answer my research questions.  
The first section of this chapter provides a survey of literature concerned with the 
use of scientific knowledge in policy areas. Scientific knowledge regarding BSE 
represents an area of policy-relevant science needed to control the risk and make 
regulation policy rather than a pure research area. The second section looks at 
literature on the approaches to risk and the ways in which the public perceive risk. 
The third section provides a survey of literature pertaining to public understanding of 
science and explores the capability of the public who can contribute to science-
related issues. The fourth section provides an account of the concept of civic 
epistemology suggested by Jasanoff as the ground of legitimacy for scientific 
knowledge on which policy is based.  
 
2.2 Science in policy-making    
In this section, I will survey the literature pertaining to scientific knowledge in 
policy areas. Science has always been seen as a potentially reliable source of 
information for policy-making. Access to knowledge and the ability to exploit data 
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are essential bases on which to legitimise experts’ participation in policy decision-
making.
11
 With the increasing technological complexity of modern society, policy-
makers have become increasingly dependent on scientific knowledge. I will first 
explore how science has achieved a privileged status since the World Wars and the 
way in which policy-relevant science has been characterised in relation to politics.  
Science has formed closer relations with politics since the World Wars. Especially 
in the US, the contribution of science during the war time offered scientific experts a 
direct path to political influence and privileged status as a major intellectual interest 
group.
12
 Scientific advice expanded the realm to wider public policy areas, closely 
connected to the notion of science as a source of national wealth. As scientific 
advisory bodies became institutionalised within the government in many industrial 
countries and the budget for scientific research increased, they had great influence on 
the distribution of resources and setting the national policy priority.
13
  
There was a shared notion that decisions related to science should be made within 
science. This was based on the assumption of science as self-governed with a 
distinctive ethos and norms.
14
 For best performance, science, following this 
assumption, should be separated and protected from the intervention of social and 
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political interests. Michael Polanyi compared science to free market, and as such 
would be the most efficient when self-regulated by interactions among scientists 
without political intervention.
15
 Vannevar Bush argued for the autonomy of 
scientists from political, economic and social interests.
16
 Policy-making delegated 
by scientific expertise was expected to be effective by excluding political biases and 
vested interests.
17
  
However, the neutral and pure image of science as a commitment to objective 
truth has been challenged since the 1960-1970s.
18
 Expectation surrounding the 
progress which technological development would bring was tempered, and an 
explosion of public controversies under the influence of broad social movements 
such as anti-war, anti-nuclear, and environmental movement, called public attention 
to the hidden side of technological development.
19
 Expanding concerns over health 
and environmental regulatory issues led to the proliferation of science-oriented 
administrative agencies and expert advisory bodies. However,  reliance on science 
was not sufficient to resolve public controversies.
20
 Scientific claims were entangled 
with broader tensions among different social values and interests which motivated 
the controversy.
21
 For example, in Dorothy Nelkin’s study of the public disputes 
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over the plan to build a nuclear power plant on Cayuga Lake, scientists formed no 
consensus during scientific deliberation with regard to the state of pollution and 
possible change in the lake.
22
  
The more dependent on scientific knowledge policy-making was, the more 
undermined the authority of scientific advice became.
23
 Polarised claims of 
contesting parties exposed uncertainty and lack of consensus within science.
24
 
Several studies have attempted to explain the limitation which scientific knowledge 
in the policy area disclosed by distinguishing policy-relevant science from science 
proper. For example, Harvey Brooks defined ‘science in policy’ as “matters that are 
basically political or administrative but are significantly dependent on technical 
factors”, and said that in policy-relevant science “the distinction between means and 
ends is often blurred and technical uncertainties leave a wide-open door for the entry 
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of personal values and political predilections.”25 He was concerned that scientists’ 
participation in policy processes would undermine the autonomy of science as a self-
governed institution as well as the credibility of science in the political process. Thus, 
he advised scientists involved in policy-making to be insulated from interest and 
pressures.
26
 Likewise, Alvin M. Weinberg said that ‘trans-scientific’ issues in policy 
areas are those that “can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by 
science.” 27  He stated that judgment about ‘trans-scientific’ issues was beyond 
laboratory science and required the intervention of non-scientific factors. He 
presented low level radiation effects and serious nuclear reactor accidents as 
examples of trans-science. According to his explanation, such issues cannot be fully 
resolved by using scientific methods only, because enormous cost is incurred when it 
comes to finding solutions or the possible occurrence is extremely low. With this in 
mind, he stated that the role of the scientists in matters of trans-science differed from 
that of scientists in issues which could be answered clearly by science.
28
 The 
concepts about policy-relevant science suggested by Brooks and Weinberg 
presupposed that the indeterminate and fallible character of science which appeared 
in controversies and policy area was not intrinsic to science proper. Therefore, the 
authority of scientific knowledge could be left untouched and scientists could still 
play a significant role in policy-related scientific issues.
29
 According to Weinberg, 
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scientists could at least “help delineate where science ends and trans-science 
begins.”30  
Similarly, Sheila Jasanoff defined ‘regulatory science’ as “a hybrid activity that 
combines elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social 
and political judgment.”31 She stated that as regulatory science tends to be done “at 
the margin of existing knowledge” where scientific consensus in fragile, the criteria 
for judging the validity are “fluid, controversial, and arguably more politically 
motivated.”32 As such, she said that knowledge in regulatory science is susceptible 
to pressure from external oversight, and has indeterminate and marginal 
characteristics.  
The point which distinguishes the ‘regulatory science’ of Jasanoff from the 
definitions of Brooks and Weinberg’s policy-relevant science is Jasanoff’s 
acceptance of the ‘socially constructed’ nature of scientific knowledge.33 According 
to her, the way in which scientific evidence is produced and presented in regulatory 
science does not depend on science alone, but is intimately related to social 
commitments in an unacknowledged way.
 
Consequently, it is impossible to find 
clearly ‘where science ends and politics begins.’ For example, regarding the 
commercial cultivation of GM crops, while risk assessments in the US considered 
only direct effect on agriculture, risk assessments in Europe included effects on non-
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agricultural environment such as wild flora and fauna.
34
 This resulted in different 
conclusions regarding the risk of GM crops. 
Due to this constructive nature of regulatory science, according to Jasanoff, the 
authority and credibility of scientific advice are not granted by solely seeking better 
technical expertise. It is essential to conform to the standards of political legitimacy 
and has to do with the accountability in democratic governance.
35 
In Jasanoff’s case, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US succeeded in legitimising the 
carcinogen regulation policy not by verifying transparency in its methodology but by 
establishing an authoritative governance system, such as the Science Advisory Board 
which embraced external experts and the Health Effect Institute which was jointly 
established with the automobile industry.
36
   
As the way in which regulatory scientific knowledge acquires legitimacy is 
subject to the way in which public accountability is constituted within a society, the 
same scientific evidence can be exploited differently in different contexts. It reflects 
the rule-making principle and process; both of which are perceived as proper in each 
society. Many comparative studies regarding regulation policy in Western countries 
showed that policy strategies and outcomes relied on different policy styles and 
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institutional factors in each country.
37
 For example, in the US where the 
interpretation of scientific evidence by an expert advisory committee was often 
challenged in the adversarial political culture and prevalence of litigation, the 
regulatory process relied heavily on formal quantitative analysis for the objective 
rationale of policy.
38
 On the contrary, in European countries where regulatory 
processes were less exposed to the public than in the US, the approach to evidence of 
risks was more informal and flexible, and regulatory policy-makers were under little 
pressure to make explicit principles to prove the authority of their analysis.
39 
For 
example, the US and the UK disagreed on how to regulate aldrin and dieldrin even 
though they were based on the same pesticide studies. Whereas EPA in the US found 
aldrin and dieldrin to be carcinogenic to humans, the British MAFF (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) concluded that they did not pose a risk to human 
health. This divergence was caused by the difference between the two countries in 
dealing with inconclusive evidence. EPA accepted animal test results as legitimate 
grounds on which to classify aldrin and dieldrin as human carcinogens, but the UK 
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government regarded the evidence as insufficient to verify risk to humans.
40
  
As international ‘harmonization’ is given an increasing amount of consideration in 
regulation policy, international standards such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules or the Codex Alimentarius are considered more important than before 
in domestic regulatory policy making issues, and convergence in regulatory policies 
is often considered to be inevitable.
41
 Nevertheless, this convergence does not mean 
that the influence of the national context on regulatory policy-making should be 
disregarded. Indeed, not only do most international organisations recognise the 
member’s autonomy in making domestic regulatory policy, but even an identical 
regulatory policy can be made by different mechanism or on different grounds, 
depending on the specific context of each country. 
In this thesis, I follow the constructivist approach which argues that scientific 
knowledge in the policy process is intimately related to social commitments as well 
as scientific processes using the concept of ‘regulatory science.’ This will be helpful 
in understanding the complexity associated with the regulatory scientific knowledge 
over BSE and the policy, which is why I now turn to examine ‘risk.’    
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2.3 Risk    
This section surveys the literature concerned with risk, mainly focussing on the 
ways in which risk is perceived and constructed within society. The most important 
aspect of risk is uncertainty. Wynne subdivided the concepts associated with risk and 
uncertainty as follows:  
Risk: “when the system behaviour is basically well known, and chances of 
different outcomes can be defined and quantified by structured analysis of 
mechanisms and probabilities”;   
Uncertainty: “if we know the important system parameters but not the 
probability distributions”; 
Ignorance: “which by definition escapes recognition”; 
Indeterminacy: the issue of the “social commitments and conventions 
which constitute scientific paradigms or technological systems.”42 
 
With this said however, the concept of risk which I shall use in this section is an 
integrated one which encompasses all associated concepts, rather than the narrow 
definition of risk suggested by Wynne.   
To quote Renn, “Risks refer to the possibility that human actions or events lead to 
consequences that affect aspects of what humans value.”43 However, risks do not 
exist just out there as a numerical possibility. Beck stated that “Risks are taken, 
whereas dangers happen to you.”44 Risks reflect public ways of responding to 
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threats and insecurities, not like danger to which people are exposed regardless of 
their choice.
45
 Therefore, “what matters is what people believe about these risks and 
why they hold those beliefs.”46 How people evaluate and respond to risks becomes 
the crucial question, and one which must be asked.  
Public response to risk does not have a direct relationship to the degree of risk or 
its scientific assessment. Lay people understand risk in different ways from experts 
and their concerns reflect what is often excluded from experts’ risk assessments.47 
Psychological factors influence lay people’s perception and evaluation of risks. For 
example, people tend to accept risks from voluntary activities, whereas they object to 
imposed ones with even a much smaller risk; moreover, risks which are seen as 
familiar and natural are more acceptable to the public than risks from strange and 
artificial sources (Table 1). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Science & Technology 36, 8 (2001): 801–812. 
45
 Bente Halkier, “Handling Food-related Risks: Political Agency and Governmentality”, in The 
Politics of Food, ed Marianne E. Lien and Brigitte Nerlich (Berg, 2004). 
46
 Horton, R. Genetically modified foods: ‘absurd’ concern or welcome dialogue?, Lancet, 354, 1999, 
p.1372 cited in Stuart Allan, Media, Risk and Science, 1st ed. (Open University Press, 2002). p.174 
47
 Paul Slovic, “Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and Risk 
Communication,” in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, ed. Deborah G. 
Mayo (Oxford University Press, 1994). p.63 
 34 
Table 1 Factors Important to Risk Perception and Evaluation
48
 
Factor Conditions Associated with 
Greater Public Concern 
Conditions Associated with 
Less Public Concern 
Catastrophic 
potential  
Fatalities and injuries grouped 
in time and space 
Fatalities and injuries, 
scattered and random 
Familiarity  unfamiliar Familiar 
Understanding  Mechanisms or process not 
understood 
Mechanisms or process 
understood 
Uncertainty Risks scientifically unknown 
or uncertain 
Risks known to science 
Controllability 
(personal) 
uncontrollable Controllable 
Voluntariness 
of exposure 
involuntary Voluntary 
Effects on 
children 
Children specifically at risk 
Delayed effects 
Children not specifically at 
risk 
Immediate effects 
Manifestation 
of effects on 
future 
generations 
Risk to future generations No risk to future generations 
Identification 
of victim 
Identifiable victims Statistical victims 
Dread Effects dreaded Effects not dreaded 
Trust in 
institutions 
Lack of trust in responsible 
institutions 
Trust in responsible 
institutions 
Media 
attention 
Much media attention Little media attention 
Accident 
history 
Major and sometimes minor 
accidents 
No major and minor accidents 
Equity Inequitable distribution of 
risks and benefits 
Equitable distribution of risks 
and benefits 
Benefits Unclear benefits Clear benefits 
Reversibility Irreversible effects Reversible effects 
Personal stake Individual personally at risk Individual not personally at 
risk 
Origin Caused by human actions or 
failures 
Caused by acts of nature or 
God 
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This cognitive approach showed that the public do not perceive and evaluate risk 
only by probabilities. However, it was criticised for regarding the lay perception of 
risk as distorted or problematic by assuming a pre-existing and objective risk which 
can be identified through scientific measurement and calculation; it was also 
criticised for reducing the public perception of risk to an issue of individual 
psychological level unrelated to the social and cultural context in which perception 
and assessment are generated.
49
  
In contrast, the social and cultural approach sees risk as what is constructed as 
social facts.
50
 From this perspective, wrote Jasanoff, “risks … do not represent 
objective assessment of nature’s unpredictability but are refracted in every society 
through lenses shaped by history, politics, and culture.”51 The cultural study of 
Douglas explained the distinctive representation of risk in a society as part of a 
mechanism to support the way of life, which is a combination of ‘cultural bias’ 
(shared values and beliefs) and ‘social relations’ (patterns of interpersonal 
relations).
52
  
Social constructivist studies have also rejected the notion of an objective risk 
which is given from the outer world, and have argued that the way in which risk is 
characterised is bound to the socio-cultural context such as embedded values and 
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interests, political or institutional cultures and power.
53  
Johnson and Covello, 
together with Stallings, noted that societal actors influence characterising and 
framing risk issues and social processes to resolve them.
54
 Dietz et al. showed that 
differences in resources among conflicting groups influence the way in which the 
nature of disputes is framed.
55
 In their study, conflicts were defined differently 
according to the values and interests of intervening organisations, as well as the 
resources that each organisation possessed in relative abundance. Rayner and Cantor 
argued that people were more concerned about fairness, competence, and 
responsibility than probabilities or technical issues, especially when the actions for 
choice involved very low probabilities and the differences in probability between the 
actions were so small, which most typifies the conditions faced by policy-makers 
when making decisions on risks.
56
  
Certain social constructivist authors focussed on the construction of risk 
knowledge. They argued that all knowledge regarding risk, and even experts’ risk 
assessment, was neither objective nor value-free, and was bound to the social and 
cultural context.
57
 In light of this, they opposed the perspectives which take the lay 
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perception of risk as distorted or problematic contrary to neutral and objective expert 
assessment. According to their explanation, lay people are not irrational, but instead 
pursue a specific form of knowledge based on a much broader context than experts’ 
scientific assessment, which is perceived by numbers or incidences of harmful events. 
Brian Wynne said:  
… legitimate public ambivalence and resistance to expert presumptions 
about framing of risk issues was first interpreted as simple ignorance, then 
“misunderstanding,” and latterly as a naïve wish for an impossible “zero-
risk” environment. The construction of the public ignores sociological 
evidence that shows that people are by no means naive about the existence 
or complete eradication of risks, and points rather to scientists’ 
unacknowledged insecurity about recognizing the conditionality of their 
own knowledge…58    
 
The factors which are involved in public evaluation of risks are impossible to 
quantify or fully articulate. Renn et al. stressed the importance of procedure for 
decision-making, especially for the people who would be affected by the decision.
59
 
Freudenburg argued that trust in institutions’ ability to manage risks predicts public 
perception better than personal characteristics of the public such as age, sex, political 
party affiliation and ideology.
60
 Similarly, Hornig stated that how the public felt 
about the institutions which managed the risk was crucial to determining the public 
level of concern regarding risk.
61
 Wynne argued that “the basic framework of public 
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responses depends largely upon the experience and perception of the trustworthiness 
of relevant institutions or social actors involved, not upon the understanding of 
technical information.”62 In his sheep farmers’ case, experts’ evaluations about risk 
from the Chernobyl nuclear accident did not win the trust of sheep farmers, not only 
because the experts had little knowledge of local farming practices, but because their 
institution was affiliated with a government agency which had been in conflict with 
local farmers.
63
 
In this thesis, I follow the social constructivist approach to risk. This approach is 
selected due to the fact that BSE controversy was an issue of regulatory policy-
making, which is accompanied by the intervention of social and political values and 
the issue of public accountability. In the following two sections, literature concerning 
the relationship between scientific knowledge and the public will be explored.  
 
2.4 Science and Public  
In this section, I will explore the literature pertaining to public understanding of 
science based on the recent history of public science in the UK.  
As previously mentioned, the great expectation and adulation which science 
enjoyed after the Second World War did not continue.
 
With concerns about 
environmental and nuclear issues, public attitudes to science were ambivalent and 
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the government decreased support for science research.
64
 In this political condition, 
the UK’s Royal Society set up a working party chaired by Walter Bodmer and 
published a report in 1985 partly with the aim of restoring enthusiasm and support 
for science. It led to the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) movement. The 
British scientific community felt that public lack of interest and the negative attitudes 
towards science undermined science’s political influence and the legitimacy of 
claims for state-funding, whilst the lack of support from the public resulted from this 
lack of understanding of science.
65
 Accordingly, providing greater knowledge to the 
public was seen as crucial in terms of increasing the public’s appreciation of science. 
Organisations were set up to improve PUS activities and scientists were encouraged 
to learn to communicate with the public. A better understanding of science was 
expected to help the public make better personal decisions and to raise the nation’s 
competitiveness. Further, a better public understanding of science would enhance the 
status of science and scientists.
66
  
However, in the years following the initial PUS movement, surveys revealed that 
the public’s level of knowledge and support for science did not always show a 
positive correlation, contrary to the expectation of the scientific community.
67
 
Indeed, there were negative views on PUS activities, with many feeling that they 
only served the interests of scientists. Shinn and Whitley stated that everything 
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written by scientists and about science could be understood as activities for securing 
resources for the scientific community.
68
 In addition, Stephen Hilgartner said that 
popularisation of science simply contributed to preserving the privilege of scientists 
rather than narrowing the gap between experts and lay people.
69
  
More fundamental criticism of the traditional PUS approach was indebted to the 
constructivist approach which was based on the tradition of sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Constructivists argued that scientific knowledge is constructed in 
context-specific ways, and as such, simply trying to educate or correct the public’s 
cognitive deficit could not be the answer to the PUS problem. With this perspective 
in mind, the questionnaire format of surveys used to gauge the public’s knowledge of 
and attitudes towards science presumed general and absolute knowledge about which 
scientists had the right answer and the public were required for it to be counted as 
‘scientifically literate.’70 It neglected the finding that scientific knowledge can be 
uncertain or ambiguous, and attributed all public disagreements with science to 
ignorance.
71
  
Moreover, according to the constructivists, lay people are not passive recipients of 
knowledge provided by scientists, and have the potential to complement or challenge 
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expert knowledge. For example, a study by Brian Wynne investigated Cumbrian 
sheep farmers, and although their knowledge, based on their specific experiences 
from hill sheep farming (e.g. ecology of sheep or peculiarity of the local terrain) was 
dismissed by scientists, those scientists failed to predict the behaviour of radioactive 
fallout in soil and to provide appropriate advice to farmers.
72
 What was represented 
as the universal behaviour of cesium in soil by scientists was in fact a specific 
experimental result about clay soil and thus it was not relevant to peaty soil in 
Cumbrian fells. In addition, there are cases which have shown that public knowledge 
could make an active contribution to experts’ knowledge production. The AIDS 
treatment activists discussed by Epstein made themselves credible participants in 
knowledge production and brought about changes in conducting biomedical research 
by learning expertise and expertise culture.
73
 Callon showed that knowledge 
production can be made by lay public participation in his study of the French 
Muscular Dystrophy Association case.
74
 In his case, patients and their parents 
engaged in knowledge production by communicating with experts, changing 
research orientation, and making themselves the subjects of research project.  
These cases confirmed that expert knowledge has no uniquely privileged status to 
truth. Especially in risk issues characterised by uncertainty and the lack of 
knowledge, distinctions between experts and lay public are blurred. Indeed, Beck 
stated that: “in matters of hazards, no one is an expert - particularly not the 
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experts.”75 Ravetz and others argued that in ‘post-normal science’ where “facts are 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”, ‘extended peer 
community’ which involves not only scientists but also stakeholders affected by the 
science was desirable to guarantee the quality of the science.
76
 Besides academic 
studies, public controversies such as the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis and the controversy over genetically modified (GM) crops in the mid-to-late 
1990s changed the way in which the relationship between science and society was 
viewed in the political arena, particularly in the UK.
77
 Public trust became the main 
issue, whilst openness and transparency in the policy process were highlighted to re-
establish the credibility of the public in science.
78
 Two-way and dialogic forms of 
public consultation and engagement were encouraged.
79
  
Collins and Evans tried to delimit and legitimise increasing public participation in 
the technical debate by acknowledging public expertise, which is distinguished from 
the legitimacy of public participation as the democratic right.
80
 They defined 
expertise of the public as ‘experience based expertise’ which was not recognised by 
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degrees or certificates.
81
 They classified expertise into three levels: 1) “No 
Expertise”; 2) “Interactional Expertise” which is enough to “interact interestingly 
with participants and carry out a sociological analysis”; and 3) “Contributory 
Expertise” which is enough to “contribute to the science of the field being 
analyzed.” 82  They argued that even formally trained experts cannot have 
contributory expertise in a specific issue outside their particular fields and “specific 
sets of lay people” who have special experience associated with the scientific and 
technical matters in disputes, can contribute to the issues.
83
  
However, the claim by Collins and Evans was criticised for being based on 
dichotomy and an unequal relationship between experts and the public.
84
 Wynne 
raised the question of how to define appropriate contributory expertise in new 
domains such as bioscience or GM food, if only specific experience is presumed for 
legitimate participation. Jasanoff argued that what is counted as expertise in a society 
is a product of a particular cultural context, and therefore, to be counted as expertise 
or experts in one society does not mean that it will be always the same in different 
societies. According to her, public participation is “an instrument for holding 
expertise to cultural standards for reliable public knowledge” and the standards 
which are used by the public to identify appropriate public knowledge constitute 
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‘civic epistemology’ in a society, as will be explored in the following section.85  
The next section examines Jasanoff’s concept of ‘civic epistemology’ as a means 
by which to achieve “civic engagement with government reasoning” which is 
grounded on the notion of the public as a knowable agent who can evaluate and 
validate knowledge of experts, and further can contribute to knowledge production.
86
  
 
2.5 Civic epistemology  
The previous section showed that lay people have the competence to contest 
experts’ claims and to contribute to knowledge production even in science-intensive 
issues. In this section, the concept of civic epistemology will be examined with 
regard to the ways in which the public engage with science and politics in a 
democracy.  
Ezrahi stated that the rise of experimental science after the scientific revolution 
provided a space where a state’s actions were observable and attestable by the 
public.
87
 Jasanoff focussed on this ‘witnessing’ public who are ‘informed, reasoned, 
and attestive to the legitimacy of the state’s actions.’ 88  She argued that the 
credibility of policy relies on a “citizen’s general proclivity to accept the knowledge 
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claims and demonstrations of efficacy advanced by the state.”89 According to her, 
every society has its own way in which it feels credible knowledge should be shown, 
defended, and represented; indeed, this is subject to the political culture developed 
from the historical, political, and economic experience. She called this indigenous 
knowledge way a ‘civic epistemology’,90 and stated that civic epistemology is a 
collection of institutionalised practices by which knowledge for collective choice is 
tested and achieves its legitimacy in a society (usually a national society). Scientific 
knowledge is not expected from this shared public knowledge method. In light of 
this, Jasanoff stated: 
Science, no less than politics, must conform to these established ways of 
public knowing in order to gain broad-based support – especially when 
science helps underwrite significant collective choices.
91
   
Indeed, ‘civic epistemology’ is therefore distinguished from the notion of ‘public 
understanding of science’ which assumes the universality of scientific knowledge 
and the ignorance of the public. Civic epistemology is a concept associated with the 
accountability and legitimacy of scientific knowledge within political cultures rather 
than knowledge itself.
92
 What should be asked is not what and how much the public 
knows but how knowledge is culturally constructed as grounds for collective action.  
Different relationships among the state, the public and science in different 
countries offer specificity to the ways in which scientific knowledge for policy is 
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constructed and legitimised in each country. Jasanoff’s comparative study (2005) 
showed how three industrialized Western countries (US, UK, and Germany) made 
different policy choices about biotechnology in different ways. Although the 
countries have a lot in common such as market-oriented economies, comparable 
levels of economic and technological development, and democracy, their civic 
epistemologies were nevertheless different. To compare how public knowledge was 
made and was given legitimacy in a society, she suggested six interrelated 
dimensions of civic epistemology: ‘the dominant participatory styles of public 
knowledge making’; ‘the methods of ensuring accountability’; ‘the practices of 
public demonstration’; ‘the preferred registers of objectivity’; ‘the accepted bases of 
expertise’; and ‘the visibility of expert bodies. 93  A brief explanation of each 
dimension, which is based on Jasanoff’s description, is presented below. 
Dominant public knowledge making style: Scientific knowledge is made and 
presented in public sphere by the “established institutional routines” in a society and 
different players contribute to public knowledge-making in different styles.
94
 While 
interested parties such as industry and environmentalists play significant roles in 
supplying information for policy-making in the US, the state’s role is more active in 
Europe. In the UK, public servants have been regarded as trustworthy bodies capable 
of representing the public interests. In contrast, the German style of knowledge 
making, where policy making is closely associated with law making, is characterised 
by the high involvement of legislators and technical experts and wide range of 
discussion.  
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Methods of ensuring accountability: This is a dimension of civic epistemology 
concerned with the ways in which the public can be persuaded as to the legitimacy of 
the knowledge on which policy is based, by showing that the knowledge was 
formulated using the appropriate process or representatives with specialised 
expertise. In the US, public knowledge acquired credibility through the adversary 
process represented by litigation. On the other hand, experts had greater 
trustworthiness in the UK and Germany than in the US. Experts in the UK, who 
participate in the policy process, were gradually recognised as being eligible to 
represent the public interest through their years of service for the common good. In 
Germany, the institutional affiliation of participants and the balance of the interests, 
which were represented by the members of an expert body, were crucial when it 
came to earning the credibility and trust of policy-relevant knowledge. 
Practices of public demonstration: This is concerned with the methods used to 
make “facts and things” seen to be credible “in the public eye.”95 As shown in 
Ezrahi’s analysis, demonstration has been an essential part in legitimating policy 
since modern liberal democracy. In the US, socio-technical experiments and the 
successful results validate policy claims and reinforce technological optimism. For 
example, the legitimacy of agricultural biotechnology in the US was presented with 
the fact that US people had already consumed genetically modified food without 
harm and the positive expectation of biotechnology as a solution to world hunger.
96
 
On the other hand, the governments had been relatively less pressured for public 
demonstrations in the UK and Germany. The “preference for empirical proofs” in the 
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UK, which originated from an empiricist and pragmatic tradition, demanded 
observable facts “with near absolute certainty.”97  In Germany, where political 
culture shared the abstract and idealist tradition with science, deliberative rationality 
was expected to be realised by expert bodies composed of all eligible parties.   
Objectivity: This means the independence from subjective bias or particular 
interests. In the US, objectivity expressed in numbers was preferred, and quantitative 
risk assessment was considered as sufficient for regulatory decision making. In 
contrast, risk assessment should be supplemented by political representation in order 
to secure objectivity in Germany and the UK. The political representation was 
achieved by expert bodies which included all relevant parties in Germany, and by 
consultation with appropriate individuals who verified their personal integration to 
public value in the UK.   
Expertise: To be accepted as expertise in the public sphere demands legitimacy as 
well as specialised knowledge. As such, “experts have to be accountable as well as 
knowledgeable”, and the grounds of accountability differ among countries.98 In the 
US, ‘formal qualifications’ and the ‘impersonal test of intelligence’ are considered as 
the main constituents of legitimate expertise. In the UK, expertise is tied to the 
personal integrity of individuals who have proved their social commitment with a 
record of public service. The notion of expertise like this has made it possible for a 
broad range of people to be recognised as experts without specific knowledge or 
formal qualification. In Germany where expert bodies are regarded as “the 
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microcosm of society”, to be an expert presupposes the existence of an organisation 
which is perceived as a proper constituent to discuss the issue and the institutional 
support. An individual expert represents the organisation to which they belong.
99
   
Visibility of expert bodies: This is a procedural dimension of expert bodies. In the 
US, close scrutiny of all interested parties is the way to exclude ‘bias and 
subjectivity’ from the decision-making. The activities of expert committees are open 
to public and the public access is guaranteed legally. On the contrary, expert bodies 
in Germany are deemed as “perfect microcosms of relevant rationality.”100 They are 
not required to open the activities or to allow the participation of outsiders. The 
levels of openness when it comes to expert bodies in the UK are variable. Indeed, 
this depends on the rule of access crafted by the expert body according to “its own 
notions of how to communicate with its publics.” 101 
To summarise the national patterns of civic epistemologies in the US, UK, and 
Germany, plural interest groups play the main role in knowledge making in the US, 
whilst the public accountability of knowledge claims is based on open and adversary 
processes such as litigation. The basis of expertise is professional skill, and 
quantitative risk assessment offers a basis of objectivity in the US. In the UK, public 
knowledge making is based on the trust in public service. The credibility of experts 
rests on the personal integrity of the people who participate in the policy process, 
whilst empirical proof is preferred as a way in which to acquire credibility. In 
Germany, the pre-existence of trustworthy institutions and the representation of their 
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viewpoints are crucial to achieve the legitimacy of policy. While quantitative risk 
assessment is considered sufficient for securing objectivity in the US, quantitative 
risk assessment should be supplemented by “appropriate political representation” 
such as a privileged individual’s discernment (UK) or input of all potentially 
interested viewpoints (Germany) in the UK and Germany.
102
 Integrating the 
individual dimensions of each country, Jasanoff presented three types of civic 
epistemology: “communitarian (resting on shared perceptions, the UK), consensus-
seeking (built through negotiation, Germany), and contentious (resolved through 
conflict, the US)” (Table 2).103  
Table 2 Civic Epistemologies: A Comparative View (from Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, p. 259) 
 
US 
Contentious 
UK 
Communitarian 
Germany 
Consensus-seeking 
Styles of public 
knowledge-
making 
Pluralist, 
interest-based 
Embodied, 
service-based 
Corporatist, 
institution-based 
Public 
accountability 
(basis for trust) 
Assumptions of 
distrust; Legal 
Assumptions of 
trust; Relational 
Assumptions of 
trust; Role-based 
Demonstration 
(practices) 
Sociotechnical 
experiments 
Empirical science Expert rationality 
Objectivity 
(registers) 
Formal, 
numerical, 
reasoned 
Consultative, 
negotiated 
Negotiated, 
reasoned 
Expertise 
(foundations) 
Professional 
skills 
Experience 
Training, skills, 
experience 
Visibility of 
expert bodies 
Transparent Variable Nontransparent 
 
Although civic epistemology in each country is not expected to be ‘rigidly fixed, 
uncontested, changeless over time, or evenly distributed across all sectors of society’, 
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Jasanoff stated that civic epistemology in a society is made up of ‘deep-seated and 
recurrent patterns’ which cannot be broken only by ‘exceptionally severe shock.’104 
Accordingly, her analysis of the three Western industrialised countries focussed more 
on differences among countries than internal tensions or discontinuity within 
national patterns. We may conjecture that the three Western countries, which have 
developed their political and economic systems for a long time and now have well-
settled systems, are not likely to show fluid, changeable, or conflicting features of 
civic epistemology.  
In contrast, Stöckelová focussed on the heterogeneous features of civic 
epistemology in the Czech Republic.
105
 She argued that civic epistemologies are not 
always homogeneous within a society by comparing the government’s science policy 
documents and public engagement of environmental organisations in the Czech 
Republic. Similarly, Amir showed different epistemologies in assessing nuclear risk 
between the government and civil society groups through his study of the 
controversy over nuclear powers plant in post-authoritarian Indonesia.
106
  
Of course, as Jasanoff argued, we must be careful when calling certain 
heterogeneous methods of knowledge production and use within a society ‘civic 
epistemologies.’ Indeed, civic epistemology is the way in which the government 
achieves the legitimacy of its policy and the knowledge base of the policy is 
perceived as proper within a society. If divergence of civic epistemology continues, 
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the political power cannot achieve the legitimacy of the policy in democracy. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that countries which experienced recent political, 
economic or cultural transformation (e.g. the Czech Republic or Indonesia) have the 
potential to present more changeable or conflicting features of civic epistemologies 
than Jasanoff’s cases.  
Further, it is possible that these counties will show different types of civic 
epistemologies from Jasanoff’s. Despite the context-dependent nature of civic 
epistemologies, Jasanoff was resistant to the idea that there exist as many different 
civic epistemologies as the number of “discrete national or political communities to 
host them.”107 She argued that “cross-cultural variations in civic epistemologies are 
in fact not infinite, but can be grouped in accordance with widely the three recurring 
patterns.” This argument carries with it the risk of over-generalisation in presenting 
national patterns of civic epistemologies of different countries with different 
historical, political, economic and cultural backgrounds from the Western 
industrialised democracy. Indeed, Stöckelová stated that Jasanoff’s “biased 
experience with political cultures where citizens play a key role” might mean she 
missed the possibility of different versions of civic epistemology.
108
  
Although limited in number, certain studies have suggested national patterns 
distinct from Jasanoff’s three types of civic epistemology. Renn addressed 
differences in policy cultures and in the use of science between the more 
industrialised European countries and the less industrialised ones.
109
 He classified 
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national styles of using scientific expertise into four types: ‘adversarial’, ‘fiduciary’, 
‘consensual’, and ‘corporatist.’ 110  In Renn's classification, the integration of 
scientific advice in the policy area in Southern Europe belonged to ‘fiduciary’ style 
which was characterized by expert selection based on prestige or personal 
relationships with patrons and by consultation in an arbitrary manner without public 
control or procedural rules. In addition, the studies of Gonçalves, and Gonçalves and 
Delicado pointed out that Europeanisation brought no substantive changes in 
authoritarian and hierarchical political tradition in Portugal, a semi-peripheral society 
within the EU.
111
 They argued that Portuguese membership in the EU aggravated 
the peripheral position of Portuguese science and thus the deference of Portuguese 
policy makers toward foreign veterinary science was reinforced. Indeed, following 
their comparison of public perception regarding nanotechnology in Brazil and the 
UK, Macnaghten and Guivant concluded that nanotechnology was considered 
positive with the expectation of progress in Brazil, whereas in the UK it was treated 
with scepticism and concern about the long-term and unforeseen consequences.
112
 
They attributed the response to nanotechnology in Brazil to a lack of experience 
relating to public technological controversy and the low level of institutionalisation 
of public consultation in Brazil. In light of this, Jasanoff’s claim that there are three 
recurrent types of civic epistemology is not sufficient to explain the different patterns 
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shown by the above studies, particularly in countries with different political, 
economic and cultural backgrounds from the three European countries of Jasanoff.   
Civic epistemology is a useful concept with which to capture a wide variety of 
aspects pertaining to science-related policy-making and controversies in democracies 
whilst simultaneously showing the context-specific methods. I will use the concept 
of civic epistemology to analyse the Korean BSE controversy and to identify the 
characteristics of public knowledge-making and legitimacy-achieving practice in 
Korean society. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter I survey relevant literature which will develop our understanding of 
the complex nature of Korea’s BSE controversy. The controversy includes various 
issues such as the role of scientific knowledge in regulatory policy-making, different 
constructions of risk and scientific knowledge between the public and the 
government, and the ways in which policy achieves legitimacy and public 
accountability in the contemporary knowledge society.  
The first section demonstrates that science and politics are not distinguished from 
one another in regulatory policy making through use of the ‘regulatory science’ 
concept. Scientific knowledge in regulatory policy areas is not objective and value-
free but is socially constructed. The ways in which regulatory scientific knowledge 
achieves legitimacy are subject to social commitment and reflect the ways in which 
accountability is constituted in a society. Accordingly, even the same experimental 
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evidence can be interpreted in different ways or lead to divergence in regulatory 
policy among countries, depending on the political and cultural context.  
In the following two sections, I survey literature concerning the ways in which the 
public responds to risk and scientific knowledge. Risk does not pertain to the 
objective possibility of harmful events, but instead how people evaluate and respond 
to it. Lay people tend to perceive risk in a much broader context than experts who 
perceive risk by numbers, with psychological, cultural and social factors affecting it. 
Likewise, the public are not passive recipients of scientific knowledge provided by 
scientists, and several constructivist studies have shown that the public has the 
potential to evaluate and validate knowledge of experts, and further to contribute to 
knowledge production.  
Discussion regarding civic epistemology is reviewed in the next section. The 
legitimacy and credibility of policy relies on the shared public knowledge method 
used in democracy, whilst each society has its own indigenous way in which credible 
knowledge should be shown, defended, and represented. Jasanoff’s comparative 
study of biotechnology policy in the US, UK, and Germany showed different types 
of civic epistemology at work, whilst the contextual nature of civic epistemology 
suggested the possibility of a new type of civic epistemology in a society which has 
a different cultural context.  
In this thesis, I will explore, using the constructivist approach, how the risk claims 
over BSE were constructed in Korean society and what factors were involved in the 
regulatory policy-making. The concept of civic epistemology will be used to identify 
the distinct nature of public knowledge-making and legitimacy-achieving practice in 
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Korean society.  
Prior to the chapters regarding the Korean BSE controversy, it is necessary to 
paint a more detailed picture of the BSE and the BSE crisis. Literature concerned 
with the nature and the control of BSE and the brief story of the BSE crisis in the 
UK in the 1980-1990s will be presented in the next chapter. This will help to 
sensitise us to any factors which may potentially be considered as necessary when it 
comes to understanding the Korean controversy.  
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3 BSE and the BSE crisis  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will provide information regarding BSE and the brief story of the 
BSE crisis in the UK.  
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) struck the world with horror in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. A lack of scientific knowledge about the disease was one 
of the main difficulties when it came to policy-making. After the tragic events 
peaked with the statement of the UK government in 1996, the disease began to look 
controlled as the result of various risk control measures being implemented. 
Nevertheless, it remained somewhat of an unknown disease during the Korean 
controversy and claims about BSE risk and the safety of beef provided by the 
government and the opponents were conflicting. The first section will describe the 
scientific knowledge of BSE, the current conditions of BSE and vCJD, and the 
remaining uncertainty.  
BSE cannot be explained separately from the story of the BSE crisis in the UK. 
BSE was first discovered in British cattle in the 1980s, and most BSE cases have 
been discovered there. Hundreds of thousands of British cattle were slaughtered, and 
176 people died following transmission of the disease. The BSE crisis was said to be 
a failure of the British policy system. Moreover, during the BSE controversy in 
Korea, the beef safety claims of the Korean government were often compared with 
the UK government’s reassurance that had been finally revealed as a policy failure. 
Dissenters took the UK case as a reference to the distrust against the government. 
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Indeed, the BSE crisis illuminated general and fundamental problems which can 
occur in science-based risk policy-making. In light of this, the BSE crisis cannot be 
limited to the unique experience of the UK. In the second section, the brief story of 
the BSE crisis in the UK and the implications will be explored mainly based on 
secondary sources. Understanding the various factors which framed the entire 
policy-making process and the interaction between science and politics will provide 
clues, using which we can analyse the Korean case. 
 
3.2 BSE and vCJD 
This section will summarise the scientific knowledge of BSE and vCJD, the 
current conditions of the diseases, and the remaining uncertainty raised during the 
Korean controversy.  
 
3.2.1 BSE 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is also known by its popular name 
‘mad cow disease.’ The recurring image of BSE sees a cow stumbling through the 
mud, unable to stand, swaying to and fro, and eventually falling to the ground. The 
main biomedical character of BSE is ‘multifocal spongy transformation of brain 
parancyma and a degeneration of neurons in the brain stem.’113 BSE is on of many 
TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies); a category which includes 
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progressive degenerative diseases of the nervous system, which occur in humans and 
other animals. In addition to BSE, Scrapie in sheep and goats, Chronic Wasting 
Disease (CWD) in wild deer in North America, and Transmissible Mink 
Encephalopathy (TME) are also known as non-human TSEs. In addition, 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), Gerstmann-Sträussler Syndrome (GSS), Kuru and 
Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI) are the TSEs found in humans. Particularly, Scrapie, 
which was an old and common disease in UK sheep with symptoms similar to those 
of BSE, was assumed as the source of BSE when BSE was first identified.  
TSEs are invariably fatal brain diseases. There are no known methods to prevent 
or cure these diseases, and they also have a long incubation period. The agent of 
TSEs is resistant to general sterilisation methods such as heat, chemical treatment, or 
radiation; and as the agent does not provoke an immune response in the host, there is 
no proven test to detect the disease in live animals. As these characters of the TSE 
agent cannot be found in other pathogens such as viruses or bacteria, a number of 
hypotheses to identify the agent have been raised. For example, Dickinson argued 
that TSE agent was “a piece of nucleic acid coated with host protein” (virino), which 
could avoid immune response.
114
 On the other hand, Prusiner argued in favour of a 
‘prion protein theory’ in which the prion protein, a component of normal cells, 
changes into a pathogenic abnormal prion protein for some reason, thus resulting in 
TSEs.
115
 However, the prion theory construed as a ‘protein only theory’ brought 
with it controversy, due to the fact that it contradicted the ‘central dogma’ of 
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molecular biology that genetic information can only be transferred from nucleic acid 
to nucleic acid or protein. Nevertheless, Prusiner was awarded the Nobel prize in 
1996 and the prion hypothesis is central to scientific understanding of BSE and other 
TSEs. However, many unexplained aspects still exist, and some researchers still 
argue that the TSE agent is a virus rather than a prion, and that the prion protein is 
merely a receptor for TSE viruses.
116
  
With regard to BSE, Meat Bone Meal (MBM), recycled animal waste for animal 
feed, is known to act as a vector of the pathogen. Animal waste from carcasses has 
been incorporated into animal feed as a convenient and cheap source of nutrition, 
whilst the use of MBM in ruminant feed has become common practice to increase 
food production since the Second World War.
117
 Indeed, the BSE agent spread 
through ‘cattle-to-cattle recycling’ of MBM prior to the animal protein feed ban for 
ruminant feed.
 
As the epidemic did not occur until the 1980s, increases in scrapie-
infected sheep waste in MBM or changes in the rendering process in the 1970s 
(decline in processing time and temperature, and the use of solvent) were suspected 
as the cause of the epidemic.
118
 With this said however, the Phillips report found 
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that “any rendering systems and solvent extraction could or cannot destroy 
completely the scrapie or BSE agents, and therefore, neither the change in rendering 
systems nor the declined use of solvent was the origin of the BSE epidemic, or an 
increase in infectivity of animal feed.”119 the origins of BSE prion and how it was 
introduced into ruminant feed remain unknown despite a number of hypotheses.
120
  
The incubation period of BSE is 4 to 6 years and most incidences of clinical 
disease occur in cattle with an average age of 60 months.
121
 Research on sheep or 
mice experimentally infected with scrapie suggested that the cattle brain would be 
infected at approximately 30 months of age, if calves were exposed to the BSE 
pathogen in the first few months of life.
122
 The BSE incidence in cattle under 30 
months of age is approximately 0.05%.
123
  
The transmissibility of BSE to humans was the most controversial issue during the 
whole period of the BSE controversy in the UK. The UK government initially 
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thought of BSE as a cattle form of scrapie which had never been transmitted to 
humans, and disavowed transmissibility of BSE from cattle to humans. Moreover, an 
agent was not likely to cause infection and disease in different species due to the 
species barrier. However, the BSE agent was experimentally transmitted to a wide 
range of species including cats, pigs, and finally (non-experimentally) to humans, 
thus resulting in vCJD, which will be discussed below. 
 
3.2.2 vCJD 
The human form of BSE is called variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD). 
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD) is the most well-known TSE disease in humans, 
and was identified in the 1920s. Most cases (approximately 85%) are classed as 
sporadic CJD (sCJD) which occurs normally in the middle-aged and elderly people 
(median age is 64-67) with an incidence of 1 case per million population per year 
world-wide.124 In addition, familial forms of CJD (fCJD) from gene mutation and 
iatrogenic CJD (iCJD) from infection through contaminated surgical equipment, 
injection of pituitary glands or the implantation of dura mater taken from CJD-
infected cadavers exist.
125  
Whilst the initial official stance of the UK government was that BSE would not be 
transmitted to humans, UK government experts did note that if BSE were to be 
transmitted to humans it would be likely to resemble CJD. The new type of CJD 
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cases began to be reported in the UK in the 1990s. The patients were much younger 
than sCJD patients (median age, 29 years) and the duration of the illness was much 
longer. In March 1996, the UK government admitted the causal link between this 
new type of CJD (‘new variant CJD’, nvCJD afterwards vCJD) and BSE. vCJD was 
believed to occur via consumption of cattle products contaminated with the BSE 
agent.  
 
3.2.3 Current conditions  
Decline in BSE and vCJD incidence 
The BSE epidemic peaked with more than 37,000 new cases in 1992 whilst a total 
of 190,000 BSE cases in 25 countries (including 180,000 in the UK) were reported 
until 2008.
126
 Indeed, a total of 18 European countries reported their indigenous 
cases after the first cases outside the UK in 1989, and three countries outside Europe 
(Canada, Japan, and Israel) reported their first indigenous BSE cases in 2001-
2003.
127
 The incidence of BSE has declined drastically with the implementation of 
regulatory measures, and only 29 new cases were reported worldwide in 2011 
(Figure2).
128
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Figure 2 Comparison of the BSE epidemic in UK and the rest of the world (ROW).
129
 
 
vCJD cases have been reported by 12 countries since 1996, with most of these 
identified in the UK. As of July 2012, variant CJD cases have been reported by the 
following countries: 176 from the United Kingdom; 27 from France; 5 from Spain; 4 
from Ireland; 3 each from the US and the Netherlands; 2 each in Portugal, Italy and 
Canada; and one each from Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.
130
 Two of the three US 
cases, two of the four cases from Ireland, one of the 25 French cases, and the single 
cases from Canada, Japan, and Taiwan were likely to have been exposed to the BSE 
agent while residing in the UK.
 
vCJD in the UK peaked with 29 incidences in 1999, 
but declined thereafter (see Table 3). 
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Table 3 Annual cases by onset, notification, diagnosis and death in the UK
131
 
(Year Onset  Notification  Diagnosis  Death  Median 
age  
at death  
1994 8  0 0 0 -  
1995 10  8 7 3 -  
1996 11  9 8 10 30  
1997 14  13 12 10 26  
1998 17  20 17 18 25.5  
1999 29  16 17 15 29  
2000 24  29 27 28 25.5  
2001 17  21 25 20 28  
2002 14  15 16 17 29  
2003 5  16 16  18* 28  
2004 9  6 8 9 26  
2005 6  7 6 5 34  
2006 3  5 6  5* 30  
2007 2  1 1  5* 24  
2008 3 2 1 2   
2009 3 4 3 3 26  
2010 1 2 4 3   
2011 0 2 2 5  
Total 176  176  176  176  28  
 
*Three cases have arisen to date with the people having had a blood transfusion from 
earlier cases. These cases, all male, died (were diagnosed) in 2003 (2003), 2006 (2006) and 
2007 (2006). These cases are included in the analyses although are likely to be part of the 
secondary spread. 
 
Remaining uncertainty  
Although the incidence of BSE and vCJD has decreased as a result of the 
surveillance and controlling measures, estimates regarding the future of the disease 
remains uncertain. The main uncertainties relevant to the Korean BSE controversy 
are considered below. 
Atypical BSE: Atypical BSE cases, which are slightly different from the classical 
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BSE, have been identified with the help of the development of test methods and 
active surveillance (testing of healthy animals).
132
 Most atypical cases were detected 
from old animals (e.g. 8 to 18 years in France, and 11 and 15 years in Italy), 
although a few cases were detected in young animal of approximately 20 months.
133
 
The origin of atypical BSE is not known and some hypothetical theories are 
discussed within the scientific community (e.g. a form of BSE in older animals; 
different strain of prion disease in cattle; spontaneous disease of cattle like sporadic 
CJD in humans; and a natural process of ageing of cows).
134
 Regarding the risks of 
atypical BSE to humans, there is no evidence that atypical BSE transmits from 
animals to human naturally, nor is it known whether it will pose greater or lower 
risks to humans than BSE. For the moment, like BSE, atypical BSE is assumed to be 
prevented by the present animal feed control measures which ban Meat Bone Meal 
in cattle feed.
135
  
vCJD susceptibility and human genotype: With regard to vCJD, there has been a 
concern that a second wave of the epidemic might occur. PRNP (Prion Protein gene) 
at codon 129, which is thought to play an important role in susceptibility to CJD, has 
three genotypes: methionine/methionine (M/M), methionine/valine (M/V) and 
valine/valine (V/V). All vCJD patients in the UK were reported as belonging to the 
M/M type genetic subgroup which constitutes 36.79% of the UK population.
136
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However, the first M/V type vCJD case by transfused blood was reported in 2004 
and V/V type at Codon 129 was shown in the 2001-2004 study of the prevalence of 
prion protein in surgically removed tonsils and appendices.
137
 The M/V type and 
V/V type cases raise concerns about the potential explosion of vCJD in M/V and 
V/V genotype subgroups which may have a longer incubation period than the MM 
type.
138
  
Links between sCJD and vCJD: sCJD is believed to have existed before the BSE 
epidemic and to have developed spontaneously. The recent increase of sCJD cases 
has been attributed to better diagnosis. However, there are claims that it may be 
linked to the BSE epidemic. In Switzerland and the UK, sCJD incidence increased 
significantly in the same period during which the BSE epidemic was at its height.
139
 
Moreover, in an experiment which involved injecting BSE agent into the brains of 
mice, some of the mice developed a molecular type of sCJD.
140
 The team leader of 
the experiment argued that this evidence suggested that some sCJD cases might have 
arisen from exposure to the BSE pathogen.  
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Now, whilst it is clear that BSE is controlled effectively, there remain uncertainties 
surrounding the disease, meaning that the possibility of a new epidemic of vCJD 
cannot be excluded.  
 
3.3 BSE crisis in the UK in the 1980-1990s 
When BSE first emerged in British cattle in the 1980s, no one could have 
imagined its impact. The BSE crisis in the UK had a significant influence on the 
relationship between science and policy-making as well as on meat consumption and 
agricultural practices in the UK and EU. In this section, the brief story of the BSE 
crisis in the UK will be set out chronologically and the implications provided, 
mainly based on secondary sources.  
 
3.3.1 The policy context 
Traditionally, the farming industry has been supported by the UK government.
141
 
The volatile and unstable characteristics of the agricultural market justified the 
intervention of the government.
142
 Since the Second World War, the UK government 
had sought to increase food production in order to reduce reliance on imported food 
and foster rural economies, while depression after the World War and joining the EC 
market fortified the interventionist regime.
143
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The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was established by the 
merger of the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agriculture in 1955. It had two 
missions: promotion of agriculture and food industry, and regulation of food safety. 
However, MAFF considered its primary role to be promotion of the agricultural 
industry rather than regulation. The agricultural policy division and its goal, 
promotion of the UK farming, were dominant within MAFF. For example, Gillian 
Shephard (1993), the Secretary of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
emphasised that the usefulness of MAFF was crucially the support of industries.
144
 
To promote farming, MAFF maintained a close relationship with farmers’ 
associations and the food industries. The National Farmers Union (NFU) was given 
privileged access to the policy process by the Agricultural Act (1945), and the 
government provided farmers with guaranteed returns, funds for research and 
development, and grants to encourage investment in production systems.
145
 In 
reference to the typical concept of agricultural ministries, Phillip James (2003) stated:  
“Their primary objective was to sustain and nurture these poor farmers whose 
livelihood was desperate and on whom the nation depended.”146 The powerful 
sponsorship of MAFF was the main feature of the British agriculture policy.  
Contrary to the centralised authority of MAFF in the agricultural policy area, 
many functions of food regulation were split between MAFF, the Department of 
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Health (DOH) and local authorities. For example, MAFF handled the production and 
provision of milk, as well as meat and meat hygiene in slaughterhouses; local 
authorities were responsible for the monitoring of hygiene as well as the regulation 
of meat cutting and indeed the processing plant itself. DOH did not have authority 
over hygiene related to agriculture.  
With respect to regulation associated with the food issue, public administrators 
depended on the opinions from industries and their ‘self-regulation.’147 This pattern 
has been explained as part of the tradition of economic liberalism which discouraged 
the government’s intervention in economic affairs.148 With this said however, the 
government was willing to intervene to support the producers. Consequently, the 
government’s agriculture and food policy was often appraised as unduly driven by 
producers’ interests rather than consumers’ interests.149 The power of producers was 
highlighted when the egg industry forced a junior Health Minister, Edwina Currie, to 
resign in December 1988.
150
 She resigned after only two years in her post, following 
which she stated “most of the egg production in this country, sadly, is now affected 
with salmonella.”151 Indeed, the period following her statement saw egg sales 
plummet, thus sparking outrage amongst farmers and egg producers. She resigned 
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because the food industry threatened the government, stating that it would take legal 
action to recoup its losses. 
This relationship between the MAFF and the agricultural and food industry was 
intensified under the Thatcher government.
152
 Under the Thatcher administration, 
deregulation was a principal policy goal of all governmental ministries in order to 
reduce the burden of regulatory requirements on industry and commerce and to 
encourage the creation of firms and jobs.
153
 The ‘customary role of a ministry’, 
namely that the government should promote and protect its client industry, was 
highlighted and as a result, the laissez faire approach took priority over consumer 
protection. This involved encouraging competition instead of imposing regulations. 
Under this political atmosphere, de-regulation became a top priority for MAFF 
Ministers, and specifically, food safety was recognised as an area which needed 
deregulation.
154
 
 
3.3.2 Identification of new disease and epidemiology  
From the end of 1984, several cows were struck down with similar changes in 
character and behaviour, and it was in September 1985 that the first brain from one 
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such cow reached the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL).
155
 Spongy-like changes 
in the cattle brain were identified, although it was concluded that this probably 
resulted from toxicity.
156
 It was at the end of 1986 that pathologists of CVL 
identified the possibility that cattle had developed a spongiform encephalopathy 
which was transmissible in the same way as scrapie in sheep.  
In order to know more about the nature of the new disease, it was crucial to 
encourage identification and reporting of the new disease by informing private 
practices and the veterinary community. However, dissemination of information 
about the new disease was suppressed even within MAFF until the first half of 1987. 
There were two reasons for this. The first related to anxieties within MAFF that 
premature claims regarding the discovery of a new disease without sufficient 
scientific evidence would damage the reputation of the CVL and MAFF.
157
 The 
second, and more important, reason was the concern about the possible negative 
effect on exports and trade of cattle, meat and meat products. Beef and dairy farming 
was the UK’s largest agriculture sector in the mid 1980s. In 1986, cattle population 
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was 12.5 million at 122,900 farm holdings, which consisted of almost half of the 
whole number of UK farms. The output of milk, and fattened cattle and calves were 
worth of £5,134 million (at 1990 prices), which constituted 60% of the total value of 
livestock products in the UK and 37.5% of the UK's total agricultural output.
158
 The 
Head of the Pathology Department at CVL, Raymond Bradley, said in his minute to 
his colleagues: 
If the disease turned out to be bovine scrapie it would have severe 
repercussions to the export trade and possibly also for humans if for 
example it was discovered that humans with spongiform encephalopathies 
had close association with the cattle. It is for these reasons I have classified 
this document confidential.
159
  
 
As the results began to raise concern within the MAFF, it was in June 1987 that 
details regarding BSE were eventually published through a circular letter which was 
sent to Senior Veterinary Investigation Officers of England and Wales. It directed 
that the staff not consult research institutes or universities, nor publish or discuss 
anything about BSE without clearance.
160
 It was not until December 1987 that 
MAFF announced the existence of the new disease through the Journal of the British 
Veterinary Association.  
When the first BSE case was identified, CVL scientists discovered the sponge-like 
microscopic holes and fibrils in the dead cow’s brain, which were similar to scrapie-
associated fibrils. Scrapie was not known to be transmitted to humans by 
consumption of contaminated meat due to the species barrier. The British 
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government started to investigate the wider implications for British cattle in June 
1987. John Wilesmith, the Head of the Epidemiology Department at CVL, 
conjectured that exposure of the cattle population to the BSE agent had begun in 
1981-82 and concluded that the source of infection was scrapie-infected MBM. His 
hypotheses were: 1) an increase in the sheep population in the UK led to greater 
inclusion of scrapie-contaminated materials in the rendering process and an increase 
in scrapie-contaminated MBM in cattle feed; and 2) the changes in rendering 
processes (low temperature and less use of solvents) resulted in failure to inactivate 
the scrapie agent in MBM. The fact that few cases of BSE were reported in the 
border county of northern England and in Scotland where the solvent extraction 
process was not abandoned was to be significant.
161
 The view of Wilesmith was not 
challenged during the whole controversy and was used to give the public a false 
assurance that it was unlikely that BSE was transmissible to humans in a manner 
similar to scrapie was. 
 
3.3.3 Southwood Working Party   
In February 1988, MAFF officials recommended to their minister the introduction 
of slaughter and compensation of infected cattle to control the disease. However, the 
agriculture minister of MAFF and the Treasury refused to follow the 
recommendation because of concerns about the expense of the government and the 
lack of positive scientific evidence. MAFF officials asked the Chief Medical Officer 
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(CMO) of the DOH for advice about the implications of BSE for human health.
162
 
CMO and MAFF officials noted the necessity to appraise risk in order to persuade 
the Treasury and ministers about the cost of control measures and agreed to refer the 
issue to an independent expert committee. 
163
  
The Southwood Working Party (1988-1989) was composed of eminent senior 
scientists. The advisory members, including Richard Southwood, a Professor of 
Zoology at the University of Oxford and the Chairman of the National Radiological 
Protection Board, who was nominated as the chairman, were scientists of the highest 
standing in their field with previous service records on numerous government 
committees. However, they were not experts in TSE research.
164
 According to the 
BSE Inquiry report, Southwood wanted experts who could take a broader view rather 
than being experts in the TSE field, because he was aware that the nature of the TSE 
agent was a controversial issue among the experts. Excluding acting researchers was 
a measure taken to avoid conflict within the advisory group.
165
 In addition to 
external experts, John Wilesmith, epidemiologist of CVL, joined the Working Party 
as an adviser. Wilesmith was called “the only expert adviser” who “could not be a 
proper member of the committee, as his independence would have been questioned 
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by others.”166 As the ‘Southwood Working Party’ had neither staff nor a budget (like 
most advisory committees in the UK) its activities were therefore dependent on its 
secretariat and officials from MAFF and the DOH.
167
 They arranged issues to be 
addressed by the committee members, supplied data and evidence, and drafted the 
final report of the committee. 
The role of the Working Party was not limited to purely addressing scientific 
evidence about BSE, and it was also asked to make policy recommendations. After 
its first meeting on 20 June 1988, the Southwood Working Party recommended the 
destruction of the carcasses of clinically affected animals to ensure that BSE infected 
animals would not transmit the disease to humans or other animals. The slaughter 
and compensation policy was proposed by MAFF officials in 1987, but John 
MacGregor, the Minister of MAFF, was reluctant to introduce a compulsory 
slaughter and compensation scheme. He was anxious that the compensation scheme 
would set a precedent in terms of the government’s expenditure on other animal and 
plant disease cases, which was not consistent with the Thatcherite austerity policy 
regime.
168
 The Permanent Secretary of MAFF did not want the Working Party to 
recommend slaughter and told Southwood: “Any recommendations would not lead 
to an increase in public expenditure.” 169  Nevertheless, the Working Party 
recommended that clinically infected animals should be slaughtered and destroyed. 
The recommendation was made by the guidance of the CMO and MAFF officials 
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who proposed, despite the opposition of their minister and the Treasury, the removal 
of affected animals from the human food chain.
170
 MAFF ministers reluctantly 
accepted the recommendation of the Working Party and announced a 50% 
compensation scheme which provided BSE-infected animals with 50% of the 
market-value of healthy animals. The order for the compulsory slaughter and 
destruction of cattle suffering from BSE was announced on 7
th
 July 1988.  
The 50% compensation scheme for slaughtering infected animals was criticised as 
“Whitehall penny-pinching”, and there was a concern that farmers would send 
suspected animals to the slaughterhouse earlier rather than notifying the outbreak of 
disease in order to avoid losing their value.
171
 Indeed, BSE-infected cattle were 
discovered in livestock markets in several counties. Moreover, the successful 
experimental transmission of BSE to mice by inoculating contaminated food 
suggested that eating infected cattle brains could transmit BSE to other species. The 
government finally announced a full compensation scheme for infected animals. 
Although the MAFF never conceded that some farmers sent their affected cattle to 
market, the reported cases of BSE increased by 69% after the full compensation 
scheme was introduced.
172
 
In addition to the slaughter policy, the MAFF banned the use of ruminant animal 
protein for ruminant animal feed in 1988. The aim of the ban was to reduce animal 
health risk by withdrawing contaminated MBM from animal feed.
 
MBM was fed to 
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pigs and poultry as well as cattle, although the MAFF only banned the use of MBM 
for cattle feed due to the concern that the rendering industry would lose its market.
173
 
Although the Southwood Working Party noted the risk of pigs and poultry feed and 
attempted to recommend extending the ruminant feed ban to pigs and poultry, the 
MAFF did not want the Working Party to recommend it.
174
 Recognising the concern 
of the MAFF, the Working Party did not recommend extending the ruminant feed 
ban to pigs and poultry. However, MAFF officials treated the Working Party's non-
recommendation as scientifically validated grounds not to extend the ruminant feed 
ban to pigs and poultry feed.  
The report of the Southwood Working Party, which was published after the end of 
the Working Party’s term, provided the main scientific grounding for policy 
recommendations to the successive expert committees and officials. In particular, the 
general conclusions of the report were cited as reassuring evidence of the remoteness 
of BSE risk to humans: “From present evidence, it is likely that cattle will prove to 
be a 'dead-end host' for the disease agent and most unlikely that BSE will have any 
implications for human health.”175 However, as previously seen, recommendations 
of the Working Party were restrained by the political considerations of MAFF 
officials, whilst policy advice which might not be welcome by the government was 
evaded by experts. `To take another example, the draft of the report’s ‘general 
conclusion’ by Richard Southwood, which identified the practice of feeding animal 
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materials to herbivores as the cause of BSE, was censored by MAFF officials who 
were concerned about the serious economic implications for the associated 
industry.
176
 The paragraph was altered in the final version of the report, with a less 
precautionary tone.
177
 Further, MAFF officials were involved more directly in 
writing the report. A chapter on 'the cause of BSE: the epidemiological evidence' of 
the report was written by John Wilesmith, an epidemiologist of the CVL, based on 
his epidemiological study. With hindsight, the chapter written by Wilesmith gave a 
false assurance that it was unlikely that BSE was transmissible to humans as scrapie 
was. However, the Working Party was neither requested to conduct a critical review 
of his conclusions nor was it provided data for review as some of the data were 
confidential.
178
 Whilst the content of the Southwood report was represented as a 
firm and conclusive judgment based on objective and purely scientific assessment by 
successive advisory committees and government officials, it was not deserving of 
this description. 
 
                                                 
176
 Matthias Beck, Darinka Asenova and Gordon Dickson, “Public Administration, Science, and Risk 
Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis”, Public 
Administration Review 65, 4 (2005): 396–408.; Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE.  
177
 The paragraph Southwood drafted first was:  
This problem [BSE] has arisen as a result of the practice of feeding animal materials to 
herbivores … we believe the inevitable risks are such that it would be prudent to change 
agricultural practice so as to eliminate these novel pathways for pathogens.  
However, the final version was:  
This problem [BSE] has arisen as a result of the practice of feeding ruminant materials to 
herbivores …. We believe that the risks from inadequately sterilized animal products are such 
that this method of disposing animal waste should be changed so as to eliminate these novel 
pathways for pathogens.   
Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE. p. 127  
178
 Phillips, Bridgeman and Ferguson-Smith, The BSE Inquiry., vol. 1 and vol. 3 
 80 
3.3.4 Next expert advisory committees and regulatory 
measures 
Consultative Committee on Research (Tyrrell Committee) and Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC)  
The Consultative Committee on Research (Tyrrell Committee, 1989-1990) was set 
up on the recommendation of the Southwood Working Party. Its role was to provide 
advice about TSE research in progress and future priorities for research. David 
Tyrrell, Director of the Medical Research Council Common Cold Unit and a 
distinguished virologist, was chosen as the chairman. Other members nominated by 
MAFF and DOH included: William Watson, the director of CVL, John Bourne, the 
director of the Institute for Animal Health, Richard Kimberlin who had recently 
retired from the directorship of the Neuropathogenisis Unit (NPU) in Edinburgh and 
was then independent TSE consultant, and Robert Will, a clinical neurologist and 
expert in CJD. In addition, Katherine Levy also joined as a Medical Research 
Council observer, while Hilary Pickles of DOH and John Maslin of MAFF formed 
the secretariat.
179
 Much like the Southwood Working Party, none of the members 
were actively engaged in scientific research on TSEs.
180
 The Tyrrell Committee 
considered the research programmes which were in progress and were proposed by 
CVL and NPU, and considered the research areas identified in the Southwood 
Report.
181
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The interim report of the Tyrrell Committee in June 1989 suggested a continuous 
peer review and project coordination system to minimise duplication of research on 
Spongiform Encephalopathies. Accordingly, the MAFF and DOH decided to 
establish a successor to the Tyrell Committee in late 1989. The role of the new 
committee was to carry out research oversight, to respond to specific questions from 
the government, and to provide policy advice.
182
 The setting up of the Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC, 1990- present) was announced on 3 
April 1990. Including Tyrrell, the chairman, most inaugural members of SEAC had 
also been members of the Tyrell Committee. The members included: Will, Director 
of the CJD Surveillance Unit, Watson, Director of the CVL 1986-90, and Kimberlin, 
independent TSE consultant since 1988. In addition, Fred Brown, a virologist, 
former member of the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) Committee on Scrapie 
1977-87, and former Scientific Deputy Director of the Animal Virus Research 
Institute (Pirbright) was later added.
183
 The initial membership was skewed towards 
veterinary backgrounds over human health and the expertise of the members was 
challenged by Dealler.  
… the small group of people in SEAC included only a few who understood 
the subject fully (and even they were known to believe that BSE was a 
minor risk). For example, one of the members was a vet, another an expert 
in foot and mouth disease, another a histologist, another a retired manager 
of a veterinary research laboratory. Even the chairman had been an expert 
on the common cold. Yet the government was making it clear to the press 
that these were the national experts on the subject of BSE and that they 
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were taking their advice from them.
184
 
 
The membership of SEAC was strengthened by reinforcing clinical membership and 
scientists who were actively involved in TSEs research when John Pattison was 
appointed as the new chairman in November 1995.
185
  
 
Risk to non-ruminant animals   
In early May 1990, the first feline equivalent of BSE case was diagnosed in a 
domestic cat. It was the first non-ruminant case infected naturally. Pet food 
containing contaminated sheep meat was accused of being the transmission route. As 
experimental attempts to transmit scrapie to cats had not been successful, the death 
of the cat indicated that BSE might be more virulent than scrapie. At that point, the 
use of sheep protein had been banned in cattle feed but not in pigs, poultry or pet 
food. This upset meat manufacturers, and UKASTA (the United Kingdom 
Agricultural Supply Trade Association) member producers and pet food 
manufacturers stopped using offal in their products voluntarily. The anxiety that BSE 
could spread from species to species was fuelled and the demands for tighter controls 
on animal food increased. Despite the pressures to ban offal in all animal feed, 
MAFF refused to extend the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban to non-ruminant animals, 
claiming that pigs and poultry were not susceptible to Transmittable Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (TSEs). The MAFF finally imposed an immediate ban on cattle 
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offal used in all animal food in September 1990, announcing the successful 
experimental infection of a pig with BSE through the injection of infected tissue into 
the pig’s brain.  
 
The Specified Bovine Offal ban  
The Southwood Working Party did not make policy recommendations with regard 
to the sub-clinically infected cattle which despite being infected, were not yet 
showing signs of BSE. The expert members were concerned about the risk posed in 
brain and lymphatic tissue, but decided not to recommend the ban on the use of the 
tissue in human food. It was because they thought the recommendation would not be 
agreed by MAFF due to the cost and practicability.
186
 Instead, the Working Party 
recommended a ban on the use of ruminant offal for baby food. However, the baby 
food ban raised concern about other food which was exposed to the risks born in 
potentially infective tissues from subclinical cattle, and provoked claims that cattle 
brains and nerve tissues should be removed from the human food chain.
187
  
MAFF officials claimed that the baby food ban was a purely precautionary 
measure and that there was no scientific justification to extend the beef offal ban to 
all human food.
188
 There was concern that any tightening of policy might undermine 
the credibility of the antecedent policy claims, not least that ‘there is no implication 
of risk from BSE to human.’ In fact, as noted above, the recommendation of the offal 
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ban was excluded from the Southwood Working Party’s report, because the MAFF 
did not want it. Nevertheless, officials treated the Southwood Working Party's 
conclusion as scientifically validated grounds not to extend the offal ban for baby 
food to other human food. 
The pet food industry banned offal in their products voluntarily, and bacon and 
meat manufacturers stopped using bovine brain, spinal cord, pancreas, thymus, 
spleen and intestine. Experts who were independent of the government and industry 
claimed that offal which was used for sausages, pasties, pates and pies, should be 
banned from all food chains. For example, a neuropathologist, Helen Grant, said in 
an interview “You and I might be incubating the disease already”, arguing that 
infected animals were continuing to enter the food chain.
189
 The MAFF, which was 
under pressure from the industry and the public, finally announced the ban on the use 
of brain, spinal cord, and spleen from cattle aged over six months for human 
consumption in June 1989 (Specified Bovine Offal Ban, hereafter SBO ban).
190
 The 
rhetoric of the MAFF was that a SBO ban was the easiest way to implement 
Southwood's advice to manufacturers of baby food not to use bovine offal and 
thymus. The offal ban was later re-adjusted, and intestines and whole heads, except 
for cheek meat and tongue, were banned. 
Another concern associated with the offal ban was Mechanically Recovered Meat 
(MRM) which was used for processed meat products such as sausages, burgers and 
pies.
191
 MRM was derived mainly from the vertebral column which was likely to be 
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contaminated by the spinal cord. It was not practical to remove the spinal cord 
perfectly from the central nerve system. MAFF officials noted that inevitable 
contamination would result from small pieces of spinal cord inadvertently remaining 
in the vertebral column. John Gummer, the senior MAFF Minister, referred this issue 
to SEAC. However, SEAC members did not have expertise in the technical aspects 
of slaughterhouse practices and were unaware of the concerns regarding the removal 
of spinal cords and the safety of MRM. Relying on the information provided by the 
MAFF, the SEAC drew the following conclusion: “So long as the rules were 
properly observed and proper supervision was maintained, there was no need to 
recommend further measures on grounds of food safety.”192 The MAFF treated this 
conclusion by the SEAC as reassurance that there was no need for further 
consideration of MRM; a stance which lasted until 1995.  
As previously mentioned, the SBO ban was presented by the MAFF only as a 
precautionary step in public announcements rather than necessary regulatory 
measures against a serious threat to public health. The MAFF argued that the SBO 
ban was not based on scientific evidence. Messages from the government to industry 
conflicted with each other: ‘offal to be removed due to risk’ and ‘no risk in beef.’ 
Moreover, although removal of the brain and spinal cord from carcasses required 
significant change in abattoir processes, no guidance was provided and the industry 
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was presumed to be able to implement the regulation properly.
193
 Inspections to 
enforce the implementation of the regulation were rarely carried out between 1990 
and 1995 whilst no practical changes occurred in abattoir processes. It was in 1995 
that SEAC was informed of the failure to remove offal from carcasses. SEAC 
suggested, as a precaution, to suspend the use of vertebrae from cattle aged over six 
months when producing MRM, until it was clear that the removal of spinal cords 
was being undertaken properly in all cases.
194
 Despite resistance from the industry, a 
ban on the use of bovine vertebral columns for the production of MRM came into 
force in December 1995. 
 
3.3.5 Concerns about human risk  
Concerns regarding the transmissibility of BSE to humans always existed since 
the very initial period of the BSE controversy. When BSE was declared as a 
notifiable disease for the control of the epidemic in 1988, the Guardian referred to 
Dr. Tim Holt’s article in the British Medical Journal which claimed that BSE-
infected meat could cause CJD in humans and that the sale of cattle brains for human 
consumption should be banned.
195
 The MAFF argued that there was no proof that 
eating BSE could cause CJD. In early May 1990, the death of a cat with the feline 
equivalent BSE symptoms reinforced the concern that BSE had jumped the species 
barrier and might be transmissible to humans. Local authorities introduced a full or 
partial ban on beef products in their school meals, despite the government’s safety 
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claims. Gummer, the MAFF Minister, fed his daughter Cordelia a beef burger in 
front of the media, but his actions, which were intended to reassure the public, were 
derided and did not convince the public about the safety of beef. The Sunday Times 
reported that a quarter of British households had stopped eating the traditional lunch 
of roast beef due to fears about mad cow disease.
196
 As many people had stopped 
eating beef already or were considering stopping or cutting down on eating beef, 
cattle and beef sales dropped, thus leading to increases in economic loss and layoffs 
in the meat industry. 
In September 1990, the successful experimental infection of a pig with BSE by 
injecting infected tissue into the brain was announced; and in the December, an 
infant antelope in London zoo, which was born from a BSE-infected mother, was 
confirmed to have died from the brain disease. Helen Grant argued in favour of 
stopping the use of even the offal of calves under 6 months in meat products.
197
 In 
April 1991, the assistant CVO, Kevin Taylor stated that BSE might have a different 
host range from scrapie. As the ‘safe beef’ reassurance of the government was based 
on the theory that BSE came from scrapie-infected sheep which could be eaten by 
humans without any infection, this claim was sufficient to raise doubts regarding the 
safety of beef. However, he asserted that any human health risk had ended with the 
ban on cattle brains and offal in November 1989.
198
 Nevertheless, anxiety about 
transmission of BSE to humans was high, as evidenced by the BBC thriller ‘Natural 
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Lies’ aired in May 1992, which supported the notion that humans could be infected 
with BSE. The MAFF criticised it for prompting needless public anxiety.
199
  
The number of BSE cases was still failing to decrease. Indeed, 1,000 new cases 
were reported per week in 1993 whilst more than 100,000 cases were confirmed 
cumulatively by the same year.
 
This total was much larger than the Southwood 
Committee’s prediction of 17,000-20,000. In March and August 1993, the deaths of 
two dairy farmers who died from CJD after their cattle had been struck by BSE came 
to light.
200
 This again raised fears that BSE might have crossed the species barrier 
from cow to human. From late 1993, CJD-suspected cases in young people were 
reported to the CJD Surveillance Unit. The Southwood Working Party had noted that 
if BSE were to be transmitted to humans it would likely resemble CJD. The story of 
16-year-old CJD patient Victoria Rimmer, which was screened on TV in January 
1994, provided another example of the possible link between BSE and CJD.
201 
CJD 
was rare among young people and she had never been treated with any growth 
hormone taken from the human donors with CJD, which was the cause of previous 
CJD cases in young people. Her mother claimed that her daughter had contracted 
CJD by eating contaminated meat, but the Department of Health denied a link 
between BSE and CJD. The CMO, Kenneth Calman blamed the TV program for 
broadcasting ‘irresponsible scare stories.’ The government was accused of hiding the 
truth and was criticised for not releasing information on the ages of people who died 
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from CJD, as newspapers reported that the families of CJD patients were told not to 
go public on the disease by doctors.
202
 The Guardian said: “If they are young, that 
would be a strong indication that the disease is the human form of BSE.”203 
According to a government report revealed in October, twice as many people had 
died from CJD in 1994 as in 1985. In November 1994, Professor Lacey, at Leeds 
University, published a book entitled Mad cow disease: the history of BSE in Britain. 
In it, he claimed that BSE might be dormant in tens of thousands of people and could 
explode from the year 2010. He had argued that all cattle from infected herds, an 
estimated 6 million out of a national herd of 16 million, should be slaughtered, and 
people under the age of 50 should stop eating beef.
204
 However, his claim was 
regarded as an alarmist and sensational action by the government.
205
  
Moreover, it was revealed that the safeguards for protecting carcasses from 
contamination were not observed in slaughterhouses and brain and offal entered the 
food chain continuously. An official veterinary surgeon at a slaughterhouse argued 
that brains of cattle were used repeatedly without cleaning and the certification of 
‘cow from BSE-free herds’ was signed without sufficient evidence. In addition to 
this, there was also an incident in which a cattle breeder, who had used false 
documents to claim his animals for sale were free of BSE, was fined. Approximately 
1 in 4 education authorities banned the use of beef products in school meals. In 
addition, the British public demanded the labelling of beef products and a ban on 
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brain and offal from calves under the age of six months, previously deemed to be too 
young to be carrying BSE.  
In March 1994, Germany called for a Europe-wide ban on British beef due to a 
supposed link between BSE and CJD in humans. Germany stated that it would take 
unilateral action to stop imports of British beef if the European Union did not tighten 
health controls. In case that Germany would be successful in imposing a European 
ban on British beef exports, Britain’s loss in trade was estimated to be £300 million a 
year, without including the damage to the beef industry's reputation in the home 
market. This conflict was expressed as ‘the Anglo-German battle over food hygiene’ 
or ‘agricultural warfare.’206 Germany was accused by the UK government of using 
health scares as a weapon with which to protect their herds. Though the MAFF was 
confident the European Commission would support the British case, the deal ended 
with a European Union-wide export ban on British beef from any animal which had 
been exposed to BSE within the last six years.  
In October 1995, researchers at the CJD Surveillance Unit submitted an article 
regarding the recent CJD cases in young people to the medical journal The Lancet. It 
said: “These cases appear to represent a new variant of CJD, which may be unique to 
the United Kingdom. This raises the possibility that they are causally linked to BSE. 
Although this may be the most plausible explanation for this cluster of cases, a link 
with BSE cannot be confirmed on the basis of this evidence alone.” 207  The 
government continued to deny the risk associated with eating beef. Prime minister 
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John Major told Commons in December 1995: “There is no scientific evidence that 
BSE can be transmitted to humans or that eating beef causes it in humans. I am also 
advised that beef is a safe and wholesome product.”208  
 
3.3.6 The link between vCJD and BSE and the aftermath  
On 20 March 1996, Stephen Dorrell, the health secretary, announced that the new 
strain of CJD (vCJD) found in 10 young people might have been caused by exposure 
to BSE before the 1989 offal ban. The government’s statement on the potential link 
between BSE and v CJD was to upset the continuous denial of the transmissibility of 
BSE from cow to human and the risk of eating beef. The EC introduced the 
indefinite ban on the export of all British beef and beef products to anywhere in the 
world on 25 March 1996.
209
  
Even after the announcement on March 20, the government still argued that beef 
was safe to eat. Stephen Dorrell told the Commons: “I see absolutely no reason for 
any responsible person not to buy British beef or beef products of any kind in the 
shops today.”210 However, many companies declared the bans on the use of British 
beef, ignoring the MAFF’s safety claim. For example, pub chain Bass Taverns, with 
its 200 restaurants and 2,500 pubs, announced they would use foreign beef; hotels 
and airlines such as British Airways and Virgin Atlantic removed British beef from 
their menu, whilst fast food chains McDonald's, Burger King and Wimpy, also 
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banned British beef. Up to a million people turned vegetarian and beef sales 
plummeted. Farmers demanded the removal of old animals from the human food 
chain and the slaughter of calves in infected herds, whilst supermarket chains backed 
the disposal to save collapsing meat sales. Cull and removal was regarded as the only 
way to calm fears and to restore public confidence in beef.  
Although public health concerns peaked,  there were voices of opposition.
 211
 
The Sun, a tabloid paper, argued that the BSE scare was politically motivated, and 
attacked Labour for causing public panic.
212
 Health concerns were submerged soon 
by economic hardship by the indefinite world-wide ban on British beef products 
imposed by the EC.
213
 Pages of newspapers were full of numbers detailing lost 
export revenues, the impact on GDP, and the cost to farmers.
214
 Once the crisis 
developed into a political and economic issue between Britain and the European 
Union, public health concerns were eclipsed and the beef crisis became a threat to 
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national identity as well as a threat to the national economy.
215
  
In Britain, beef has a symbolic image bound up with national identity, and 
historically English people were famous for their consumption of beef. In 
Shakespeare’s Henry VI written in 1599, the English were described as beef-eating 
people by the French. The French nickname for the English, ‘les rosbif’ also 
originated from ‘roast beef.’216 Claims about the safety of British beef continued, 
and the argument that ‘British beef is the best’ appeared more often. For example, 
Scotland’s agriculture minister argued that burgers made with British beef were safer 
than imports and suggested a boycott of the McDonald’s Big Mac which had banned 
British beef.
217
 Many articles with the title ‘Beef and Englishmen’ expressed 
concern about the damage in British life and culture as a result of the beef crisis. 
Roast beef represents the typical English national dish served as Sunday lunch, 
whilst beef is also an important ingredient in many hearty English foods such as 
puddings, sausages and pies. Moreover, beef was the symbol of patriotism. In the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, when French style cooking was vogue in England and 
England was at war with France, roast beef represented the plain and unaffected 
English taste opposing to pompous and luxurious French kitchen. Prominent writers, 
actors, and patrons organised ‘Beefsteak Club’ while ‘The old England’s roast beef 
song’, written by Henry Fielding, was a great hit and was sung on patriotic occasions 
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until the 19
th
 century.
218
  
The government shifted the blame from itself to European countries, arguing that 
the countries hid their BSE occurrence and only the UK suffered damage.
219
 A 
tabloid argued that a politically motivated scare from trivial risk was “killing an 
industry, messing about with the nation's diet and granting French and German 
farmers ecstasies of pleasure.”220 
Although the UK government succeeded in externalising blame, the confidence in 
its safety policy was damaged. The MAFF announced a cull of all cattle older than 
30 months on 3 April 1996, with an expected of up to £160 million in 1996-2001. 
This was a more stringent measure than the SEAC’s recommendation of deboning 
carcasses of cattle older than 30 months.
221
 As the summit of the EC in Florence in 
June 1996 required the UK government to implement rigorous regulation on BSE as 
a prior condition to lift the ban on the UK beef products, additional regulatory 
policies were subsequently introduced. The feed ban was extended to all mammalian 
protein for all farm animal feed in order to prevent cross-contamination through 
MBM among different species. A cattle passport system to monitor the movements 
of all cattle in Britain throughout its lifetime was also introduced. A Date-Based 
Export Scheme for cattle born after 1
st
 August 1996 and a cull of offspring of BSE-
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infected animals were proposed in 1997. Moreover, bone, dorsal root ganglia and 
lung were added to the list of offal which should be banned in 1998.  
The authority of the British political system was seriously injured. The 
Conservative party lost in the general election in 1997. The new Labour government 
tried to restore consumer confidence and trust by restructuring the food policy 
system. The responsibility for food regulation was separated from sponsorship for 
the promoting industry, thus leading to the establishment of the Food Safety Agency 
(FSA) in 1998.
222
 The FSA was established as “a non-ministerial government 
department” which was independent from the involvement of ministers.223 It took 
full responsibility for the protection of public health, and was supposed to provide 
unbiased and expertly-informed advice to the MAFF minister. 
Moreover, there was widespread condemnation of the closed scientific advisory 
process. In its editorial in April 1996, The Lancet claimed the necessity of “a 
separate, independent agency which reports to the public, not to the policy 
makers.”224 The Guidelines on Scientific Advice and Policy Making produced by the 
Office of Science and Technology (OST) in 1997 were the first response. It stated: 
“Departments should not require experts to come to firm conclusions which cannot 
be justified by the state of scientific knowledge” and it included “consumer groups 
and other stakeholder bodies” in expert sources for science-related policy-making. 
Further, the House of Lords report in 2000 recommended that “direct dialogue with 
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the public should move from being an optional add-on to science-based policy-
making and to the activities of research organisations and learned institutions, and 
should become a normal and integral part of the process.”225 Following this, new 
experiments of public engagement in scientific issues such as GM food and 
nanotechnology have been briskly carried on in the UK.  
 
3.3.7 Appraisals of the UK BSE crisis  
The BSE crisis in the UK was clearly a case of policy failure. More than 200 
people died from vCJD and hundreds of thousands of cattle were culled. The 
economic loss for the countries which experienced incidences of domestic BSE was 
huge. The lack of knowledge regarding BSE, an entirely unknown disease, provided 
the cause of the crisis. However, many studies showed that political and cultural 
factors of British society more directly contributed to exacerbating the crisis. Their 
explanations could be categorised according to their focus by the protection of the 
beef industry and the institutional and cultural character of the British policy process.  
 
Protection of the beef industry   
The UK BSE crisis was often described as a policy failure caused by the MAFF’s 
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producer-oriented policy.
226
 According to this view, consumers’ interests and public 
health were structurally ignored by the MAFF in order to protect the economic 
interests of the farming industry. As presented in the last section, the MAFF had two 
conflicting missions: the promotion of agriculture and food industry, and the 
regulation of food safety. However, the MAFF considered its primary role to be 
promotion of the agriculture industry rather than regulation. The MAFF was 
criticised for being skewed towards the interest of the livestock industry from the 
early period of the controversy, and blamed for being ‘in the pocket of the farming 
lobby’ by some of the British media. The early food safety issues (e.g. Salmonella 
outbreaks in the late 1980s, Listeria during the 1970s and 1980s, and E. coli 157 in 
1996-1997) were cited as another example of the MAFF’s unbalanced attitude 
between food industry and consumers.
227
 The producer-driven policy networks in 
the MAFF were intensified under the political atmosphere in the Thatcher 
government stressing ‘deregulation’ and the ‘customary role of a ministry.’228 Under 
this political atmosphere, the MAFF was reluctant to introduce new regulation, and 
depended on ‘self-regulation by the farming community.’229 The failings in the 
animal feed ban and the SBO ban were the cases of the so called ‘market knows best’ 
approach. Inspections, enforcement, or legal penalties to back up the ruminant feed 
ban of 1988 rarely existed until August 1996. When the SBO ban was introduced, no 
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practical guidance regarding the removal of SBO from carcasses was provided for 
the process at slaughter houses. The industry was presumed as being capable of 
implementing the regulation properly without guidance or enforcement from the 
government, although this was not the case.
230
 These criticisms on the predominance 
of farming interests in the UK government’s policy-making contributed to separating 
the authority for consumers’ interests and public health from the MAFF whilst also 
establishing the FSA. 
The MAFF was reluctant to publish information and to tighten regulations 
regarding BSE.
231
 The Philips report stated that the complacent policy of the UK 
government was shaped by the anxiety regarding ‘alarmist over-reaction’ in the beef 
market.
232
 Public awareness of the disease was prevented by the officials who were 
concerned about the irrational response of the market, and the government 
continuously reassured the public about the safety of the British beef. The MAFF 
understated the risk posed in beef and uncertainties were filtered out from the official 
message of the government. Collins and Pinch stated that: in Britain, “the official 
response to public health risks has traditionally been paternalistic reassurance. The 
government judges that the danger of panic usually outweighs any real risk to its 
citizens.”233  
However, the UK government was not alone in taking this complacent and passive 
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approach. The policy approach of the European Commission (EC) was not very 
different from that of the UK government until March 1996.
234
 Policy makers of the 
EC were concerned about the reduction in beef sales and the increase in demands for 
compensation for farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
235
 For 
example, when the death of a cat from the feline equivalent of BSE was reported in 
1990, the EC Agriculture Commissioner decided to stop the discussion about BSE in 
order to not ‘provoke unfavourable market responses.’ Until 1996 the EC resisted 
policies which would impose higher costs on the UK and European beef market, and 
the animal feed industry. The study of Bauer et al. (2006) showed that European 
governments such as those of Germany, Italy and Finland also tried to reassure the 
public by dismissing or understating the risk of BSE even after BSE became a 
problem outside of the UK.
236
 This passive attitude of the EC and the European 
countries in dealing with the BSE issue showed that considerations of the industrial 
interests over uncertain health risk could not be taken as the unique feature of the 
UK policy-making.  
 
Interactions between science and politics in policy area  
The BSE crisis gave rise to questions about the relationship between science and 
politics, as well as the role played by scientific knowledge in the policy area. During 
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the BSE crisis, policy decisions were apparently made entirely by independent and 
purely scientific bodies and based on robust scientific evidence. Policy-makers said, 
“We are just doing what our expert advisors tell us should be done.”237 
Advisory committees were (and are) an inherent part of British political culture 
with the assumption that policy decisions on scientific matters should be grounded in 
sound science.
238
 The government established expert committees for selected issues 
and recruited external experts who were eminent and considered to be independent 
of the government. The role of the expert committees was often to provide particular 
policy recommendation beyond identifying scientific evidence. To seek experts’ 
advice was a significant way in which to secure the appropriateness and the 
legitimacy of policy, especially when introducing regulations which might have a 
negative impact on business.
239
  
The UK advisory committees were criticised for their lack of transparency and 
accountability. There were no recognized principles which ruled the process of the 
advisory committees, for example, with respect to the process for the selection of the 
members or a mechanism for guaranteeing the openness and the accountability of the 
advisory bodies.
240 
Advisory members were often criticised for representing the 
industry which was the subject of the regulatory policy under discussion. Data and 
evidence examined in the committees were not disclosed to the public, and the 
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discussions were kept secret.
241
 It was often unlawful under the legislation that the 
general public, or independent analysts and scholars knew how regulatory decisions 
were made.
242
 The relationship between advisory committees and the departments 
was formed through ‘great confidentiality and informality.’243 This closed culture of 
advisory committee was highlighted as the cause of the BSE crisis in the UK in the 
1980-90s, and led to the establishment of the Food Safety Agency in 1998 by the 
Labour government.  
A study by Zwanenberg & Millstone focussed on the procedural and structural 
arrangement surrounding the scientific advisory bodies in the policy process, and 
showed how the scientific advisory process was influenced by non-scientific 
considerations in the policy process.
244
 While asymmetries of resources and 
information between the advisory scientists and civil servants existed, scientists were 
requested to provide policy recommendations as well as appreciation of scientific 
evidence. The advisory scientists were directly or indirectly pressured to make 
acceptable and ‘do-able’ policy recommendations for the ministers, whilst the 
assessment of scientific evidence was mixed with political considerations. For 
example, the recommendations of the Southwood Working Party were limited by the 
condition that any recommendations would not lead to an increase in public 
expenditure, which was imposed by the Permanent Secretary of the MAFF. The 
government’s policy decisions were represented as being made on purely scientific 
grounds, although expert advisory bodies were actually used to support policy 
                                                 
241
 Ibid. 
242
 Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE. 
243
Dressel, BSE. p.171 
244
Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE. 
 102 
preference framed by civil servants on political and commercial grounds, and they 
provided a shield behind which officials could hide. 
Some commentators have focussed more on the particularity of the British 
political culture. Jasanoff, in particular, argued that the British political culture 
assumed ‘greater trust in expertise’ which was embodied in trustworthy people.245 
The trustworthy advisory members were chosen among the ‘great and good’ people 
who had proven their standing to define the public good through their years’ 
experience of public service.
246
 She argued that since the personal integrity and civic 
virtue of individual advisory members were preferred over specified expertise or the 
rationality of their views, their knowledge claims did not need to be justified by 
formal legitimation such as a quantitative risk assessment like in the US and were 
not subjected to scrutiny.
247
 According to her, this reliance on experts did not 
change after the BSE crisis, which rocked the credibility of the political institutions. 
Although the UK government tried to establish new institutional forms after the BSE 
scandal, which were more pluralistic in composition and were more open to many 
public inputs such as the GM debate. she stated that the new system still relied on 
trustworthy persons who demonstrated ‘personal commitment to public issues.’248    
Dressel showed the character of reasoning in the British political culture by 
contrasting it with that of Germany.
249
 Following her comparative study of BSE 
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controversies in the UK and Germany, she concluded that a policy decision had to be 
based on sound science reasoning in the UK political culture, whereas scientific 
knowledge was just a starting point for a broader negotiation process on a policy 
level in the German federal system. Similarly, Frewer and Salter argued that the 
regulatory policy regime in the British policy culture was biased toward ‘the hard 
science’ which required empirical evidence.250 The cultural approach showed the 
particularity of the British way, in contrast with other countries.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides scientific knowledge of BSE and a brief history of the BSE 
crisis in the UK.  
The first section summarises the nature of BSE and the current situation of the 
disease. BSE is a progressive degenerative disease which affects the nervous systems 
of bovine cattle, and is known to be caused by an abnormal prion protein. It is 
believed that cattle were infected by BSE-contaminated animal protein feed, and that 
the human equivalent form, vCJD, was transmitted to humans by BSE-infected beef 
products. BSE incidence, which peaked in the mid-1990s, decreased significantly as 
risk control measures and surveillance were put in place, although unknown areas 
still remain.   
The BSE crisis in the UK started with the discovery of BSE-infected cattle in the 
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early 1980s, and peaked in 1996 when the UK government admitted the association 
between vCJD and BSE. For more than ten years, the UK government understated 
the potential human health risk posed by beef, and it was always represented as 
purely scientific-evidence based. However, the scientific advisors’ assessment of risk 
was affected by political considerations on beef and related industry concerns, whilst 
the institutional and structural arrangement of the policy process, as well as British 
political culture, affected the crisis.  
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4 Broader context of the Korean BSE 
controversy  
4.1 Introduction  
The story of the BSE crisis in the UK showed that the policy process regarding 
BSE in the UK government was shaped by various factors such as political and 
economic interests and the political culture, in addition to scientific evidence. 
Following the overview of the British BSE controversy in the previous chapter, I will 
explore the relations between science and politics in Korea and the policy structures 
related to the BSE policy. Indeed, recent decades have seen Korea achieve economic 
modernisation and political democratisation. The development process under the 
authoritarian regime was guided by the aim of catching up with the advanced West. 
This chapter will help to place the Korean BSE controversy in a particular context. 
In the first section, I will describe the features of the political and scientific culture in 
Korea, whilst the second section will provide the policy structure associated with 
BSE regulation.  
 
4.2 Political and scientific culture in Korea  
In this section, I will describe the political and scientific culture in Korea, with a 
particular focus on the relations between science and politics. Firstly, the 
authoritarian character of the Korean political culture, which was established during 
the compressed modernisation process, will be given. Following this, the scientific 
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system which has been developed by the government’s mobilisation for economic 
growth will be described. Before exploring the Korean political and scientific culture, 
I will provide a brief explanation of the politics in Korea, which will be helpful in 
understanding the controversy. 
 
Summary of politics in Korea and the relationship with the US 
Korea has a presidential system based on separation of powers: legislation, 
administration, and jurisdiction. Therefore, unlike the UK, the executive branch does 
not depend on the legislature regarding its existence, and the cabinet members do not 
need to be linked with the legislature. The president, who is elected to one five-year 
term, directs all cabinet members, military, and executive officers in the government 
as the head of state and the head of the executive branch. The authority and 
responsibilities of state affairs in Korea are centralised, and fall to Korea’s president. 
Maintaining the US-Korea alliance has always been one of the most important 
tasks for the Korean government. Since 1945 when Korea was liberated from Japan’s 
colonial rule, the US supported the establishment and development of the Republic 
of Korea. Since the Korean War in the 1950s, the US played a role in repressing wars 
in the Korean peninsula under the ROK-US Mutual Defense Agreement and the 
ROK-US Agreement on Status of Forces (SOFA) in Korea. Moreover, economic 
support from the US contributed to Korea’s economic development. Indeed, the US 
remains the biggest market and supplier of direct investment of Korea. The US has 
influenced many aspects in Korean society, from military alliance and economic 
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support, to academic tradition and popular culture.  
However, simultaneously, many Korean people are concerned about Korea’s 
economic, political, and cultural subordination to the US. Anti-Americanism has 
been present particularly in anti-military government groups in the 1970s and 
1980s.
251 
This still remains with regard to specific issues such as crimes by US 
forces in South Korea and perceived intrusion of Korean sovereignty by the US.
252
 
For example, the deaths of two schoolgirls hit by a US military vehicle in 2002 led to 
massive anti-US demonstrations.  
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4.2.1 Authoritarian political culture and powerful 
bureaucrats 
Developmental state and “decide-announce-defend (DAD)”   
In 1953, after 40 years of a colonial period under Japan and the Korean War 
(1950-1953), Korea was one of the poorest agrarian countries in the world with 1.3 
billion US dollars of GDP. Excessive growth of bureaucratic institutions under the 
colonial rule of Japan, continuing military tensions with North Korea, and the 
immature private sector are said to have contributed to the creation and maintenance 
of the authoritarian political power in Korea.
253
 The authoritarian political power in 
Korea was established by the military coup in 1961 and the repressive rule continued 
until 1987.
254
  
The military government advocated the ‘modernization of the nation’ and the 
‘self-reliant economy’ as the priorities of the state affairs. The mobilisation process 
of national resources for economic growth was promoted by the government. The 
‘growth at all costs’ policy overwhelmed the whole Korean society. Regulation 
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power by winning the election in 1963. Though the coup contributed to lay the foundation for the 
industrialization and economic growth, its legacy is controversial due to the suppression of democracy 
and civil liberties. The May 16 coup was the starting point of the successive military regimes which 
lasted until 1993.  
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issues associated with technological development such as environment or health, 
which could not directly contribute to economic growth, were often sidelined, 
because limited resources had to be invested selectively in the fields of national 
strategic priority.
255
 Still, while Korea is considered to have world-class technology 
in mobile communication and electronics, technology regarding air pollution or 
waste problems is estimated to be 60-70% of the advanced countries.
256
 This ‘rush 
to development’ is said to be the main feature of ‘developmental state’, which is 
defined as a state which “attempts to accelerate economic growth as quickly as 
possible, by mobilizing all types of available resources to obtain objectives such as 
the increase of per capita GNP and exports.”257 The Korean economy grew at an 
average rate of 8.9% annually from 1962 to 1987, and finally developed to become 
one of the world’s top ten economies with strengths in the car, electronics, 
shipbuilding, and iron industries.
258
 
Leftwich identified the components of developmental state as: “(1) a determined 
developmental elite; (2) relative autonomy of the state; (3) a powerful, component, 
insulated economic bureaucracy; (4) a weak and subordinate civil society; (5) 
effective management of non-economic interests; and (6) repression is common and 
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political legitimacy is determined by economic performance.”259 As identified by 
Leftwich, the rapid industrialisation process in Korea cannot be explained without 
the powerful bureaucracy.
260
 Bureaucrats in Korea were given extensive 
discretionary power, and had much pride in the fact that they were leading the 
nation’s development. Though the military dictatorship ended in the late 1980s, the 
traces of powerful bureaucracy remain: centralisation of power towards upper 
reaches, closed policy processes, and exclusion of the public from policy-making 
processes.
261
  
The political culture in Korean bureaucracy is characterised as vertical relations of 
command and obedience rather than horizontal relations of guidance and assistance. 
The formal decision-making process within the government is hierarchical. The 
initiator of policy is usually a division head in ministries or lower bureaucrats. They 
offer proposals to their superiors in the ministry and the subsequent hierarchical 
examination and modification process continue until the final decision-maker signs it. 
However, the actual process is more complex, and is often reversed due to the 
intervention of various interests and powers, and in particular, centralised power 
within the government is likely to promote such reverses.
262
 Indeed, Lee stated that: 
“The most important [p]remise for policy formulation is what is ordered by 
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hierarchical superior. This premise cannot be revised significantly. Consequently, the 
facts gathered and the analysis undertaken are governed by the need for the 
rationalization of the premise.” 263  The centralisation of power influences the 
relationship with the public as well. The decision-making process was often 
governed by secrecy in order to avoid criticism from the media, critics, or the 
oppositional political party. Conflicts in the policy process were exactly what should 
be avoided for rapid and efficient policy implementation.
264
 Wide participation and 
consensus-building in policy-making were rarely considered, while public hearings 
or deliberation processes, if any, were ceremonial and a place for mobilisation rather 
than consensus building.  
The conflict over a radioactive waste disposal facility, discussed below, was a case 
which illustrates the bureaucratic and unilateral policy-making in Korea. Cho argued 
that the process of selecting the site for a radioactive waste disposal facility by the 
Korean government depended on a “decide-announce-defend (DAD)” model which 
focusses on efficiency in the policy process.
265
 According to her, in the DAD model 
which often appears while selecting locations for environmentally obnoxious 
facilities (Locally Unwanted Land Use, LULU), the government makes decisions 
without involving local people, announces the decision, and defends it, facing the 
resistance or opposition of local people.  
The Korean government made several attempts to select a site on which to build a 
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radioactive waste disposal facility for 19 years from 1986 to 2005, but failed as 
many times.
266
 The main reason for the failure was the resistance of local people. 
The government faced opposition from the local people in three proposed sites in 
1986. In 1990, the government chose Anmyeon island to build the second nuclear 
energy research institute, although it was revealed by newspapers that the new 
nuclear energy research institute planned by the government was in fact a radioactive 
waste facility. The government withdrew the plan, confronting fierce outcry from the 
local people.  
Political democratisation in the late 1980s and the growth of anti-nuclear 
movement groups made the government recognise that policy-making using closed 
and repressive methods was impossible.
267
 The government established ‘the Act for 
the Promotion of Radioactive Waste Management and Support of the Areas Adjacent 
to the Facilities’ in 1993, and prepared legal grounds for prior consultation with 
residents and economic support for the adjacent areas. The government proposed 
three sites, but failed to select one due to opposition from the local assemblies. In 
1994 the government chose Gullup island , after considering ten sites which had 
been proposed in the past. Democratic attempts, such as open forums, explanatory 
meetings, and joint conferences between experts and local representatives, were 
made by the government, which recognised the importance of local people’s 
receptivity. Although the government’s attempt, based on public relations and 
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persuasion, was a step forward for democracy, the operation was unilateral and 
formal.
268
 The safety of the nuclear waste facility was presumed and the government 
attributed the resistance of local people to ignorance or their irrational response.
269
 
The government failed to obtain the consent of local people. Moreover, as it was 
revealed that the island was unsuitable for the radioactive waste disposal facility due 
to geological instability (symptom of active fault which was likely to have 
earthquakes in the future), the plan was withdrawn. The government could not avoid 
criticism that it chose the island where a small number of residents lived for the 
expediency in the policy process. 
In 2003, the government introduced a competition-based selection process which 
combined voluntary applications from local governments with the huge carrot of 
economic support for the area. Local governments were invited to the entry to host 
radioactive waste facility in their region, and the government would select a place 
after evaluating the applications under some guidelines. In one particular city, Buan, 
where the governor submitted the entry, a serious row broke out. The conflict in 
Buan was ended by a civil vote with an overwhelming majority of the residents 
opposing the radioactive waste disposal facility. Although the civil vote did not have 
legal binding force, the government retracted the application submitted by the 
governor. Following the Buan row, the government made a civil vote a compulsory 
step which should precede the local government’s application. In addition, the 
government promised not to store high-level radioactive waste (spent fuel) in the 
facility and to increase economic compensation and support for the hosting region. 
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Competition between local governments was serious, and finally, a city, Gyeongju, 
which showed the highest support rate in the civil vote was chosen as the site for the 
low and intermediate-level radioactive waste facility in 2005. With regard to this, 
some commentators criticised the government for alledgedly mobilising local people 
by promising regional development and economic compensation rather than by 
encouraging deliberation based on in-depth scientific investigation and open 
information.
270
 Moreover, doubts regarding the geological safety of the selected site 
were raised. An investigation report on the safety of the site, which was publicised at 
the request of environmental organisations, showed that the geological features of 
the site were not stable, and disputes between the government and environmental 
organisations have continued since then. The government argued that the geological 
defect could be compensated through engineering, while environmental 
organisations claimed that the whole building plan should be discarded.  
Though the long conflict surrounding the nuclear waste facility was resolved, it 
seems that Korea’s democratic process left room for improvement before being 
settled. The government stated in December 2004 that it would formulate the policy 
for high-level radioactive waste based on public deliberation. The government set up 
a task-force-team composed of representatives of civil organisations as well as 
experts and representatives of the industry. The task-force-team prepared policy 
recommendations for the public deliberation process regarding spent fuel 
management. However, the government suddenly announced an indefinite 
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postponement of the public deliberation plan in 2009, stating that spent fuel 
management was a technical issue which needed scientific approach and that the 
engagement of lay public might cause unnecessary conflicts. Instead, the government 
decided to make research contract with scientists. Lee stated that the regression of 
the government to a technocratic approach showed the government’s inherent 
negative attitude about direct public participation in policy-making.
271
  
The controversy surrounding the radioactive waste disposal facility illustrated that 
though the Korean government’s policy process introduced a democratic process, it 
was still dependent on unilateral promotion rather than democratic deliberation. 
Cho’s survey of the radioactive waste policy showed the gap between the notion of 
the government and the public in recognising the effect of democratic mechanisms in 
the policy process. In her survey, to the question of whether policy-decision was 
made open and with public consensus, while 85% of the government officials 
answered ‘yes’, 88.8% of local people and 91.5% of the general public said ‘no.’272  
 
Expert committees dominated by bureaucrats  
Powerful bureaucracy in Korea affected the way in which expert committees were 
operated within the policy process. A ‘committee system (operated with various 
names: e.g. council, commission, or board etc.)’ comprising experts outside 
government, is used in order to respond to technical, complex or contentious policy 
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issues.
273
 The Ministry of Public Administration and Safety (MOPAS), which is in 
charge of operation of the government, recognises that the committee system 
contributes to improving “professionalism, democracy, transparency, and fairness’ in 
policy process” by using the expertise of external experts and gathering various 
opinions.
274 
The number of expert committees within the Korean government has 
increased. The number of committees within the government was 319 in 1999, 530 
in 2008, and 499 in 2011.
275
Most of the governmental committees in Korea are 
advisory committees which help ministers’ decision-making without legal authorities 
(93% of 499 committees in 2011).
276
 Advisory committees in Korea generally have 
no budget and no staff, while the committee members are expected to carry on with 
their existing duties.  
Jeong defined the governmental committee system in Korea as ‘bureaucracy-
dominant model’ which is contrasted with ‘expert-dominant model’ (US) and ‘trade 
association -dominant model’ (Japan).277 He pointed out that the participation rate of 
the government officials was excessively high, while that of interest groups was 
limited. In a survey conducted in 1990, more than 50% of committee members were 
from the related ministries and government sector (e.g. quangos), while senior 
government officials normally chaired committees.
278
 The proportion of the 
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participants from the government sector in the governmental committees is 
decreasing. Instead, an increasing number of academic experts are now invited.
279
 
Nevertheless, the operation of the governmental committees continues to rely 
primarily on bureaucrats. Committees within the government are generally operated 
as follows: government officials set an agenda for discussion, and occasionally, 
solutions are even provided to experts by the officials; experts and civil servants 
deliberate in the committee meeting chaired by a civil servant, and conclusions 
preferred by the government are confirmed as the conclusion of the committee 
meeting. Kim stated that experts’ participation in the Korean policy process looks 
active, but actually depends on bureaucrats.
 280
 As such, experts’ contribution to the 
policy process is just procedural rather than practical, and expert committees are 
likely to be used as a tool for legitimation of policy rather than as a bilateral 
communication channel.  
Lack of transparency and public access is another problem with the Korean 
committee system. Activities of the governmental committees are rarely open to the 
public. According to a survey by a civil organisation in 2004, 45% of committees did 
not open minutes and 15.4% did not even make minutes.
281
 Only a summary of 
discussion or the conclusion of meeting was offered to the public without details of 
who said what. The survey showed that only 17 of 87 committees, which were 
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attended by high echelons of the government beyond vice minister level, were 
required to make a compulsory stenographic record or sound recording of the 
meetings.
282
 The government said that this was intended to encourage free 
discussion among committee members and to prevent confusion which may be 
caused by the publication of ongoing issues.
283
  
In 2009, the Korean government established ‘the Act on Establishment and 
Operation of Committees under Administrative organizations’, and let ministries 
make and publish information regarding the activities of the committees under their 
discretion. However, this rule does not apply to the matters which belong to non-
disclosure categories in the ‘Act on Disclosure of Information by Public 
Agencies.’284 The act states that the government can reject the request for disclosure 
of information pertaining to the matters of protection of privacy and diplomatic 
relations, and on-going matters in internal review processes, which are feared to 
undermine national interests when disclosed, or which carry the possibility of 
impeding the appropriate process.
285
 Civil organisations argue that the non-
disclosure categories are too broad and the judgment regarding whether or not a 
particular issue belongs to the categories depends entirely on the government 
officials.  
Indeed, the government has recently promoted participation of the civil sector in 
the governmental committees. However, participation of civic groups in the 
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governmental committees is not active. A report from a civil organisation stated that 
bureaucrats tended to think that committee members outside the government lacked 
the capability of making policy alternatives, and were likely to be non-objective and 
biased to narrow interests, compared to bureaucrats.
286
 Moreover, as the NGO sector 
in Korea, which grew based on the tradition of pro-democracy movement under the 
authoritarian regime of the military governments in the 1970-80s, is “mainly 
characterized by its anti-government and anti-corporate position”, the government 
tends to avoid them and the government’s invitation is likely to be limited to 
nonpolitical organizations.
287
  
To summarize, expert advisory committees are widely used in the policy-making 
process in Korea, but their operation is at the discretion of bureaucrats and the 
activities of expert bodies were generally not transparent.  
 
4.2.2 Relationship between Science and Politics   
Science as a tool for economic development  
Science and technology has been at the center of the economic growth policy. Due 
to the historical experience of failed modernisation in the 1900s and the following 
colonial rule of Japan, the development of science and technology was considered as 
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a significant issue on which the survival of the nation relied.
288
 The instrumentalism 
of science and technology was maximised through the rapid modernisation process 
in Korea.
289
 A ‘science and technology development plan’ became a part of the 
‘National long-term economic development plan’ from 1962. The government chose 
the heavy and chemical industry as the strategic focus, and founded Government 
Research Institutes (GRIs) in order to provide a foundation for industrial take off 
within a short period of time. GRIs, which were founded in pursuit of technological 
self-reliance in the late 1960s and the 1970s, did not only assist firms by introducing 
technology from industrialised Western countries, but also contributed to securing 
highly qualified human capital by recruiting many Korean scientists and engineers 
abroad.
290
 The slogan ‘Establish State with Science and Technology’ was also put 
forth during this period, and the goal of science and technology policy to lead and 
support the nation’s economic development remains still active. 291  Generally 
speaking, funding for science and technology is unanimously supported in the 
Korean political arena.
292
 Science and technology was a primary tool for the 
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foremost national goal, economic growth, and how to rapidly catch up with advanced 
countries was the most important task of science in Korea.
293  
Under the atmosphere, scientists were only expected to seek professional 
knowledge and not agonise over social values other than economic growth.
 294
 
Despite the end of the authoritarian political power in the late 1980s, this notion still 
remains.
295
 According to a study regarding the norms of the Korean scientists, 
scientists believe that economic application is more valued than pure scientific value 
when selecting a research theme, and scientists who perform research for national 
development can receive more recognition than those who carry out research for 
purely scientific interests.
296
   
Although the private sector now makes up 70% of the national R&D investment, 
the government is still recognised as having a great influence on science and 
technology policy as formulated by scientists. In a survey, scientists chose 
bureaucrats (39.7%), politicians (37.7%), and the president (12.8%) as the most 
influential groups in science and technology policy, and pointed out scientists 
(73.6%) as the group which should have more influence on science and technology 
                                                                                                                                          
National Science and Technology Council on 12 August 2008) 
293
 Sang-yong Song, Popularization of science and the role of academic society, Science and 
Technology (The Korean Federation of Science and Technology Societies: July 2001), qtd. in Suh, 
Science and Social Controversy and Korean Society. 
294
 Hwan suk Kim, “The Cause and Social Meaning of Hwang’s Fraud,” Economy and Society 715 
(2006).; Song, “A Study on the Characteristics of Science and Technology Policy in Korea.”; Suh, 
Science and Social Controversy and Korean Society.  
295
 Ibid. 
296
 Heeje Bak, “Perceptions and Evaluation of Norms of Science among Korean Scientific 
Community,” in Scientific Society in Korea, by Hwan suk Kim et al. (Kungree, 2010). 
 122 
policy in the future.
297
  
Stem cell fraud of Hwang Woo Suk in 2005 marked a case which illustrated the 
static and subordinate feature of the scientific culture in Korea.
298
 Hwang gained his 
celebrity status after success in cloning cattle in 1999, which came with media 
spotlight and the support of high-ranking politicians. Then, a number of doubts were 
raise regarding his success, but the scientific peer review process did not work 
properly.
299
 The Korean government, which chose biotechnology as one of the next 
generation growth-engine industries after the IT industry, rendered unsparing support 
for Hwang’s research. A huge research grant was offered to his team, and politicians 
presented themselves as Hwang’s patrons. 
Cloning research was emerging with great expectation of medical and economic 
promise, while the institutional ground to deal with the ethical issue was not fulfilled. 
The government created the Korean Bioethics Advisory Commission (KBAC) in 
2000 for advice on human cloning and stem cell research. The draft of the Bioethics 
law by KBAC prohibited reproductive and therapeutic cloning.
300
 However, it was 
not welcomed by the government, and particularly the Ministry of Science and 
Technology which was in charge of promoting biotechnology. The draft formulated 
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by KBAC was not submitted to the National Assembly. Instead, the “Bioethics and 
Biosafety Act” which finally passed the National Assembly at the end of 2003, 
permitted human embryonic cloning with approval by the National Bioethics 
Committee. As the act did not come into effect until July 2005, Hwang’s team 
carried out their research after obtaining the approval of the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of Hanyang University and of Seoul National University. However, 
with hindsight, discussions at the IRBs were no more than a formality. The members 
of the IRBs did not recognise their role and obligation, whilst the IRBs which had to 
examine the ethics of his research were used to legitimate it.
301
 
Hwang announced in 2004 that he had succeeded in establishing a stem cell line 
by cloning somatic cells, and the result was published in Science. In the following 
year, he announced that he had succeeded in creating the world’s first patient-
tailored stem cell. His success in 2004 and 2005 was recognised not only as a major 
scientific breakthrough but also as the nation’s achievement which would bring 
enormous economic wealth to Korea.
302
 Hwang was granted the title of ‘supreme 
scientist’ with special support from the government, and the government set up a 
committee for promoting his Nobel Prize award.  
In November 2005, a TV program in Korea, PD Notebook, raised doubts about the 
ethical misconduct of Hwang’s team in securing eggs. The allegation regarding this 
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ethical misconduct, which had been first raised by Nature in 2004, stated that his 
team used many more eggs than presented in their papers, that the egg donors had 
been paid, and that two of the donors were junior researchers in his team.
303
 
Although Hwang admitted the allegation and apologised for the misconduct, PD 
Notebook was blamed by the public for impeding Hwang’s research and harming 
national interests.  
However, the controversy did not end and was expanded to include disputes 
regarding the authenticity of the stem cells which his team announced they had 
established. PD Notebook wished to verify the results of Hwang’s team by 
reenacting the experiments or examining DNA fingerprints of the stem cells. Hwang 
rejected the suggestion and said that the authenticity would be verified through 
follow-up research by the scientific community. While elder scientists’ groups 
supported Hwang, younger groups did not. Politicians, including the president, 
appealed to the public to stop wasteful disputes and to wait for his follow-up 
research. Further, the government stated that it would continue to support his 
research. The Korean government and the elder scientists groups argued that it was 
not right for media, non-experts, to raise issues about science, which should be dealt 
with by scientists. However, evidence of forged data was presented by anonymous 
scientists’ discussions on an internet discussion board and via PD Notebook. Finally, 
the investigation committee of Seoul National University concluded in January 2006 
that the stem cells did not exist and that the scientific data were forged. After the 
                                                 
303
 2,221 eggs were collected from 119 women from November 2002 to December 2005, and 66 
women were paid. (Herbert Gottweis and Byoungsoo Kim, “Explaining Hwang-Gate: South Korean 
Identity Politics Between Bionationalism and Globalization”, Science, Technology & Human Values 
35, 4 (2010): 501–524. 
 125 
Hwang allegation proved true, however, many Korean people still believed that he 
should have another chance, because he was an excellent scientist in stem cell 
research, a potentially lucrative field for the nation.
304
  
During the Hwang scandal, stem cell technology was considered as the source of 
future national wealth, and ethical issues associated with cloning and egg donation 
were regarded as an obstacle which should be controlled so as not to impede his 
research.
305
 With the government’s overwhelming support, the self-regulating 
mechanisms of the scientific community, such as peer review or IRB, were 
powerless and a mere formality.  
 
Knowledge dependence on the West  
As previously mentioned, the main strategy for compressed modernisation of 
Korea as a latecomer was to ‘catch up’ with industrialised Western countries by 
importing and imitating their success. Korean social scientist Suh argued that though 
Korea was elevated “from periphery to semi-periphery in scientific knowledge 
production”, the dependent character still remained and had been consolidated, to 
some extent, by vertical international networks. Examples included obtaining 
doctoral degrees in Western advanced countries, forging supervisor-student 
relationships with academicians there, and by publishing papers in Western 
                                                 
304
 Ibid. 
305
 President Roh’s speak at the opening ceremony of World Stem Cell Hub on 19 Oct. 2005 
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journals.
306
 Suh wrote that as significant research results were published in journals 
of advanced countries and discussions were held there, the views of foreign scientists 
and the literature of foreign countries were likely to win more authority and 
credibility than domestic ones. Dependent knowledge production, he said, also 
caused importation of reflectivity and criticism of the imported knowledge itself. As 
a result, science-related social controversies in Korea tend to be raised by the 
imported issues from the West rather than being based on indigenous context and 
discussions within the Korean community.
307
 The fluoridation controversy in the 
1990s was presented as a case of imported controversy by Suh.
308
 The summary of 
the controversy below is based on his study.  
The fluoridation policy related to public water was introduced in Korea by the 
government to prevent tooth decay in the late 1970s. Fluoridation, which the US 
first started in 1945, was recognised by the WHO as an economical programme for 
public health in 1957. Although there were disputes surrounding the effectiveness 
of fluoridation in the 1960s, the WHO propagated fluoridation, dismissing claims 
about the side effects.
309
 In the late 1970s, and with the incidence rate of tooth 
decay high and the cost of dental health increasing, the Korean government started 
to examine fluoridation. The government established the Code for the Fluoridation 
of public water in 1979 and implemented pilot projects in 1982 and 1984. The 
                                                 
306
 Suh, Science and Social Controversy and Korean Society., pp59-97  
307
 Yi-Jong Suh, “The characteristic of Science-Society Controversies in Korea”, presented at 
conference of Korean Social Association, 2004  
308
 Yi-Jong Suh, “Korean Science-Society Controversies and the Transplanted Character: Focused on 
Fluoridation of Tab Water Controversy,” Eco Society 6, no. 0 (2004): 39–72.  
309
 More than 60 countries including US, Canada, and Australia implement fluoridation, but most 
European countries and Japan do not.   
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government expanded the range of fluoridation and made it a compulsory 
programme in 1998.
310
 In addition, as the Dentists’ group for Healthy Society 
accepted fluoridation as its agenda, fluoridation became a civil movement for 
public health.  
It was in 1998 that fluoridation became a controversial issue in Korea, when an 
editor of an ecology magazine, Green Review (Noksaek Pyeongron) introduced an 
article from an American magazine (Joel Griffiths and Chris Bryson, ‘Fluoride, Teeth, 
and the Atomic Bomb’, Earth Island Journal, 1997-1998). The article stated that 
fluoridation in the US had been promoted as a part of the atomic bomb program. 
Green Review subsequently raised actively opposing claims to fluoridation, 
focussing on the negative effect from fluoride on human health and the environment. 
This was mainly achieved by introducing anti-claims against fluoridation which had 
been first made in other countries. The main points of dispute between the 
supporting group and the opposing group of fluoridation related to the effectiveness 
of fluoride in reducing tooth decay, alleged health risks (e.g. skeletal fluorosis and 
increasing cancer risk) and environmental effect, as well as individuals’ freedom of 
choice (e.g. whether fluoridation should be forced, although tooth decay is not highly 
contagious). Supporting and opposing groups mobilised scientific evidence from the 
studies which had been carried out in other countries. With a lack of contextualised 
knowledge in Korean society with regards to issues such as fluorine exposure in its 
natural state through soil, air, water and so on, and the optimum level for Korean 
people. The fluoridation controversy was a “proxy war” between conflicting claims 
                                                 
310
 Fluoridation is left as in the local governments’ discretion now by the amendment of the related 
law in 2000.  
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which had already been raised in other countries.
311
 Indeed, the controversy has not 
been resolved and is still ongoing.  
Dependence on foreign knowledge is also applied when introducing institutions to 
reflectivity and public deliberation. Seong et al. argued that although Korea seemed 
to be well equipped with institutions for public deliberation such as participatory 
technology assessment and consensus conference, the institutions for public 
deliberations were often managed in superficial forms.
312
 This is because the 
institutions were imported from the Western advanced countries by the government’s 
‘catch up’ strategy rather than being driven by in-depth consideration of the actual 
concerns which the Korean people may have about technological development or 
controversial research.
313
 Due to this ‘catch up’ strategy Seong et al. argued that, 
even in reflection, the operation of the imported institutions is likely to be formal and 
ceremonial rather than to contribute as a substantial mechanism to solve 
technological problems or to keep the government from abusing its power. 
 
4.3 Policy structure for BSE and Beef policy  
The last section provided a description of the general political culture and the 
                                                 
311
 Suh, “Korean Science-Society Controversies and the Transplanted Character.”  
312
 Jie-un Seong, Wichin Song, and Byung-Kul Jung, Technology Risk Management in the Post 
catch-up stage (Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2007). 
313
 Similarly, Holden and Demeritt in their study of Singapore’s biomedical policy said that in the 
developmental political culture in Singapore, “the practice of ethical review was not driven by much 
consideration for the ethical concerns that the Singaporean people may have about biomedical 
research. Rather, it was largely about complying with international bureaucratic standards and 
procedures so that the resulting data could be used in drug licensing applications in the major markets 
of the US and Europe” Kerry Holden and David Demeritt, “Democratising science? The politics of 
promoting biomedicine in Singapore’s developmental state”, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 26, 1 (2008): 68–86. p. 80 
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relationship between science and politics in Korea. Korea conducted its 
modernisation projects successfully under the developmental regime, and the 
concentration of political power and the tradition of elite bureaucracy established 
during the compressed development process reinforced the technocratic approach in 
policy processes. Science and technology has been used as a main instrument for the 
economic growth while importation of knowledge from the West has been a 
principal strategy for the rapid economic growth. The dependent knowledge 
production structure made it difficult to raise and solve indigenous problems of the 
Korean society. 
This section will describe the policy structure surrounding the Korean BSE 
controversy. Firstly, there will be a summary of the domestic authority regarding 
BSE and beef policy in Korea, the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MIFAFF) and its policy regarding BSE and food safety. Secondly, the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), which provides guidelines for the 
control and surveillance of BSE risk regarding the trade of beef products, will be 
described. Lastly, regulatory policy measures for BSE risk implemented in several 
countries including Korea will be shown. There will also be a demonstration of how 
BSE risk is understood and the risk is managed in different countries.  
 
4.3.1 MIFAFF, NVRQS, and the policy  
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF)  
The Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF) was 
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established in 1948, and has experienced a few changes in its name.
314
 However, its 
main missions and policy visions have been maintained without significant change: 
to ensure the food supply; to increase farmers’ welfare and income; to promote the 
agriculture and food industry; to develop the agricultural sector; and to secure the 
safety of agricultural products. The MIFAFF is said to “function in an advocacy role 
for the nation’s farmers, promoting the goal of self-sufficiency, stressing the need for 
protectionism, and generally resisting agricultural imports.”315 
Beef related jobs within the MIFAFF have belonged to the Livestock Policy 
Bureau. The bureau oversees: livestock and dairy production; animal feed policy; 
protection and control of livestock epidemics; sanitation of meat and dairy products; 
quarantine and inspection for trade; and regulation regarding import of livestock, 
feed, and meat. The MIFAFF also has inside veterinarians, amongst whom is the 
Chief Veterinarian Officer (CVO), representing the government in international 
quarantine issues. One of the division heads in the Livestock Policy bureau is 
normally designated as the CVO. Although the CVO is the highest veterinary 
position within the MIFAFF, he/she is just working-level under the commands of the 
Director General of Livestock Bureau who is normally a general administrator with 
                                                 
314
 Change of the name of the Ministry was: the Ministry of Agriculture (1948. Nov.) → the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries (1973. Mar.) → the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1986. 
Dec.) → the Ministry of Agriculture (1996. Aug.) → the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (2008. Feb.) → the Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (Feb. 2013). The 
change in 2013 was not related to the BSE controversy in 2008. In this thesis, the acronym MIFAFF 
will be used regardless of the period of time. 
315
 Yong S. Lee, Don F. Hadwiger and Chong-Bum Lee, “Agricultural policy making under 
international pressures: The case of South Korea, a newly industrialized country”, Food Policy 15, 5 
(1990): 418–433. P.420 
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an economic or political academic background.
316
  
 
National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS)
 317
 
The National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS) was under 
the command of MIFAFF. While the MIFAFF made policy decisions, the NVRQS 
implemented them and undertook research in the veterinary field. The NVRQS was 
created by merging the National Animal Quarantine Service (1909) and National 
Veterinary Research (1911) in 1998. The NVRQS’s missions were: the 
“import/export quarantine and inspection of animal/animal product, prevention and 
control of animal diseases, sanitary management and inspection of livestock products, 
research and development in veterinary sciences, quality control of veterinary drug, 
and animal protection and welfare.”318 The NVRQS is composed of veterinary 
researchers, veterinary officers (for quarantine), and administrative officers. 
Interchange of veterinary officers at the MIFAFF and NVRQS is common. 
The Department of Livestock Product Safety & Inspection in the NVRQS was in 
                                                 
316
 The high ranking posts within the Korean Public Administration have been composed by general 
administrators with economic or political academic background, and the authority and status of 
specialist public servants are weaker than general administrators. Handerson (1968) attributed the 
weaker authority and status of specialists in the Korean government to the influence of the traditional 
Confucianism which “defined specialist as a lower class job.” With declining morale of scientists 
since the financial crisis in 1997, the government has promoted increasing the number and the 
influence of bureaucrats with natural science and engineering background as a part of policy to 
elevate morale of scientists. Gregory Henderson, Korea, the Politics of the Vortex (Harvard 
University Press, 1968)., p. 195 
317
 NVRQS was changed into the ‘Animal, Plant and Fisheries Quarantine and Inspection Agency’ 
merged with National Plant Quarantine Service and National Fisheries Products Quality Inspection 
Service in 2011, and changed into the ‘Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency’ in 2013 by 
restructuring of the Korean government. I used NVRQS in this thesis. 
318
 http:// www.nvqrs.go.kr 
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charge of the sanitary and safety management of animal products, inspection of 
exported/imported animal products and animal feed, as well as cooperation with 
international organisations and trading countries. The Import Risk Assessment 
Division performs import risk assessment and provides the result to the MIFAFF 
Minister. Indeed, this is a crucial process in terms of the government’s decisions to 
permit (or not) the import of meat from other countries. Research about BSE was 
performed at the Foreign Animal Disease Division in the Department of Veterinary 
Research.  
 
  
Figure 3 The organization of NVRQS 
 
Research and development policy regarding BSE  
Scientific research on BSE and CJD in Korea was mainly supported by the 
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MIFAFF and has not been buoyant.
319
 The Korean government’s R&D investment 
in BSE-related research in 2007 constituted approximately 0.01% of the 
government’s total R&D investment.320 This is largely because the R&D investment 
in animal diseases is itself small. From 2006 to 2010 R&D investment from the 
MIFAFF in animal disease represented just one twentieth of the budget for R&D in 
food production and the system (e.g. machine, equipment, seed, fertiliser, 
agricultural chemicals).
321 Seo stated that the production-oriented livestock policy 
resulted in a relatively small R&D investment for livestock diseases while a 
temporary expedient without a national strategy for animal disease R&D made long 
term basic research difficult.
322
 Moreover, BSE is not a disease with national 
priority in Korea.
323
 The government set up a special committee for zoonoses R&D 
in 2007 and whilst Brucella, Avian Influenza, and rabies were chosen as priority 
                                                 
319
 < The Korean government’s investment to BSE related research (2006-2007) > 
(million KRW/ 1,100 KRW ≒ 1 USD) 
year  MOST* MIFAFF RDA** KFDA*** Total 
2006 
BSE 0 238 0 80 318 
CJD 8 0 0 0 8 
Prion 293 672 0 0 965 
2007 
BSE 0 163 50 0 213 
CJD 8 0 0 0 8 
Prion 170 664 0 0 834 
Total  479 1,737 50 80 2,346 
*Ministry of Science and Technology  **Rural Development Administration  ***Korea Food and Drug 
Administration  
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, “Status of the BSE Related National R&D,” 
September 18, 2008. 
320
 Ibid. 
321
 From 2006 to 2010, MIFAFF invested 47.3 billion KRW for animal disease R&D, 401 billion 
KRW for food production and processing, and 424.9 billion KRW for production system (e.g. 
machine, equipment, seed, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals). Ji-Young Seo, Scientific and 
Technological Countermeasure against Infectious Animal Dieases, Science and Technology Policy 
Institute, 2011 
322
 Ibid.  
323
 Ministry of Science and Technology, et al., “National R&D Investment Plan for Zoonoses, 
proceeding for Science related ministers’ meeting,” March 15, 2007. 
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diseases for investment, BSE was neglected.
324
 
BSE has never been officially reported in Korea, and as a result, the BSE research 
group in Korea is small. A small number of researchers are involved in BSE research 
and only a few research institutes have laboratory facilities of Biosafety level 3, 
which are essential to deal with infectious pathogens. Approximately 50% of the 
research fund for BSE, CJD and prion research in Korea is used by the NVRQS.
325 
The Prion Diseases Laboratory within the Foreign Contagious Diseases Research 
Division at NVRQS is the only reference laboratory in Korea recognised by the OIE. 
BSE research of NVRQS focusses on research for surveillance of cattle rather than 
basic research, and the main research partners of NVRQS in BSE research are 
foreign research teams such as UK Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) rather 
than Korean research groups, due to the lack of research fundamental for BSE in 
Korea.
326
  
 
Food safety policy  
Indeed, prior to 2008, there was no integrated legislation regarding the food safety 
of every food item. Even though the Framework Act on Food Safety was established 
in 2008, individual acts which regulate specific food items still exist, and 
administrative authorities are dispersed across several ministries and agencies such 
as the MIFAFF, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Korea Food and Drug 
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 Ibid. 
325
 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, “Status of the BSE Related National R&D.” 
326
 interview with a civil scientists at NVRQS  
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Administration (KFDA), NVRQS, Rural Development Administration (RDA), and 
National Fisheries Research and Development Institute (NFRDI).
327
 For example, 
agricultural products including livestock products were regulated by the MIFAFF, 
food and its distribution and processing by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and 
liquor by the National Tax Agency, while each regulation is based on different acts.  
Moreover, the authority of regulation generally belong to ministries or agencies 
which are also in charge of food production, distribution, and promotion of the 
industry. Accordingly, food risks tend to be interpreted as obstacles to the industry by 
the government officials.
328
 In many cases, food risk information is not fully open to 
the public, and bureaucrats do not want food risk issues to be raised.
329
 For example, 
when BSE spread throughout Europe in the 1990s, the MIFAFF hesitated to 
publicise the information about BSE and did not promote active prevention measures, 
due to concern about the effect on the beef industry. Therefore, there are voices to 
call for establishing independent institutions in order to secure objectivity and 
transparency in food risk assessment.
330
   
The anxiety of Korean people regarding general food safety is high. Only 22.4% 
of respondents answered that bills and regulations about food safety were properly 
enforced. This was in stark contrast with the EU, where 73.6% of respondents 
                                                 
327
 KFDA is under the control of Ministry of Health and Welfare, and NVRQS, RDA, and NFRDI are 
under Ministry of Agriculture. 
328
 Seong, Song, and Jung, Technology Risk Management in the Post catch-up stage. pp. 129-134;  
329
 Yang-kee Lee, “Legal Analysis of Korea-US Beef Import Negotiations and Developing Advanced 
Korea SPS Regulations,” Journal of Korea Trade 33, no. 5 (November 2008): 405–428.  
330
 Gye-Im Lee et al., “Analysis on Food Related Law System in Korea,” Agriculture Economy 32, no. 
3 (2009): 1–21.; Lee, “Legal Analysis.”; Yun-Jae Hwang and Byung-Joon Woo, A Study on the 
Socio-Economic Influence of Consumers’ Safety Concerns on Animal Products (Korea Rural 
Economic Institute, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, 2010). 
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showed trust in their food regulation policy. Likewise, the anxiety level of the 
Korean people in various food safety issues is much higher than the average of EU 
countries (Table 4).
331
  
 
table 4 the level of concern about food safety in Korea and EU
332
 
 Korea EU 
BSE 3.07 0.73 
GM Food 2.98 0.84 
Food Addictives 3.32 0.83 
Residual pesticide (Fruit, Vegetables) 3.31 0.92 
Antibiotics, Hormone (meat) 3.32 0.96 
Food Virus (e.g. AI ) 3.28 0.90 
Unhygienic control of food, restaurants, and food factories 3.56 0.37 
 
With regard to the cause of Korean people’s sensitivity to food safety, a lack of 
trust in the government is often cited. In terms of food safety issues, trust of the 
Korean public in their government is low. Indeed, a survey conducted in 2001 
revealed that only 44% of respondents answered that they trust the government’s 
announcement about food safety.
333
 When US beef was banned in 2003 due to the 
BSE case, 48% of respondents answered that ‘consumers’ organization’ was the most 
                                                 
331
 A Public Survey on Risk and Safety in 2008 done by the Institute for Social Development and 
Policy Research at Seoul National University, and Euobarometer 2007 cited in Duk-Jin Chang, 
“Politicization of Risk Appeared in Candlelight Vigil in 2008,” in Risk Society, Risk Politics, by 
Chin-Sung Chung et al. (SNU Press, 2010). p171 
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 Source: A Public Survey on Risk and Safety in 2008 done by the Institute for Social Development 
and Policy Research at Seoul National University, and Euobarometer 2007 cited in Duk-Jin Chang, 
Politicization of Risk Appeared in Candlelight Vigil in 2008, in (ed.) Chin-Sung Chung et al. Risk 
Society, risk Politics, SNU Press, p171  
333
 quoted in Ji-Hyun Choi and Gye-Im Lee, “Facts and Vision of Food safety system,” in Agriculture 
Outlook 2005(1), ed. Se-Ik Oh (Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2005), 267–290.  
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trusted information source, and only 15% of respondents said that they had trust in 
‘the government’s announcement.’334 Following this, domestic beef consumption in 
Korea dropped significantly with 37% in January, 29% in February, and 17% in 
March 2004, despite assurances about beef safety from the government.
335 
Regarding this tendency, the Korean government officials often criticised the public 
for being excessively sensitive to food issues.
336
  
 
4.3.2 World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)  
Regulatory policies regarding BSE and beef are not confined to domestic politics. 
Instead, the policy area should be considered in international terms. In this section, 
the World Organization for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE), 
which provides guidelines for the control and surveillance of BSE risk regarding the 
trade of beef products, must be described.  
 
The structure of the OIE and the Terrestrial Animal Health Code 
The World Organization for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties, 
OIE) was established in 1924 with the purpose of addressing the legitimate 
                                                 
334
 Ibid.    
335
 Ibid.  
336
 Young-soon Lee, Development Plan for Control of Specified Risk Materials and Test of 
Slaughtered Animals (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2005).; Tae-Yung Kim, “Risk Analysis 
and Efficient Control Measures on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the Republic of Korea” 
(PhD Thesis, Seoul National University, 2005). 
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protection from animal diseases and zoonoses.
337
 The outbreak of rinderpest in 1920 
was said to provide momentum to establish an international body to coordinate 
disease control efforts and to regulate international trade in animals and animal 
products.
338 
The Paris-based international organisation had 173 member countries by 
2009.
339
 It is comprised of the World Assembly (the supreme body), geographically 
representative Specialist Commissions (elected every three years), and supporting 
organisations such as laboratories and working groups (Figure 4). The OIE’s main 
objectives are: to collect and disseminate information on the global animal disease 
situation, and to offer veterinary scientific information and technical support to 
member countries for animal disease control and the promotion of national 
veterinary services; it is also charged with safeguarding international trade.
340
 To 
achieve these missions, the OIE has established standards, guidelines, codes and 
manuals on animal disease control to be used as reference documents by the member 
countries; it also keeps lists of transmissible diseases considered to be of importance 
in public health and the international trade of animals and animal products. The 
documents and recommendations are established by consensus of the member 
countries’ senior veterinary authorities at the World Assembly.  
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 The original name was the ‘Office International des Epizooties.’ It was renamed as ‘World 
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338
 C. Zepeda, M. Salman and R. Ruppanner, “International trade, animal health and veterinary 
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Figure 4 OIE Organization (http://www.oie.int/about-us/wo/) 
The OIE standards, which are commonly referred to as international references for 
animal health and zoonotic diseases, are the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the 
Terrestrial Code), the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 
Animals (the Terrestrial Manual), the Aquatic Animal Health Code (the Aquatic 
Code), and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals (the Aquatic 
Manual).
341
 The Terrestrial Code and the Aquatic Code contain recommendations 
for safe international trade and preventing animal diseases (including zoonoses) via 
animals and animal products (i.e. disease reporting, prevention and control, and 
sanitary measures). The Terrestrial Manual and the Aquatic Manual, for example, 
contain “international standards on quality management in testing laboratories, 
                                                 
341
 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission, “Procedures used by the OIE to set 
Standards and Recommendations for International Trade, with a Focus on the Terrestrial and Aquatic 
Animal Health Codes” (September, 2011). 
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principles of validation and quality control of diagnostic assays, and diagnostic 
testing methods for specific diseases including official tests listed in the Codes.
342
  
Recommendations on new standards and on significant revisions of existing 
standards are developed by small groups of independent experts (Ad hoc Groups or 
Working Groups in Figure 3). All draft texts are reviewed by member countries and 
the relevant Specialist Commission, whose members are elected by member 
countries; they are then approved at the World Assembly General Session which is 
held annually. It normally takes two years for new texts to be adopted in the 
Codes.
343
 Standards are adopted by consensus of member countries at the General 
Session, and in incidences when the session fails to achieve consensus, voting and a 
two-thirds majority are needed for the standard to be adopted.
344
  
The Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2011) includes recommendations for 73 
animal diseases, among which is Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). The 
BSE chapter in the Code includes: definitions of ‘commodities that can be/should 
not be traded’; criteria with which to determine ‘BSE risk status’ of a country or 
zone; and guidelines for surveillance and risk assessment. Among them, the 
definition of safe commodities and BSE risk status are important guidelines for the 
international trade of beef products. Whether or not a certain beef commodity can be 
traded relies on the BSE risk status of the exporting country.  
OIE now has three categories with which to assess the BSE risk of countries: 
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 Ibid. 
343
 It was used as the evidence that the OIE standard could not reflect updated scientific research 
results during the Korean BSE controversy.  
344
 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission, “Procedures Used by the OIE.” 
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‘Negligible BSE risk’, ‘Controlled BSE risk’, and ‘Undetermined BSE risk.’345 In 
addition, trade regulations are more stringent when it comes to cattle and 
commodities originating from ‘Undetermined BSE risk’ states, and less for those 
from ‘Negligible BSE risk’ states. For example, brains, eyes, spinal cords, skulls and 
vertebral columns from cattle above 12 months of age, which were produced in 
‘Undetermined BSE Risk’ states, are banned from being traded ‘for the preparation 
of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals.’346 On the contrary, with cattle 
originating from ‘Controlled BSE Risk’ states, only brains, eyes, spinal cords, skulls 
and vertebral columns from animals over 30 months of age should not be traded. 
Although the OIE recommendation does not have a compulsory legal effect, as the 
BSE risk status affects the trade of beef products and cattle, countries make efforts to 
be recognised as having as good a status as possible. 
                                                 
345
  “Negligible BSE risk” state is a country which has conducted a risk assessment and demonstrated 
that appropriate generic measures and surveillance taken in accordance with the OIE standard; there 
has been no case or imported (and completely destroyed) case of BSE, or “every indigenous case was 
born more than 11 years ago”; the OIE criteria (e.g. the compulsory notification and investigation of 
all cattle showing clinical signs, the examination in an approved laboratory of brain or other tissues …) 
have been complied with for at least 7 years; and it has been demonstrated “neither meat-and-bone 
meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants” for at least 8 years. (OIE, 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010, Article 11.5.3) 
“Controlled BSE risk” state is a country which has conducted a risk assessment and not demonstrated 
that appropriate measures have been taken ‘for the relevant period of time’; surveillance has been 
carried out in accordance with the OIE Terrestrial Code; and there has been no case or imported (and 
completely destroyed) case of BSE and it has not been demonstrated that the OIE criteria have been 
complied for 7 years and “neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been 
fed to ruminants” for 8 years. In case there has been indigenous case of BSE, the OIE criteria are 
complied with, and “it can be demonstrated … that neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived 
from ruminants has been fed to ruminants; and all BSE cases, as well as: all cattle which, during their 
first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and which investigation 
showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period.” (OIE, Terrestrial 
Animal Health Code 2010., Article 11.5.4.)  
Most European countries which experienced BSE belong to this category. US was identified as 
‘Controlled risk state’ in 2007 in spite of discovery of BSE infected animal in 2003.  
“Undetermined BSE risk” state is a country which cannot demonstrate that it meets the requirements 
of the aforementioned category. (OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010., Article 11.5.5.)  
Korea belonged to this category until 2010 though there is no BSE case reported.
 
  
346
 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010., Article 11.5.14 
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International trade and regulation  
The OIE standards do not legally bind member countries. The General Remarks of 
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code recognise the member countries’ authority to set 
their own safety regulations.
347
 However, the General Remarks also state: “This 
must be based on a scientific risk analysis and done in accordance with the country’s 
obligations under the SPS agreement.”348 It is related to the relationship between 
OIE and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The WTO includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as amended 
(GATT 1994) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS).
349
 The General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
established to promote free trade in the 1940s, and since then, it has reduced and 
eliminated tariffs and subsidies in trade. With declines in tariff barriers, the concerns 
that food safety and sanitary standards would be used as non-tariff barriers came to 
the fore.
350
 Accordingly, the SPS Agreement was made “to facilitate unhindered 
international trade in animals, plants and their products without endangering human, 
animal or plant life.”351 However, as WTO does not have scientific expertise in 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, it made agreements with some international 
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 “An importing country is always free to authorize the importation of animals or animal products 
into its territory under conditions either more or less stringent than those recommended by the Code” 
OIE, “Terrestrial Code, Users’ Guide,” 2010., A. General remarks 
348
 Ibid. 
349
 “Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,” May 1998, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm.  
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 M.B. Nelson, International Rules, Food Safety and the Poor Developing Country Livestock 
Producer (Rome, Italy: Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
2005).  
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 G K Brückner, “Working towards Compliance with International Standards,” Revue Scientifique et 
Technique (International Office of Epizootics) 23, no. 1 (April 2004): 95–107; discussion 391–401. 
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reference organisations, and recognised the sanitary standards set out by the 
reference organisations as science-based recommendations for international trade.
352
 
The OIE was mandated as the international reference organisation for international 
standards in animal health by the WTO in 1994. The purpose of the mandate was to 
avoid “the introduction of pathogens via international trade in animals and animal 
products, while at the same time preventing countries from setting up unjustified 
sanitary barriers to inhibit trade.”353 
While the WTO and the SPS do not impose particular regulations on their 
members, they do require countries to justify their standards scientifically in case 
they are stricter than international standards.
354
 Accordingly, countries have two 
options in setting their health and sanitary measures: whether to base the measures 
on international standards or to adopt stricter measures than international standards 
through scientific justification. The following paragraph shows this clearly:  
The first option, and the one strongly encouraged by the SPS Agreement, 
is for Members to base their health measures on OIE international 
standards such as the Terrestrial Code. The second option applies in the 
absence of a relevant standard or when a Member chooses to adopt a 
higher level of protection than that provided by the OIE standard. This 
option necessitates the use of scientific risk analysis to determine whether 
importation of a particular commodity poses a significant risk to human or 
animal health and, if so, what health measures could be applied to reduce 
that risk to a level acceptable to the importing country.
355
 
                                                 
352
 WTO relies on three standard-setting organizations: CODEX Alimentarius for public health and 
food safety, International Plant Protection Convention (IPCC) for plant health, and the OIE for animal 
health.  
353G K Brückner, “The Role of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) to Facilitate the 
International Trade in Animals and Animal Products,” Onderstepoort Journal of Veterinary Research 
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 OIE, “Devising Import Health Measures for Animal Commodities,” 2010. 
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According to the above, while sanitary measures which conform to the OIE 
standards are not required to provide any additional justification, countries should 
justify their measures scientifically to choose a higher level of protection for their 
sanitary measures than the OIE standards. The legitimacy of international standards 
is the scientific excellence of those standards. The OIE’s recommendation is 
regarded as “an optimal level of animal health security, incorporating the latest 
scientific findings and available techniques.”356 The OIE Director General said:  
In term of the SPS Agreement, countries are allowed to apply sanitary 
measures stricter than those recommended in the international standards of 
the OIE provided that such stricter sanitary measures are scientifically 
justified.  
Nonetheless, as OIE standards are elaborated with the support of 
internationally renowned scientists, it is difficult to justify scientifically 
national measures that differ those of the OIE.
357
 
 
Although OIE standards relied on the consensual adoption of member countries, 
they became less voluntary when combined with the WTO’s enforcement 
mechanism.
358
 The enhancing authority of international standards, which impose the 
burden to justify their sanitary regulations with scientific evidence on importing 
countries, is likely to narrow states’ policy discretion.359  
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4.3.3 Regulatory policies on BSE in Europe, Japan, and 
US 
Although the OIE provides general guidelines regarding the control and 
surveillance of BSE risk, regulatory policies in each country show national 
disparities. In this section, the BSE regulatory policies in Europe, Japan, and the US, 
which were mainly compared with those of Korea during the Korean BSE 
controversy, will be outlined. 
 
Animal Feed Ban  
The primary route of transmission of BSE is believed to be contaminated animal 
feed. The EU introduced a ban on the use of ruminant protein for ruminant animal 
feed in 1994 and prohibited the use of animal protein for all farm animals in 2000.
360
 
Moreover, Japan also issued a ban on the use of ruminant-derived MBM for 
ruminant feed in April 1996, and banned the use of all mammals-derived proteins in 
animal feed when a BSE-positive animal was confirmed in September 2001.
361
 The 
US banned the use of animal proteins for ruminant feed in 1997 with the exceptions 
of blood products, gelatin, plate waste, milk products, and animal protein from 
porcine or equine sources. In April 2008, the US Food and Drug Agency (FDA) 
announced new rules to expand the scope of prohibited cattle-derived risk materials 
for all animal feed.
362
 Compared to Japan and European countries, the US has a 
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 Detwiler et al., “A Position Paper on the Relaxation of the Feed Ban in Europe.” 
361
 Ban on the use of pig-derived proteins for pigs and chickens were lifted in April 2005. Ibid. 
362
 Cattle Material Prohibited in Animal Feed (CMPAF) by the new rule is: “the entire carcass of 
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much lower level of animal feed regulation (Table 5). The US takes the view that as 
BSE occurrence in the US is much less than in Europe and the contamination source 
is small, strict regulation like in Europe is not necessary.
363
   
Table 5 Comparison of Animal Feed Ban among countries (UK, EU, US, and Japan) 
Animal Feed Ban UK EU US Japan 
ban on ruminant protein  
for ruminant animal feed  
1988-1990 1994 1997.8 1996 
ban on SRMs  
for farm animal feed 
1990-1996 - 
ban on brain 
and spinal cord 
from animals over 
30 month age for 
all farm animals 
(2009) 
- 
ban on animal protein  
for farm animal feed 
1996 2001 - 2001 
 
Removal of Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) 
Whereas the animal feed ban was primarily designed to prevent BSE in cattle, 
most important when it comes to protecting human health is the removal of cuts 
called Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) and a ban on their use in human food. SRMs 
are known to contain about 99% of BSE infectivity in infected animals, and 
                                                                                                                                          
BSE-positive cattle; the brains and spinal cords from cattle 30 months or age and older; the entire 
carcass of cattle not inspected and passed for human consumption that are 30 months of age or older 
from which brain and spinal cords were not removed; tallow that is derived from BSE-positive cattle; 
tallow that is derived from other materials prohibited by this rule that contain more than 0.15 percent 
insoluble impurities; and mechanically separated beef that is derived from the materials prohibited by 
this rule.”  
“Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy - Feed Ban Enhancement:  Implementation Questions and 
Answers”, WebContent, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, June 5, 2009, 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/ComplianceEnforcement/B
ovineSpongiformEncephalopathy/ucm114453.htm.  
363
 Final Report by Japan-United States BSE Working Group, July 22, 2004, http:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/economy/beef.html. 
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removing SRMs from human consumption is considered to reduce BSE risk 
substantially.
364
 However, the possibility remains that tissues which have not been 
considered as SRMs will show BSE infectivity with the help of development in 
testing methods.
365
  
With regards to which cuts are defined as SRMs, there is a shared definition in 
principle by relative infectivity in bovine tissues. However, specifically, definitions 
of SRMs differ slightly across countries (Table 6). Generally speaking, the EU and 
Japan have more stringent regulations than the US and the OIE. For example, the US 
bans only brain and spinal cord from cattle older than 30 months, while the EU bans 
those from cattle older than 12 months and Japan bans those from cattle of all ages. 
In addition, the US only bans distal ileum, although the EU bans whole intestine for 
human food. The difference in definitions of SRMs among the countries is the result 
of considering various factors other than BSE infectivity in bovine tissues. While the 
EU considered BSE incidence cases in young cattle, the US took the position that as 
BSE in cattle of young age presumes excessive exposure to a contamination source 
while the animals were calves, it is unlikely that BSE will occur in animals younger 
than 30 months in the US. This conclusion can also be attributed to the fact that the 
BSE incidence rate is much lower in the US than in European countries.
366
 
 
                                                 
364
 Percentage of total infective load per bovine is: Brain 64.1%, Spinal cord 25.6%, Trigeminal 
ganglia 2.6%, Dorsal root ganglia 3.8%, Ileum 3.3%, Spleen 0.3%, Eyes 0.04%. “Joint 
WHO/FAO/OIE Technical Consultation on BSE: Public Health, Animal Health and Trade” (OIE 
Headquarters, Paris, June 11, 2001). 
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 TAFS, TAFS Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials (Berne, February 2009). 
366
 Final Report by Japan-United States BSE Working Group, 22, July, 2004, http:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/economy/beef.html. 
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Table 6 Comparison of definitions of SRMs 
OIE US EU Japan 
(i) cattle of any 
age originating from 
Controlled-risk state 
and Undetermined-
risk state: tonsils and 
distal ileum 
(ii) cattle over 30 
months of age 
originating from 
Controlled-risk state: 
brains, eyes, spinal 
cord, skull and 
vertebral column.  
(iii) cattle over 12 
months of age 
originating from 
undetermined-risk 
state: brains, eyes, 
spinal cord, skull and 
vertebral column. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(OIE, Terrestrial Code 
11.5.14, commodities 
that should not be 
traded) 
(i) Cattle 30 months 
of Age and Older: 
Brain, Skull, Eyes, 
Trigeminal ganglia 
(nerve tissue), Spinal 
cord, Dorsal root 
ganglia (nerve tissue), 
Vertebral column 
(excluding the tail, 
transverse processes 
of the thoracic and 
lumbar vertebrae and 
the wings of the 
sacrum). 
(ii) All Cattle: 
Tonsils, distal ileum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Federal Register - 
69FR 42255 July 14, 
2004) 
(i) the skull excluding 
the mandible and 
including the brain 
and eyes, and the 
spinal cord of animals 
aged over 12 months; 
(ii) the vertebral 
column excluding the 
vertebrae of the tail, 
the spinous and 
transverse processes 
of the cervical, 
thoracic and lumbar 
vertebrae and the 
median sacral crest 
and wings of the 
sacrum, but including 
the dorsal root 
ganglia of animals 
aged over 24 months; 
and 
(iii) the tonsils, the 
intestines from the 
duodenum to the 
rectum and the 
mesentery of animals 
of all ages.” 
 
 
Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 722/2007 of 25 
June 2007 
bovine heads (except 
for tongues and cheek 
meat), spinal cords, 
distal ileum, vertebral 
column from cattle of 
all ages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan Food Safety 
Commission, Measures 
against Bovine 
Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) 
in Japan,  September 
2004 ,  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
english/topics/foodsafet
y/bse/) 
 
Moreover, some cuts are defined as SRMs in the EU because of their close 
association with other SRMs, although they have not demonstrated inherent BSE 
infectivity.
367
 Skull and vertebral column are designated as SRMs due to possible 
contamination from brain and spinal cord respectively. Moreover, although the 
                                                 
367
 TAFS, TAFS Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials. 
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infectivity in parts of intestines other than the distal ileum is not yet confirmed, 
whole intestines are prohibited “on a simple practical basis” by the EC Scientific 
Steering Committee (SSC) which was concerned about slaughterhouse 
contamination.
368
 In contrast, the US does not ban whole intestines but forces at 
least 2-metres from the end of the ileum to be cut and removed.
369
 Japan, which has 
indigenous BSE cases and generally operates strict regulations on BSE, opposed the 
proposal to designate the entire intestine from cattle of all ages as SRMs at the OIE 
meeting, for the reason that intestine is used for traditional dishes.
370
  
 
Testing and screening  
Testing the brain tissue of cattle after death is the only way in which to establish 
whether or not an animal is infected with BSE. The objectives of testing are, 
according to EC regulation:  
1) “Surveillance”: to identify the existence of BSE in a country and the likely 
numbers of infected cattle, and to monitor the effectiveness of BSE prevention 
and control measures; and 
2) “Additional protection of health”: to eliminate infected cattle from the food 
chain for the safety of meat.
371
  
                                                 
368
 Scientific Steering Committee, Listing of Specified Risk Materials: a scheme for assessing relative 
risks to man, Re-edited version adopted by the Scientific Steering Committee during its Third Plenary 
Session of 22-23 January 1998, p.8, para. 3.6 
369
 The narrowed ban on intestines was suspected of considering the economic interests of US beef 
industry.  
370
 Kim, “Risk Analysis and Efficient Control Measures on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in 
the Republic of Korea.” 
371
 EC, Frequently Asked Questions about BSE-Tests, n.d., 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/bse/bse21_en.html.   
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With regard to testing, countries again have different foci. While the US tends to 
consider testing as a tool of surveillance only, Japan and the EU also recognise 
‘protection of public health’ effect of testing.372 The US carries out only sample 
tests to estimate the distribution of BSE in cattle and does not require all cattle above 
a certain age to be tested. On the contrary, the EU and Japan carry out a monitoring 
program for all cattle over a certain age. The EU introduced rapid post-mortem tests 
on animals above 30 months of age for human consumption in 2001, and carried out 
a monitoring program for all bovine animals above 24 months of age which were 
“sent for emergency slaughter or with observations at ante mortem inspections” and 
“not slaughtered for human consumption, which have died or been killed on the farm, 
during transport or in an abattoir (fallen stock).”373 Japan introduced a blanket test 
for all slaughtered cattle in 2001, but has carried out testing only for cattle above 21 
months of age since 2005.
374
  
The position of the US is that the complete BSE test for all cattle older than a 
particular age is not necessary, because most of cattle in the US are slaughtered 
before the age at which BSE infection can be detected (almost of all cattle are 
normally slaughtered at between 20 to 30 months of age in the US).
375
 The 
incubation period of BSE is 4 to 6 years and detecting the infection in the brain 
through diagnostic testing is possible shortly before the clinical symptoms appear.
376
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373
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As previously mentioned, the incidence of clinical disease occurrence in cattle 
younger than 30 months of age is approximately 0.05%.
377
 Similarly, the OIE does 
not recommend a complete test for all slaughtered cattle. Testing a small number of 
high-risk animals (e.g. clinically suspected animals) can earn higher marks in the 
OIE’s assessment than testing a large number of normal cattle. Therefore, the 
complete test of the EU and Japan was said to be just for “restoring consumer 
confidence” rather than offering a substantial increase in safety.378  
 
4.3.4 Regulatory policies on BSE in Korea 
There has been no BSE case reported in Korea. Although a complete test of all 
cattle has never been carried out, the Korean government has stated that there is, 
indeed, no risk of BSE in Korea. The grounds for this statement are: there has been 
no scrapie in Korea; no BSE-suspected cases have been detected despite testing a 
larger number of cattle in accordance with the OIE guideline; and there are no vCJD-
suspected cases despite the consumption preference of the Korean people (including 
the eating of intestines). Accordingly, the policy priority has been on preventing the 
introduction of BSE pathogens from foreign countries rather than domestic 
regulation. The Korean government banned the importation of beef related 
commodities from 34 countries including European countries which experienced 
domestic BSE incidence in 1996.  
                                                 
377
 European Commission/the Scientific Steering Committee, “Update on The Opinion on TSE 
Infectivity Distribution in Ruminant Tissues.” 
378
 Heim et al., “Update on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Scrapie and Chronic Wasting 
Disease.” 
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The use of animal protein and food waste for ruminant animal feed was banned in 
Korea in 2000, although this feed ban offers a lower level of protection than that of 
the UK, EU and Japan (see Table 7). The Korean government says that the current 
level of animal feed ban is sufficient to prevent BSE, because there is no need to 
worry about cross-contamination in Korea where BSE did not occur.  
Table 7 Comparison of Animal Feed Ban in Korea and other countries 
Animal Feed 
Ban 
Korea  UK EU US Japan 
ban on ruminant  
protein for 
ruminant  
animal feed  
ban on 
animal 
protein for 
ruminant 
animal feed 
(2000) 
1988 
-1990 
1994 1997.8 1996 
ban on SRMs for 
farm animal feed 
- 
1990 
-1996 
- 
ban on 
brain and 
spinal cord 
from animals 
over 30 
month age 
for all farm 
animals 
(2009) 
- 
ban on animal 
protein for farm 
animal feed 
- 1996 2001 - 2001 
 
With regard to SRMs, Korea had no guideline or regulation in place until 2006. 
The government says that this is not problematic due to the fact that there is no BSE 
in Korea and the government has banned importation of cattle and beef products 
from countries where BSE occurred. Before the “Import Sanitary Requirements on 
US beef and beef products”, which was agreed with the US in 2006 to resume beef 
import from the US where the BSE-infected animal had been discovered in 2003, 
 153 
there was no definition nor regulations on SRMs. In terms of beef products imported 
from BSE-free countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and slaughtered in 
Korea, the Korean government does not impose regulations regarding SRMs. 
Accordingly, there were no rules about the process of removal and disposal of SRMs, 
nor were there relevant facilities for animals produced and slaughtered in Korea for 
domestic consumption. The government started to build facilities to remove SRMs in 
2007, although removal and disposal are still not compulsory. 
Korean people enjoy so many different cuts of cattle for food that it has been said 
that ‘they eat every part except for horn and hoof.’ Cattle have long represented the 
most treasured possession for Korean farming households up to a comparatively 
recent date. When agricultural machines did not develop, the ox, which ploughed 
fields and carried things for humans, became indespensible for farming. Accordingly, 
oxen was slaughtered on special days such as weddings or feasts, and thus it was a 
very rare event for most poor farmers to eat beef, and byproducts such as intestines 
and bones in addition to muscle meat were consumed for food.
 379
 In 2003, Korea’s 
per capita beef consumption was 8.1kg, less than one fourth that of Australia (36.9kg) 
and one fifth that of the US (42kg).
380
 However, by-products including SRMs are 
largely consumed in Korea. For example, a survey by the MIFAFF in 2003 showed 
that more than 50,000 restaurants served dishes cooked with bovine byproducts such 
as intestines, blood, or vertebral column.
381
 Therefore, it is not a simple issue for the 
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Korean government to regulate SRMs, even though many cuts enjoyed by Korean 
people are defined as SRMs in other countries. For example, intestines, which are 
designated as SRMs and banned from consumption as human food in the EU, are 
one of the preferred cuts among Korean people. The position of the government is 
that compulsory removal and disposal of SRMs will be considered if and when a 
BSE case is discovered in Korea.  
The position held by the Korean government with regard to testing is closer to that 
of the US than those of the EU and Japan. The Korean government had tested 3,043 
normal cattle in 1996 – 2000 (the result came out negative) and has carried out a 
sample test for high-risk animals like downer cattle since 2007. The association of 
twelve farmers’ organisations and the Korean Beef Association suggested a complete 
test for all slaughtered Korean beef to confirm the safety and to request that the US 
government conduct the same level of screening on 21 July 2008. Some civil 
movement groups supported this move. In response, the MIFAFF stated that testing 
all slaughtered cattle has no substantial effect on consumers’ safety, because the 
diagnostic test cannot detect infectivity in cattle until 4-6 month before clinical 
onset.
382
 In addition, MIFAFF officials were concerned that testing all cattle may 
mislead the public to question the fact that there is no BSE in Korean cattle.  
In sum, domestic regulatory policies on BSE in Korea are based on the notion of 
‘not being affected by BSE in the home country’ and these impede the pursuit of 
further efforts to implement regulatory measures. The government takes the stance 
that the current level of regulation is sufficient to prevent BSE and protect 
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consumers’ health and more stringent regulations should be enforced only if BSE 
actually occurs.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the context surrounding the Korean BSE controversy. 
The first section described the political and scientific culture in Korea. Korea 
performed its modernisation projects successfully under a developmental regime. In 
addition, the concentration of political power and elite bureaucratic tradition 
established during the compressed development process reinforced the technocratic 
approach to decision making. Despite political democratisation in the 1980s, there 
does not seem to have been a fundamental change in the technocratic approach of the 
government,  
Science and technology have been used as the main instrument for economic 
growth. The scientific community internalised developmentalism and statism. With a 
lack of resources and knowledge base, the importation of knowledge from the West 
has been not only promoted as a main strategy for rapid economic growth by the 
government but also applied to the reflections and criticisms of the imported 
knowledge. Dependence on foreign knowledge and the ‘catch up’ approach have 
made it difficult to raise and solve indigenous problems of the Korean society, while 
democratic deliberation mechanisms were often used solely for formality purposes.  
The second section provided the policy structure surrounding beef and the BSE 
issue. The MIFAFF’s policy is production-oriented and thus, food safety policy tends 
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to be sidelined. The NVRQS under MIFAFF is comprised of the largest chunk of 
BSE-related research, although BSE research does not have much importance within 
the whole government. Trust in food safety of the Korean people is not high, but 
their concerns are often regarded as an excessively sensitive response by bureaucrats 
and scientists. 
The government’s discretion in creating BSE regulation policy is constrained by 
the international trade environment. The OIE demands scientific justification of 
regulation policy stricter than the recommendations provided by the OIE, in order to 
prevent sanitary measures from being used for protectionism. The enhancing 
authority of the international organisation combined with the WTO’s enforcement 
mechanism is likely to impose constraints on the state’s autonomy. 
The EU, the US, Japan, and Korea all have different BSE regulation policies based 
on various factors such as their historical experience, different interpretations of 
scientific studies, and considerations of their regulatory environment such as 
convenience in implementing regulations, dietary habit of nations, or the cost, as 
well as scientific evidence affecting the regulatory policies. Accordingly, with the 
same purpose of removing risk materials from the human food-chain or of 
eradicating the disease in cattle herds, each country has adopted different regulatory 
policies. The Korean government’s BSE regulation policy is based on the notion of 
‘not being affected by BSE in its own country.’  
In the next two chapters, the detailed story of the Korean BSE controversy will be 
provided.   
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5 The Chronology of BSE controversy in Korea 
(1): policy-making on beef  
5.1 Introduction  
In the spring of 2008, an enraged public took to the streets of Seoul to protest 
against the newly created regulations on US beef. The new beef regulations allowed 
for the importation of beef from cattle older than 30 months of age and some beef 
offal, which had been previously banned. Massive public protest against the 
government’s decision was sparked by a TV program showing the potential risk of a 
BSE epidemic from imported US beef. Public protests lasted more than two months 
and ended when the government suspended the import of beef from animals older 
than 30 months until such time as the concern of Korean people was eased.
383
 
Despite accumulated knowledge of BSE through the experience of the UK and many 
European countries in the 1990s, BSE was still uncertain and controversial. People 
were confused by contradictory claims about BSE from the government and 
dissenters, while scientific discussions organised by scientists failed to calm the 
controversy.  
The Korean BSE controversy looked similar to that of the UK on the surface. It 
seemed that the Korean government had decided to import risky beef from the US 
while hiding the risk, and the beef safety claims of the government often overlapped 
with the UK government’s reassurance that had been finally revealed as policy 
                                                 
383
 According to the National Police Agency, 2,398 assemblies were held, and about one million 
people participated in demonstrations from 2 May to 15 August 2008. Seoul Central District 
Prosecutors’ office, White Paper on Illegal Violent Demonstrations Objecting US Beef Import. 
 158 
failure. In particular, the government’s abrupt policy-shift on US beef in 2008 was 
mainly accused of causing the controversy. However, what should be considered in 
the Korean BSE controversy is that beef was a long pending issue which entangled 
political and economic interests between Korea and the US; it was not just a food 
issue. As such, the BSE controversy in 2008 cannot be reduced to the events of 2008, 
but must be understood from within a broader policy context which includes the 
question of the relationship between Korea and the US, tracing back to the period 
prior to 2008.  
The BSE controversy story in Korea will be presented in the next two chapters. 
Firstly, this chapter, the first part of the Korean BSE controversy, will focus on the 
regulatory policy-making process for US beef within the Korean government. As one 
of the largest beef exporting countries, the US has been trying to increase beef export 
to Korea since the 1980s, although export of this beef to Korea was stopped due to a 
BSE case in the US in 2003. Although the Korean beef market was open to the US in 
2006, the export did not go on smoothly. By following the ban and resumption 
process chronologically, I will show how and why the Korean government chose the 
policy on beef which would be imported from the US and what role the scientific 
advisors played in the policy-making process. Through this, I will show how the 
Korean government’s regulatory policy on US beef was formulated amidst complex 
political and economic relations between Korea and the US, and how scientific 
expertise was used in the policy process.  
The first section of this chapter summarises the BSE process, from the US beef 
ban in 2003 to the partial lifting in 2006. The second section will focus specifically 
 159 
on the process whereby the beef requirements agreed in 2006 were relaxed and new 
beef conditions were implemented in 2008. 
 
5.2 Korea and US beef before 2007  
This section presents the BSE process, from the US beef ban in 2003 to the partial 
lifting of the ban on boneless muscle meat in 2006. First, I will provide the 
background necessary to understand the relationship between Korea and the US 
regarding beef, before dealing with the BSE controversy itself. Beef has been an 
issue of conflict for the US since the 1980s. Korea became one of the largest beef 
markets for the US, after sustained American pressure, although BSE in the US in 
2003 led to a ban on US beef by the Korean government. Korea resumed the import 
of boneless muscle meat from cattle under 30 months of age in 2006. In the second 
part of this section, I will describe the policy process which led to the Korean 
government’s decision to lift the ban on boneless muscle meat, with a focus on the 
Korean MIFAFF’s advisory body, the National Livestock Health Control Council 
(NLHCC). In the last part of this section, I will describe the disputes between the 
government and civil activists over the newly made beef import requirements which 
allowed for the import of boneless muscle meat.  
 
5.2.1 Korean beef market and BSE in the US 
Beef conflict between Korea and the US 
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Korea and the US have a long history of beef conflicts. Korea started to import 
beef in 1976 as the domestic demand of beef increased. The increase in beef import 
forced cattle prices in Korea down, and the Korean government stopped importing 
foreign beef from 1985 to 1987 to protect the livestock industry. Following this, the 
US, Australia, and New Zealand took this ban to the GATT Dispute Panel, and the 
Korean government, which lost the GATT decision, resumed beef import in 1988.
384
 
The Korean beef market was open in earnest with the Uruguay Round (UR) 
agriculture agreement which was concluded in December 1993, and as of 1995, the 
WTO (World Trade Organization) regime has been increasing pressure with regard 
to the opening of the agricultural market.
385
 The Korean government agreed to 
increase its beef import quota (obligatory importing of a certain quantity of beef) and 
to fully open its beef market by 2000. The importation of beef increased rapidly, and 
as a result, the US became one of the main beef exporting countries to Korea, with 
its market share increasing from 44% in 1993 to 61% in 1999.
386
  
However, as Korea suffered depreciation and economic downturn due to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, beef import decreased seriously. In 1999, the US and 
Australia filed a complaint with the WTO against Korea, arguing that the separation 
policy of the Korean government between stores which could sell only Korean beef 
and stores which could sell only imported beef separately, discriminated against 
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imported beef. Korea has fundamental constraints when it comes to the development 
of beef farming, such as small scale cattle farming, shortage of pastures, and 
dependence on imported animal feed. Indeed, the self-support rate of beef in Korea 
is normally 50-60%. As Korean people generally prefer Korean beef (Hanwoo) to 
imported beef, Korean beef is normally two or three times more expensive than 
imported beef. As a result, fraud is commonplace, with immoral retailers fabricating 
the origin of imported food as domestic and selling it at a higher price. The Korean 
government argued that the separation policy of beef selling stores was a kind of 
labelling system to prevent beef origin fraud and to protect consumers’ rights to 
know the origin of beef; however, Korea lost the suit. 
As a result of pressure to open the beef market from the US since the 1980s, US 
beef became a symbol of economic invasion of Western imperialism which would 
impoverish Korean agriculture. Generally speaking, Korean agricultural products are 
not competitive in terms of price against foreign ones produced in large quantities. 
With rice, the opening of the Korean beef market has been a principal issue on the 
agenda of all international trade meetings. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, cattle 
have long been regarded as the most precious property by farming households in 
Korea. Stories of parents who sold oxen to pay the university fees of their children 
were common in the 1970s-80s. Moreover, as the livestock industry has grown to be 
the second largest part of Korean agriculture (31.5% of total agricultural products in 
2007), it looked evident that increasing beef import would ruin Korea’s entire 
domestic livestock industry. It was a common sight in the 1980s-90s to see angry 
farmers taking to the streets with their calves, protesting against the opening up of 
the agriculture market, whenever important trade negotiations were held.  
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BSE in the US in 2003 
Korea was the third largest overseas market of US beef in 2003 with the import of 
200,000 tons of beef (850 million USD), before a BSE-infected 6 years and 6 
months old Holstein dairy cow was discovered in Washington State on December 24, 
2003.
387
 The Korean government immediately imposed a ban on beef products from 
the US (on 27 December 2003). The Korean government’s policy was to ban 
importation of ruminant-originating commodities from the countries with BSE 
incidence or suspected risk since 1996, and the immediate ban on US beef products 
was based on this rule. In addition to Korea, more than twenty countries imposed a 
ban on US beef products.
388
  
The US government announced that the BSE-infected animal in Washington State 
was imported from Canada when it had been a calf. After the announcement, the US 
government requested that its main beef market countries resume beef import from 
the US. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) said that the OIE did not 
recommend banning skeletal muscle meat which was considered to be safe to 
consume, and claimed that many countries’ bans on US beef were not in compliance 
with the OIE standards.
389
 Meanwhile, a new BSE-infected cow was detected in 
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Texas on November 19, 2004. After an investigation, the US government stated that 
it was a 12-year-old cow which had been born before the animal feed ban (ban on the 
use of ruminant protein for ruminant animal feed) introduced in April 1998 and that 
it was an atypical BSE case. As mentioned in Chapter 3, atypical BSE is a type of 
BSE which differs from the typical case which occurred in the UK due to the 
infection by contaminated animal feed. Moreover, neither the infectivity of atypical 
BSE to humans nor the risks have yet been proven. The US government pressured 
the main US beef importing countries such as Japan and Korea to resume beef 
import, arguing that there were no problems in US cattle. The US was blamed by the 
Korean media for threatening beef importing countries with possible trade conflict 
all in the name of economic profit.
390
 Seoul Economic Daily stated in its editorial:  
… the [Korean] government should not submit to any type of pressure to 
ease the beef ban which will threaten the nation’s life, until the safety of 
US beef from BSE is confirmed by the enforced measurement of the US 
government. …           
 
Although the Korean government prohibited importation of US beef, it allowed 
distribution of boneless muscle meat which had been imported from the US before 
the beef ban in December 2003 and stored in cold warehouses.
391
 This was due to 
expectations of a serious beef supply shortage and a rise in beef prices in the 
domestic market. Even though Korea imported beef from Australia, New Zealand, 
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and Mexico, in addition to the US, they could not substitute US beef which had 
accounted for more than 40% of the Korean beef market share before the ban. The 
grounds of the decision to allow the distribution of US beef was that whereas the 
BSE-infected animal discovered in the US was a cow older than four years, US beef 
which had been imported to Korea was generally from cattle aged under two years. 
The minister said that it was unlikely that people would be contaminated with BSE 
by eating beef except for Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) which were known to 
have high infectivity.
392
 However, domestic beef consumption dropped significantly 
(37% in January, 29% in February, and 17% in March 2004), despite assurances 
about beef safety from the government.
393  
 
5.2.2Decision to resume US beef import: National Livestock 
Health Control Council (NLHCC)   
“US made the re-opening of the Korean beef market a top priority” and officially 
requested that the Korean government enter into discussions on the beef issue.
394
 
Both countries started steps to re-open the Korean beef market to the US from April 
2005. In this section, the way in which the Korean government made the decision to 
resume US beef import will be described, with a focus on the role of the National 
Livestock Health Control Council (NLHCC).   
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The National Livestock Health Control Council (NLHCC) 
The National Livestock Health Control Council (NLHCC) is the highest level of 
an advisory committee which is set and operated in accordance with the Act on the 
Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases. The mission of the NLHCC is to provide 
policy advice to the minister of the MIFAFF on livestock quarantine issues, for 
example, the prevention of epidemics, inspection of animals for export/import, and 
improvement of the national quarantine system.
395
 It is also the council’s mission to 
consult on import risk assessment performed by the NVRQS which is crucial to 
decisions regarding whether or not to allow importation of meat products from 
foreign countries. However, the minister is not legally bound to follow the advice of 
the NLHCC. 
The NLHCC consists of experts in livestock farming and veterinary fields. The 
Act on the Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases defines the qualification of the 
members as “persons who have expertise in livestock farming or veterinary 
medicine.”396 There are no other restrictions on the council’s composition except 
that one representative of civil organisations and one female member should be 
included; the council should also be comprised of less than sixty members. The chair 
of the NLHCC is the Deputy Minister of MIFAFF, and the Director General of 
Livestock Policy Bureau is the vice chair. One of the division-heads at the MIFAFF 
takes charge of the secretary of the NLHCC (and therefore, the secretary of the 
NLHCC changes as meeting issues change). Like most advisory committees within 
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the government, there are no secretariat personnel with full responsibility for the 
council.  
The members of the NLHCC are chosen by MIFAFF civil servants on the basis of 
their professional knowledge, reputation and experience, or institutional affiliation of 
individuals. Officials at the NVRQS and CDC (Center for Diseases Control under 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare) are usually invited as advisory members. 
Representatives of the livestock industry and consumers’ organisations are also 
included. The biggest group is academic scientists. For example, the NLHCC had 59 
members as of December 2009: 12 were general administrators of the MIFAFF, and 
civil scientists of governmental agencies (NVRQS and CDC) and national/ local 
institutes; 23 were scientists mainly in the veterinary field with a few in medicine; 8 
were representatives of livestock producers’ associations; 6 were from civil 
organisations; 6 from industry, and 2 from the government-associated agency. The 
term of advisory members is two years and members can be reappointed after the 
end of the term. 
The NLHCC is not a standing committee and the committee meeting is convened 
by the MIFAFF when needs arise. The plenary meeting in which all 60 NLHCC 
members attend is scarcely held. Instead, the NLHCC has 5 sub-committees (Foot 
and Mouth Disease, BSE, Cattle diseases, Pig disease, and Fowl diseases) while the 
sub-committees are practical units which are convened as the NLHCC meeting by 
the government. Sub-committees generally consist of civil servants from MIFAFF 
and NVRQS (general administrators and civil scientists), producers’ and consumers’ 
representatives, personnel from MIFAFF-associated quangos, and scientists from 
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academia. The number of scientists from academia is 5 - 7 out of nearly 20 members 
of each sub-committee. Members from the government and the government 
associated organiwations usually constitute nearly 30% of the membership.  
The members of the BSE sub-committee meeting included: 5 civil servants (3 
from the MIFAFF and NVRQS, and two from the CDC); 1 from the Livestock 
Health Control Association (an executive-QANGO of MIFAFF); 4 from producers’ 
organisations (the Korean Beef Association, the Korea Dairy and Beef Association, 
the Korea Feed Ingredients Association, and the Korea Feed Association); 1 or 2 
from consumers’ organisations (the Citizens group for Consumers’ issue), and 
scientists in academia.
397
 The scientists were: Joong-bok Lee (professor at Konkuk 
University, veterinary epidemiology), Min-chul Lee (professor at Chonnam National 
University, neuropathology), Yoon-jae Choi (professor at Seoul National University, 
animal cell engineering), Su-hwan Ahn (visiting professor at Kyungpook National 
University, later Livestock Health Control Association, veterinary epidemiology), 
and Yong-sun Kim (professor at Hallym University, virology). Later, Sun-il Park 
(professor at Kangwon National University, veterinary clinical pathology and 
epidemiology), Han-sang Yoo (professor at Seoul National University, veterinary 
microbiology) replaced Min-chul Lee and Yoon-je Choi. Hee-jong Woo (professor at 
Seoul National University, veterinary immunology), and Yong-soon Lee (professor at 
Seoul National University, former director of Korea Food and Drug Agency, 
veterinary pathology) also joined. Some scientists were former MIFAFF/NVRQS 
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officials or concurrent researchers at the NVRQS, or had a personal relationship with 
MIFAFF and NVRQS officials as academic advisors. As the NVRQS is the oldest 
and the biggest research institution in Korea’s veterinary field, and interchange of 
veterinary civil servants between MIFAFF and NVRQS is frequent, veterinary 
scientists are likely to have either formal or informal network connections with the 
MIFAFF and NVRQS in some way. 
Scientists were chosen by civil servants under considerations of various factors 
such as discipline, expertise, and institution. Scientist members of NLHCC were not 
the ‘great and good’ in the British sense, where expert committees were visible even 
to ordinary people and advisory members were recognised by their service to public 
issues.
398
 Of course, some scientists are more often invited to governmental 
committees due to their experience, but this does not have such an impact or honour 
in their public life. The scientist members of the NLHCC were leading scientists in 
their fields, although most of them were not active researchers in TSE. (The lack of 
research base for BSE and vCJD in Korea has already been presented in the previous 
chapter.) As such, it was not strange to see scientists in the BSE sub-committee 
involved in research on other animal disease issues such as Foot and Mouth Disease 
or Avian Influenza. Nevertheless, scientists such as Joong-bok Lee, Yong-sun Kim, 
and Yong-soon Lee were often invited by the MIFAFF as advisors for BSE issues 
regardless of their NLHCC membership, since the beginning of the 2000s when BSE 
spread throughout Europe. In particular, Yong-sun Kim was a generally-admitted 
expert in prion disease research and had the only CJD diagnosis and autopsy centre 
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in Korea.  
 
Decision to resume US beef import  
On 29
th
 November 2005, the MIFAFF held an NLHCC meeting (actually the BSE 
sub-committee, chaired by MIFAFF Deputy Minister) to discuss whether to start the 
process to resume beef imports with the US. The government had already formed a 
tentative conclusion that beef importation from the US would not increase BSE risk 
in Korea and resuming US beef import was unavoidable. The grounding was that the 
US had already implemented regulation policies in accordance with the OIE 
guidelines. Once it was agreed at the NLHCC, the official negotiation process 
between the two countries would start. To start the negotiation meant that 
importation of US beef would be resumed at any rate, although the scope and 
conditions would be established through negotiations between the two countries. 
At the meeting, the MIFAFF argued that BSE incidence in the US was very low 
and the risk was controlled properly in accordance with the OIE guideline. In 
addition, it was presented that the OIE defined muscle meat from carcasses of 
animals under 30 months as a safe commodity which could be traded regardless of 
exporting countries’ BSE incidence. According to the press release by MIFAFF, 
scientists agreed with the government in that BSE- risk in US beef was very low and 
beef from animals under 30 months was recognised as safe to eat.
399
 Nevertheless, 
they also pointed out that the science of BSE was not perfectly known and SRMs 
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were still used for non-ruminant animal feed in the US. The NLHCC meeting on 29
th
 
November did not reach an agreement about whether to start the process for 
resuming the import of US beef. The Farmers’ Newspaper reported that the head of 
the Han woo (Korean beef) Association asked scientists to consider beef farmers.
400
 
According to the report, MIFAFF officials tried to coax beef producers with policy 
measures to support livestock farmers, but failed. 
With regard to the NLHCC meeting on 29
th
 November which ended without 
conclusion, the Director General of the Livestock Policy Bureau at MIFAFF said, 
“The government will try to get support from NLHCC members until mid December” 
and “the economic damage of domestic livestock farmers cannot be an excuse to 
postpone resuming US beef any longer.
401
 Another official stated, “As the safety of 
US beef was scientifically confirmed, the government would induce the members to 
agree to resume beef import.” He added “Even if the NLHCC meeting will not be 
able to bring a conclusion, the authority to make the decision whether to resume beef 
import is on the minister.”402 This meant that the government would press ahead 
with the resumption process even without the agreement of the NLHCC. 
The 2
nd
 NLHCC meeting (chaired by MIFAFF Deputy Minister) was held on 14
th
 
December 2005. Scientists generally agreed that there was no concern about BSE 
risk  in US beef as long as appropriate restrictions were imposed. However, there 
were claims that as the surveillance system in the US was not sufficient enough to 
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guarantee the beef safety. The producers’ and consumers’ representatives requested 
that the government not start negotiation with the US, arguing that the Korean 
consumers still did not trust US beef. NLHCC members again failed to reach an 
agreement this time. However, an MIFAFF official said that there was no 
justification to postpone resuming US beef as long as scientists agreed about the 
safety of US beef and the final decision authority about whether to start the 
negotiation belonged to the MIFAFF Minister.
403
 Finally, the MIFAFF announced 
the start of beef negotiation with the US.  
 
5.2.3 Import Health Requirements for US beef (2006) 
Disputes over the import sanitary requirements for US beef 
In January 2006 the Korean government agreed to resume import of US beef 
which had been banned since 2003, thus leading to the establishment of the ‘Import 
Health Requirements for US Beef and Beef products’ (hereafter ‘beef import 
requirements 2006’) in June 2006. The summary of the requirements was:  
1) Korea imports only deboned skeletal muscle meat from carcasses under 
30 months. (SRM, diaphragm, trimmings, tongue, cheek meat, ground 
meat, mechanically recovered / separated meat and products from 
advanced meat recovery, offal, and processed meat products cannot be 
imported.); 
2) SRMs (Specified Risk Materials) are brain, eye, spinal cord, skull, 
vertebral column, tonsil, distal ileum and protein products produced from 
these.; 
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3) The Korean government has the right to impose a unilateral ban on US 
beef in case that this requirement was not observed by the US, BSE-risk in 
the US was judged to be exacerbated, or BSE occurred in cattle born after 
the feed ban in April 1998.  
 
The MIFAFF minister explained that deboned skeletal muscle meat from animals 
younger than 30 months was safe, and the BSE surveillance program and animal 
feed policy in the US satisfied international requirements.
404 
In 2005, the OIE 
defined deboned skeletal muscle meat from animals younger than 30 months when 
slaughtered as a safe commodity which could be traded regardless of beef exporting 
countries’ BSE risk statuses.  
Civil activists (Sang-pyo Park of the ‘Veterinarians’ Association for Public Health’ 
and Seok-kyun Woo of the ‘Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights’) 
raised opposition to the government’s decision to resume US beef import.405 While 
they held the positions of veterinary surgeon and medical doctor respectively, they 
were not trained scientists. They argued that the BSE pathogen was discovered even 
in animals under 30 months and skeletal muscle meat was not perfectly safe to eat. 
As for the evidence, they referred to the experiments which detected abnormal prions 
in muscle tissue of sCJD patients and which detected scrapie agent in skeletal 
muscles of scrapie-infected mice (The latter study was carried out by the research 
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group of Stanley Prusiner who won the Nobel prize with his prion theory).
406
 In 
addition, they claimed that as the animal feed ban in the US was not sufficient to 
prevent cross contamination in poultry and pigs which had eaten cattle-originating 
animals, protein feed was used for cattle feed again, and only less than 1% of 
slaughtered cattle were inspected in the US.
407
 They argued that violations of BSE 
regulation in farmhouses and abattoirs were frequent in the US, quoting US civil 
organisations’ reports.408 
The MIFAFF refuted the claims of civil organisations. With regard to the activists’ 
claim of the risk of muscle meat, the ministry said that the detection of the BSE 
pathogen in muscle tissue had taken place in an experimental condition and that the 
BSE pathogen was never detected in meat for human consumption, referring to the 
European Commission (EC) Scientific Steering Committee.
409
 EC considered the 
risk of exposure to BSE infectivity via muscle tissue negligible, given the limited 
conditions of experiments (such as use of transgenic mice or intracerebral infection 
which is much more efficient than oral consumption route), the different species 
barrier, and risk reduction measures which were in place.
410
 The MIFAFF stated that 
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BSE cases in cattle under 30 months were ‘atypical’ BSE cases which are considered 
to be caused by different routes from the traditional BSE which was transmitted by 
contaminated animal feed, and that the infectivity to humans of atypical BSE has not 
been confirmed.
411
 (Regarding atypical BSE, see Chapter 3.2) 
With respect to activists’ claim about the animal feed policy in the US, the 
MIFAFF said that there was no case of BSE infection from feeding non-ruminant 
animal protein to cattle and almost 99% of animal feed factories in the US separated 
establishments which dealt with only one animal protein feed material (ruminant or 
non-ruminant) to prevent cross contamination. Regarding the low inspection rate 
which was less than 1%, the MIFAFF said that it was more effective to inspect 
higher-risk animals (such as non-ambulatory animals or animals with clinical 
symptoms) than a large number of normal ones in order to detect BSE cases, and that 
the US had already satisfied conditions specified by the OIE. Most of all, the 
MIFAFF argued that as Korea had the right to ban importing US beef as a last resort, 
the beef safety would be guaranteed.
412
 
…, for the greater safety, the new beef requirements invests the Korean 
government with the right to stop importing US beef in case that new BSE 
cases occur from animals born after 1998 animal feed regulation policy, 
BSE risk within the US is exacerbated (such as violation of the animal feed 
ban, failure in removing SRMs in slaughterhouses), or additional BSE risk 
is identified with the development of new technology (e.g. international 
recognition of BSE infectivity in muscle meat).
413
 
                                                                                                                                          
Statement Adopted by the Scientific Steering Committee at Its Meeting of 4-5 April 2002,” n.d.  
411
 Chang-sub Kim. “Public health concern is the first in resuming US beef”   
412
 MIFAFF, “The Government’s Opinion about the Resumption of US Beef, Conference Documents 
Presented by THE MIFAFF at the Conference Organized by Ki-Gab Kang (assemblyman) in National 
Assembly on 28 April 2006,” n.d. (my translation and summary) 
413
 Ibid. 
 175 
Safety of muscle meat  
The main point of the ‘Import Health Requirements for US Beef and Beef 
products’ (2006) was to allow deboned skeletal muscle meat from animals younger 
than 30 months to be imported. Indeed, this was based on the OIE’s decision in 2005 
to designate boneless skeletal muscle meat from animals under 30 months of age as a 
safe commodity for trade. The Korean government dismissed claims from civil 
organisations that muscle meat from animals under 30 months might not be safe 
from BSE as unscientific.
414
 However, the position of the Korean government 
regarding the safety of skeletal muscle meat at the OIE meeting in July 2005 did not 
differ considerably from that of the Korean civil activists in 2006. 
At the 73
rd
 General Session of the OIE meeting (22-27 May 2005, Paris), 
countries discussed the proposal of the Terrestrial Code Commission of the OIE to 
place deboned skeletal muscle meat in the list of safe commodities which could be 
traded without any restriction regardless of the BSE status of the exporting country. 
Following this, the safe commodities by the OIE Terrestrial Code were: 1) milk and 
milk products; 2) semen and in vivo derived cattle embryos; 3) protein-free tallow 
and derivatives made from this tallow; 4) dicalcium phosphate; 5) hides and skins; 
and 6) gelatin and collagen prepared exclusively from hides and skins.
415
 Fresh meat 
(bone-in or deboned) could be traded with increasing restrictions according to the 
five risk-levels of exporting country status (free, provisionally free, minimal risk, 
                                                 
414
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moderate risk and high risk).
416
 For example, in order for a ‘BSE provisionally free’ 
country to export fresh meat, it was required to present evidence that an ante-mortem 
inspection of “all cattle from which the meat or meat products destined for export 
originate” had been carried out.417 On the contrary, a ‘BSE high risk’ country was 
required to present much more evidence to export fresh meat such as non-
contamination by SRMs, operation of identification and trace-back system, a ban on 
ruminant-derived MBM for ruminant and its effective enforcement, ante-mortem 
inspection for all bovines, and so on.
418
  
According to the report written by the MIFAFF after the OIE 73
rd
 General Session, 
the delegates of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan had a previous meeting before the General 
Session and agreed to oppose the proposal of the Terrestrial Code Commission 
which included boneless skeletal muscle meat in the list of safe commodities. They 
argued that BSE-infectivity might exist in muscle tissue, referring to research results 
which showed that prions existed in the muscle of experimentally infected 
hamsters.
419
 Following this, the delegate of the US opposed the claims of Korea, 
Taiwan, and Japan, arguing that it was too excessively cautious to refer to the results 
of research using genetically modified animals for practical regulation.
420
 While 
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore expressed concerns about the certainty of the 
safety of muscle meat, the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Luxemburg (on behalf of 
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the EU) supported the proposal to designate muscle meat as a safe commodity for 
trade. Finally, a revised proposal was made by adding the condition “from cattle 30 
months of age or less”, and the proposal was passed despite objections from 8 
members, including one from Korea.
421
 ‘Deboned skeletal muscle meat from 
animals under 30 months of age became a safe commodity which could be traded 
regardless of the BSE risk status of exporting countries.  
However, in the domestic disputes over the ‘Import Health Requirements for US 
Beef and Beef products’ (2006), the Korean government discounted civil 
organisations’ claims that muscle meat might not be safe from BSE risk, despite the 
government itself havingraised similar claims at the OIE meeting in 2005. Presented 
again later, the Korean government raised the uncertainty of BSE knowledge in the 
international situation such as beef negotiation with the US or the OIE meetings. It 
may be no coincidence that Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, which opposed the proposal 
to designate muscle meat as a safe commodity at the OIE meeting, were “former top 
markets in Asia” of US beef and were pressured by the US to resume US beef import 
which had been at a standstill since the BSE case in 2003.
422
 The Korean 
government dismissed the uncertainty raised by the civil activists on the basis that 
their claims were unscientific. The dilemma was caused by the situation that the 
                                                 
421
 The full condition added was: “from cattle 30 months of age or less which were not subjected to a 
stunning process, prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial 
cavity, or to a pithing process, and which were subject to ante- and post-mortem inspection and were 
not suspect or confirmed BSE cases; and which has been prepared in a manner to avoid contamination 
with tissues listed in Article 13 [of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code]” OIE, Final Report on the 
73rd General Session, p.172 
c.f. ‘pith’ means “pierce or sever the spinal cord of (an animal) so as to kill or immobilize it.”  (The 
New Oxford American Dictionary) 
422 USTR, “Bush Administration Submits Annual Trade Report to Congress,” March 2008, 
http://www.ustr.gov/bush-administration-submits-annual-trade-report-congress. 
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government should protect the domestic beef market against the US, and at the same 
time, should reassure the consumers about the safety of beef in the market.   
The dual attitude to boning expressed by the government was another example. 
The Korean government was criticised by dissenters for alledgedly permitting US 
beef import with less favourable conditions than those of Japan which had made an 
agreement with the US to import only beef from cattle under the age of 20 months. 
Indeed, it was said that the Korean government had wanted to allow boneless beef 
from animals under 20 months like Japan, but failed to achieve it.
423
 However, the 
government claimed that the Korean condition focussed more on safety than that of 
Japan:  
Japan agreed to import bone-in beef from cattle under 20 months, but 
Korea focussed on the removal of bone rather than the age of slaughtered 
animals, considering safety.   
Japan allowed importation of bone and intestines, but Korea still bans 
them. It is for consumers’ safety.  
 
In addition, allowing only deboned muscle meat had economic implications for 
the Korean government. Although MIFAFF put safety concerns at the forefront of 
banning bone, the economic implications could not be neglected. The government 
said: 
Considering that half of US beef importation was short ribs (including 
bone) before the beef ban in 2003, the decision to ban import of bone will 
make a positive effect on stabilizing profit of domestic livestock 
                                                 
423
 Mark E. Manyin, South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for 
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Updated February 9, 2006, CRS Report for Congress, n.d. 
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farmers.
424
  
 
Short ribs, one of the favourite cuts for Korean people, consisted of about 60% of 
beef imports from the US in 2003 (132,568 tons out of 199,443 tons). Dong-suk Min, 
Deputy Minister of the MIFAFF and the head negotiator of the beef deal with the US 
in 2008, said that although bone was presented as a safety issue, the actual goal of 
the ban on bone-in beef was to decrease the importation of short ribs.
425
  
It was actual tasks to protect domestic livestock farmers from US beef 
importation. It was because US beef was more competitive in price than 
Korean beef even with 40% of customs. Therefore, the Korean government 
limited importation of US beef by controlling beef sanitary requirements. 
For example, the ban on bone-in beef was to ban on short ribs. 
 
In fact, bone is generally known not to have BSE infectivity. According to the 
WHO, there was a single case where infectivity was detected in the bone marrow of 
experimentally infected cattle, but the finding was never duplicated.
426
 Although 
skulls and vertebral columns from old cattle are defined as Specified Risk Materials 
(SRMs), as seen in Chapter 4.3.3, this was because of the proximity to the central 
nervous system (brain and spinal cord), not because of the inherent infectivity. 
However, bone became recognised as risky material while the government 
                                                 
424
 MIFAFF, “Press Release,” January 17, 2006.  
425
 Dong-suk Min, To Live as Public Servant in Korea (Nanam, 2010). pp. 233-234, my translation 
He was a chief negotiator of the 2008 beef negotiation with the US, which caused the massive public 
protest. During the controversy, he was seriously blamed as betrayer who sold nation’s health to the 
US. He resigned and sued producers of PD Notebook charging defamation. He wrote this book in 
order to justify the beef condition he involved and to explain he was unfairly treated by PD notebook. 
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 World Health Organization, WHO Guidelines on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible 
Spongiform Encephalopathies, 2006. 
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legitimated its regulations on US beef, and the risk concern about bone was 
consolidated through ‘bone fragments conflict’ which will be presented in the next 
section.  
 
5.3 Policy process to amend the beef import 
requirements   
The last section described the background of the relationship between Korea and 
the US regarding beef, as well as the process from the total ban on US beef by the 
Korean government in 2003, to the partial lifting in 2006.  
The Korean government, which imposed a ban on US beef in 2003, lifted the ban 
on boneless muscle meat from cattle under 30 months age in 2006. However, the 
exportation did not go smoothly, and in the meantime, the beef issue became a deal 
breaker of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, the foremost task of the Korean 
government for the economic development. The Korean government promoted 
amending the beef requirements made in 2006 in order to resolve the conflict with 
the US, and it became the direct cause of serious public protests in 2008. This 
section will discuss the process by which the beef import sanitary requirements made 
in 2006 were amended. 
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5.3.1 Conflicts over bone fragments and the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) 
Bone fragments in beef boxes  
Before the ‘Import Health Requirements for US Beef and Beef products’ took 
effect, a third BSE case was confirmed in the US in March 2006. According to the 
beef import requirements, if the BSE-infected animal had been born after the feed 
ban introduced in April 1998, beef import could be stopped again, as this could 
represent evidence that the animal feed ban was not implemented efficiently enough 
to control BSE risk in the US. The US government announced that the animal was a 
10 year-old cow which had been born before 1998, and the Korean government 
accepted the US government’s investigation result. However, there was no evidence 
to verify the animal’s age, except for dentition (examination of teeth).427 Some civil 
organisations argued that dentition was never scientifically credible to confirm the 
BSE-infected animal’s age. They criticised the Korean government for enforcing the 
previously settled position to resume beef import from the US. However, the 
MIFAFF said dentition was a statistically credible way in which to estimate the age 
of cattle. 
The Korean government declared resumption of US beef imports in September 
2006, which had been delayed by the third BSE case. However, the first three 
                                                 
427
 The affected animal was buried before investigation completed and there was no tool to identify 
the BSE-infected animal’s age and origin with no identifying brands or tags. Moreover, the US 
government failed to trace the animals in the same cattle shed with the third BSE-infected animal. Jim 
Rogers, USDA; Rae Jones, FDA; and Christy Rhodes, Alabama,, “Statement by USDA Chief 
Veterinary Officer John Clifford Regarding the Conclusion of the Epidemiological Investigation Into 
a Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)-Positive Cow Found in Alabama, USDA News Release,” 
May 2, 2006, (http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2006/05/alepi.shtml).  
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shipments of US beef (30
th
 October, 23
rd
 November, and 1
st
 December) were rejected, 
due to the fact that tiny bone fragments were found during the inspection process by 
the Korean quarantine authority. The Korean National Veterinary Research and 
Quarantine Service (NVRQS) announced that the bone fragments did not seem to be 
SRMs, but it was a violation of the beef import requirements which prohibited bone. 
Out of 1,615 boxes and 22.3 tons of beef, 10 bone fragments were discovered in 6 
boxes, with the size of the fragments as small as 1~2cm wide. The beef requirements 
did not define the detailed conditions of banned items such as permissible size of 
bone. All beef boxes, not only the boxes which included bone chips, were sent back 
to the US.  
Bone fragments were detected by x-ray detectors which had been newly 
introduced to inspect US beef. The introduction of X-ray detectors was controversial, 
because the only way to confirm BSE-infection is to take a brain sample from 
animals and inspect it, and X-ray detectors cannot detect SRMs such as brain, spinal 
cord or intestines. Civil activists (Sang-pyo Park and Seok-kyun Woo) argued that 
inspection processes using an X-ray detector could not guarantee the safety of US 
beef from BSE risk and that the government was simply pretending to remove BSE 
risk in order to reassure the public. Even MIFAFF officials were sceptical when bone 
detection using X-ray detectors was first suggested by some assembly members. 
MIFAFF officials said that no countries used X-ray detectors to detect bone and it 
was physically impossible to investigate whole shipments with X-ray detectors.
428
 
The background of the decision to introduce X-ray detectors, despite the initial 
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 Tthe Committee for Agriculture, Marine, Fisheries and Forestry at Korean National Assembly, 
Appendix of the Stenographic Record, October 13, 2006.  
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opposition, is not known, although it seems that the MIFAFF, which was pressured 
into reinforcing the quarantine process for US beef from the National Assembly 
made the decision to respond to the pressure.
429
 
Due to the friction over bone fragments, no beef was imported from the US in 
2006, and this strict attitude of the Korean quarantine authority against bone 
fragments faced a backlash from the US. The US government claimed that the 
Korean government imposed an ‘unscientific and non-tolerable’ ban on US beef and 
that this would have a negative effect on the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which 
was in the process of negotiation between the two countries. Sanitary requirements 
for US beef became a more complicated issue after being linked with the FTA, the 
biggest issue facing the two countries.  
 
Beef and the Free Trade Agreement 
The Korean government has promoted Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the 
countries of major export markets since 2003.
430
 The FTA is a kind of regional 
economic integration by reciprocal exclusive trade preference. As trade constitutes 
more than 70% of Korea’s GDP, the Korean government recognised that the FTA 
was crucial to maintain the competitiveness in exportation and to secure the foreign 
market. In particular, the FTA with the US was regarded as the most important one.
 
                                                 
429
 The Korean government, Report of the Requirement for Correction from the 2006 Parliamentary 
Inspection of the Government (for MIFAFF), February 2007. 
430
 By 2008, the Korean government made FTA with Chile, Singapore, EFTA (Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
Norway, and Switzerland), and ASEAN. (“Http://www.fta.go.kr,” n.d. 
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The FTA with the US, the biggest market of Korea, was expected to be helpful in 
advancing the whole national system of Korea and in strengthening the economic 
fundamentals. However, the FTA with the US, the world’s largest agriculture 
products exporting country, was a controversial issue in domestic politics, and was 
criticised for sacrificing agriculture for a few manufacture industries such as car and 
electronics. Fears about economic subordination to the US existed in Korea.  
Due to the conflict with the US over bone fragments, the MIFAFF was under 
attack from other ministries for interfering with the FTA negotiation. Deputy Prime 
Minister for Economy O-kyu Kwon blamed the inflexible manner with which the 
MIFAFF dealt with bone fragments in beef boxes from the US. The MOFE (Ministry 
of Finance and Economy) Assistant Minister for International Business, Sung-jin 
Kim said: “Public health is important, but rational and cool judgment is needed to 
deal with US beef issue” and “it is not appropriate to use policy measures which 
cannot be accepted internationally by reason of public health.”431 He also said, 
“Though we [Korea] need to protect our livestock farmers, our beef price is 5-10 
times more expensive than in other countries” and “48 million Korean people have 
right to consume beef with a reasonable price.”432 Jong-hoon Kim, the Minister for 
Trade, emphasised that it was wrong to create obstacles like quarantine and to refuse 
the demands of friends [US].
433
 Economic and trade officials felt that the MIFAFF 
had a narrow-minded view of nationalism to protect domestic beef farmers.  
                                                 
431
 cited in “[Appraise Korea-US FTA 171] MOFE Argues ‘Returning US Beef with Bone Chips Is 
Not Understandable,’” Pressian, December 22, 2006. (my translation) 
432
 cited in “Ministry of Finance and Economy, Beef Quarantine Requirement Is Irrational.,” 
Farmer’s Newspaper, December 27, 2006. (my translation) 
433
 “[Appraise Korea-US FTA 224] Is Minister Kim on US Side? ‘Obstacle to Beef Should Be 
Removed,’” Pressian, February 7, 2007.  
 185 
We, the country whose 70% of GDP depends on trade, cannot live closing 
door to protect ourselves. …. We should follow global standards.434  
 
Hung-soo Park, the MIFAFF Minister, expressed his dissatisfaction that the 
economic officials viewed beef as trade issue rather than a food safety issue. Beef is 
the second largest agricultural product (30%) next to rice in terms of production 
volume in Korea, but the contribution of the whole agricultural production to Korean 
GDP was only 2.9% in 2005.
435
 Differences in views regarding the domestic beef 
industry between the MIFAFF and the other economy-related ministries were evident. 
The MIFAFF was criticised for not considering national interests but only following 
the public emotion.
436
 Chosun Daily said:  
Korea is in the black annually about 10 billion dollars in trade with the US. 
The amount of export of cars is more than 8 billion dollars and Korea sells 
more than 6 billion dollars of mobile phones. On the contrary, import of 
US beef was 850 million in 2003 before we [Korea] banned it. The beef 
issue is important, but we [Korea] must not lose sight of the much bigger 
and more important issue by being obstinate against global standards. (10 
February 2007, opinion, my translation) 
 
Quarantine and sanitary conditions on beef were not included on the agenda of the 
Korea-US FTA, although the US government openly pressured the Korean 
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 Myung-hwan Yu (MOFAT minister), statement, stenographic report of the Committee for 
Unification and Foreign Affairs and Trade for the inquiry of the Korea – US FTA (Korean National 
Assembly, April 29, 2008)., p.14  (my translation and emphasis) 
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 Jeong-Bin Im and Hae-Ryeon Chung, “Agricultural Policy,” in Korean Agricultural Economics 
Society, Korean Agricultural Economics 50 Years’ Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Korean Agricultural 
Economics Society (Farmers Newspaper, 2009). 
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government to ease the beef ban for the FTA.
437
 According to the Korean 
government’s report leaked to the press on 12th September 2005, opening the Korean 
beef market was one of the conditions which the US requested should be settled 
beforehand to conclude the FTA. Pressures from the US government became 
intensified as FTA negotiation between the two countries progressed. Officially, the 
Korean government denied the co-relation of beef import conditions and the FTA, 
and argued that beef import would be treated entirely based on scientific and 
technical consideration for safety. 
As the US demanded access to the Korean beef market in return for the FTA, the 
safety of US beef became the target of Anti-FTA groups in Korea aiming to oppose 
the FTA itself and their opposition was always connected with Mad Cow Disease. 
‘US beef with full BSE risk’ was cast by the Anti-FTA group as a symbol of 
industrialised agriculture which was driven by commercial force of the globalised 
livestock industry and which threatened the safety of the Korean nation’s health. 
Compared with other abstract agenda related to the FTA, beef with BSE risk was a 
practical and concrete issue which could attract public attention.
438
 Civil 
organisations which opposed the FTA with the US argued against the trade in US 
beef as well, and equated the FTA and importation of US beef with the influx of BSE 
into Korea.
439
 Sang-pyo Park and Seok-kyun Woo, core members of the 
‘Veterinarians’ Solidarity for Public Health’ and the ‘Korean Federation of Medical 
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 Suk-Kyun Woo, “Who Lies?,” Pressian, March 27, 2007.; “Any Problems in Resuming US Beef?,” 
Yeonhab News, January 13, 2006.; “Mad Cow Will Rush in,” brochure of National Anti-FTA 
Movement, 2006.    
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Groups for Health Rights’, who had raised claims about BSE risk in US beef since 
2006 (mentioned in the last section), also belonged to the anti-FTA group.
440
  
BSE risk in Korean beef was rarely spoken of. The activists did not want to make 
public the Korean beef safety issue, despite having noted that the regulatory 
measures on Korean beef were insufficient to reach the safety level they requested of 
US beef. Chosun Daily, a conservative newspaper, said: “motivation of the group 
which is claiming BSE risk in US beef is suspicious whether it is originated from 
true concern about public health.” 441  Scientists holding positions as MIFAFF 
advisory members (Professor Yong-sun Kim at Hallym University, and Su-hwan Ahn 
at Kyungpook University) stated that exaggerating the level of BSE risk in US beef 
could also lead to a huge reduction in consumption of Korean beef as a result of 
deepening public anxiety regarding the safety of all beef products.
442
  
 
5.3.2 The ‘Controlled BSE risk’ state, US    
In order to resolve conflicts over bone fragments, Korea and the US governments 
started a discussion to amend the ‘Import Health Requirements for US Beef and Beef 
products’ agreed in 2006. At the meetings in February and March 2007, the US 
government requested that the Korean government amend the beef import 
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  Kim, “Construction of Oppositional Knowledge.”  
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April 24, 2007.  
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 Discussion at public hearing organized by the “Assembly members’ research group for the 
revitalization of Agriculture” and the “Committee of Livestock Industry Organizations” on 28 April 
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requirements so that any bone chips would no longer hinder beef importation from 
the US. Furthermore, the US government argued that the US would be able to export 
‘beef in all cuts and all ages’ immediately after the OIE classified the US as a 
‘Controlled BSE risk’ state in upcoming May.443  
The reason that the US stuck to the ‘import of beef in all cuts and all ages’ was 
that beef products produced in a Controlled BSE risk state, according to the OIE 
guideline, could be traded, with the exceptions of tonsils and distal ilea from cattle of 
any age and brains, eyes, spinal cords, skulls and vertebral columns from cattle over 
30 months.
444
 In fact, to the US, the recovered beef market following the resumption 
of deboned skeletal muscle meat in 2006 was just 50%, compared with beef export 
of the US to Korea in 2003. This was due to the fact that Korea was “a preferred 
market for certain cuts, particularly short ribs and many offal products.”445  The 
‘Controlled BSE risk’ status opened up a way for the US beef industry to export 
short ribs and offal to Korea, which would bring more profit.  
The requests of the US to import beef of all cuts and all ages were not accepted by 
the MIFAFF. Indeed, the MIFAFF simply stated that it would reject only beef boxes 
where bone chips were found, instead of returning whole shipments including bone 
chips. However, it could not satisfy the US. On 8
th
 March 2007, at the briefing for 
the 8
th
 KORUS FTA negotiation, Wendy Cutler, chief negotiator of the US on 
KORUS FTA, denounced the Korean government’s ban on bone as scientifically un-
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 MIFAFF, “Press Release,” March 8, 2007.  
The conditions for ‘Controlled BSE-risk’ state was shown in Chapter 4. 
444
 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010., Article 11.5.14 
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 U.S. International Trade Commission, Global Beef Trade: Effects of Animal Health, Sanitary, 
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grounded and commercially nonsensical.
446
 The FTA was in crisis and the deadline 
of negotiation set by both governments for the FTA, 31
st
 March 2007, was 
approaching.
447
  
However, with emergent talk via telephone between both countries’ presidents on 
29
th
 March, the Korea-US FTA came, rather dramatically, to a settlement on 2
nd
 April 
2007. In the national address announcing the agreement of KOREA-US FTA, 
Korean President Roh stated that he had promised President Bush to ‘open Korean 
beef market at reasonable level with respecting the recommendation of OIE.’ A 
Korean newspaper stated that due to the president’s statement, the MIFAFF would 
have difficulty in taking a hard-line attitude against US beef as it had done before.
448
 
On 5
th
 April, Deputy US Trade Representative Karan Bhatia stressed that the US 
Congress would not ratify the agreement, unless the Korean government fully 
opened its beef market, mentioning the promise of President Roh. The US seemed to 
regard the promise as complete acceptance of the OIE standard.
449
 
With the assessment of the BSE risk status of the US, there was suspicion that the 
US pressured the OIE to create an advantageous situation for the US. Before 
introducing the current three-category system (‘Undetermined risk’, ‘Controlled risk’, 
and ‘Negligible risk’) in 2005, the OIE had five categories with which to assess BSE 
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risk in the member countries (‘BSE-free’ state, ‘BSE provisionally free’ state, 
‘minimal risk’ state, ‘moderate risk’ state, and ‘high risk’ state). 450  The five 
categories depended on BSE incidence in a country as well as enforcement of risk 
controlling measures. However, the surveillance system is considered more 
significant than BSE incidence in the new three-category system. It seems that the 
condition of BSE which had seemed under control and the considerations of 
international trade had influenced the change of the category system.
451
 As this 
                                                 
450
 The definition of the five categories are as following (OIE, International Animal Health Code 
2002, Chapter 2.3.13.3~7):  
1) ‘BSE-free’ state: no case of BSE; or all cases of BSE have been clearly demonstrated 
to originate directly from the importation of live cattle; or the last indigenous case of BSE 
was reported more than 7 years ago; and the OIE criteria have been complied with at least 
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3) ‘minimal risk’ state: ‘the last indigenous case of BSE more than 7 years ago’; and less 
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OR the last indigenous case of BSE less than 7 years ago and less than one case per 
million BSE incidence rate during each of the last four consecutive 12-month periods 
within the cattle population over 24 months of age in the country or zone, and with at 
least 8 years’ MBM ban and at least 7 years’ compliance of the OIE criteria.  
4) ‘moderate risk’ state: the BSE incidence rate, calculated over the past 12 months, has 
been a) greater than, or equal to, one indigenous case per million and less than, or equal to, 
one hundred cases per million within the cattle population over 24 months of age in the 
country or zone; or b) less than one indigenous case per million for less than four 
consecutive 12-month periods.  
5) ‘high risk’ state: the BSE incidence rate, calculated over the past 12 months, has been a) 
greater than one hundred cases per million within the cattle population over 24 months of 
age in the country or zone; or b) greater than, or equal to, one case per million and less 
than, or equal to, one hundred cases per million within the cattle population over 24 
months of age in the country or zone, but at least one of the other requirements to be 
considered as presenting a moderate BSE risk is not complied with. 
451
 For the background of the change in the categorizing system, the OIE explained as following:  
… It became clear, however, that clinical incidence alone was not a sufficiently robust 
indicator for the categorisation of countries affected by BSE. Additionally, the 
recognition of a single case frequently precipitated the application of disproportionate 
trade barriers, significantly beyond those recommended by the OIE. This was a major 
disincentive to the establishment of surveillance programmes and the reporting of cases. 
… Furthermore, evidence from affected countries suggested that, despite the presence of 
BSE, risk to consumers and to animal health could be controlled with effective, and fully 
enforced, measures. It was therefore no longer necessary to create arbitrary divisions 
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change provided favourable conditions to the US where BSE cases had been 
continuously discovered since 2003, some US civil organisations raised suspicion 
that the US exercised its influence over the change and the OIE’s assessment of its 
BSE risk status.
452
 Likewise, the Korean civil organisations, which held 
demonstrations in front of the OIE headquarter while the 75
th
 general session was in 
progress, also argued that the US pressured the OIE to classify the US as a 
‘Controlled BSE risk’ state. They claimed that it would be the evidence which 
indicated that the OIE existed for profit of the multinational livestock industry not 
for public health, if OIE would make decisions as the US wanted.
453
   
The US was identified as a ‘Controlled BSE risk’ state at the 75th OIE general 
session in May 2007. Following this, both Korea and Japan opposed the preliminary 
assessment regarding the risk status of the US, arguing that the cattle traceability 
system was incomplete and the animal feed policy could not prevent cross-
contamination. They pointed out that the US government failed to trace the animals 
in the same cattle shed with the third BSE-infected animal, which were assumed to 
be at a high risk of being infected with BSE, and the animal feed policy allowed 
                                                                                                                                          
between affected countries based upon case numbers. After all, case numbers reflected 
infections acquired four to eight years earlier rather than risk in the country at the time of 
detection. ... 
D Matthews and A Adkin, “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Is It Time to Relax BSE-Related 
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Office of Epizootics) 30, no. 1 (April 2011): 107–117. p.109  
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ruminant protein for pigs and poultry feed.
454
 However, although flaws in the US 
animal feed policy and the surveillance system were admitted by the OIE, the 
resolution to define the US as a ‘Controlled BSE risk’ state was passed by a vote of 
member states.
455
  
As soon as the OIE resolution was made, the US argued that as the OIE 
recognised the safety of US beef, Korea should import US beef in accordance with 
the OIE guidelines on the ‘Controlled BSE risk state.’ The United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) top official commented on this matter, stating that this “risk 
classification recognizes that OIE-recommended, science-based measures are in 
place to manage effectively any possible risk of BSE in the [US] cattle population” 
and “provides strong support that the US regulatory controls are effective and that 
US cattle and products from cattle of all ages can be safely traded in accordance with 
international guidelines, due to our interlocking safeguards.” 456  Max Baucus, an 
American Senator from one of the major cattle production states, said on 23
rd
 May 
that the Korean government could not refuse US beef with the excuse of public 
health.
457
 The next day, the US ambassador reminded the Korean government of the 
promise of President Roh one month before.  
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As previously mentioned, the Korean government officially denied the connection 
between beef import and the FTA. However, it recognised that a wider opening of 
the beef market than the current level was inescapable. President Roh said: “Once 
the international organization recognizes no (BSE) risk in US beef, Korea has no 
choice but to import beef, regardless of the FTA with the US.”458 He also said: 
“Some progressive politicians, who oppose US beef import, arguing ‘BSE-infected 
beef will be imported with the conclusion of the Korea-US FTA’, are exaggerating 
scare.”459 Nevertheless, the government did not externally admit the safety of US 
beef. This was because the beef market represented one of the most significant 
bargaining chips in relations with the US. Moreover, Korean consumers’ concern 
about BSE risk in US beef would be helpful in securing the incomes of domestic 
beef farmers, when the beef market is fully open.
460
 In a joint press release 
regarding the ‘Controlled BSE risk’ status of the US which was written by the 
MIFAFF, the Ministry of Finance and Economics (MOFE), and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) on 28
th
 May 2007, the government reassured 
beef farmers, stating that the government would prepare support measures for beef 
farming households which would be damaged by the OIE’s decision for the US. 
However, the press release did not mention the public health issue regarding BSE.
 461
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5.3.3 Import risk analysis and expert committee 
After being identified as a ‘Controlled-risk state’ by the OIE, the US government 
officially asked the Korean government to amend the ‘Import Health Requirements 
for US Beef and Beef products’ agreed in 2006 in accordance with the new BSE risk 
status of the US. The ‘import risk analysis’ was needed to resume importation from 
the US, which had been partly banned. The objective of ‘import risk analysis’ is to 
assess the likelihood of the influx of pathogens and of the spread of diseases by 
importing meat products or animals.
462
 The general steps with regard to allowing 
meat products from a certain country were:  
1) To consider the permissibility of import by preliminary risk assessment 
based on existing information;  
2) To send a questionnaire about livestock sanitation to the country which 
wants to export animal or meat products (hereafter ‘exporting country’) for 
information about animal diseases, condition and control system;  
3) To review and assess the possible influx of pathogens through 
importation of the commodity, based on the answers of the exporting 
country about the questionnaire;  
4) To dispatch experts and investigate livestock sanitary conditions in the 
exporting country in order to verify the information provided by the 
exporting country and the preliminary assessment made through the 
previous steps;  
5) To decide whether to permit importation when the safety of the 
commodity is confirmed (if necessary, NLHCC will be held to consider 
and make recommendations for the MIFAFF minister);   
6) To discuss import sanitary requirements with the exporting country in 
order to minimise the risk of influx of animal diseases;  
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7) To establish and to announce import sanitary requirements; 
8) To approve meat establishments which are qualified to export; and to 
confirm certificate forms.
463
  
 
The Korean government pushed ahead with these steps swiftly. The first step was 
omitted because US beef had already been imported. After the Korean government 
sent a questionnaire regarding livestock sanitation to the US and received answers, a 
field investigation was carried out in order to assess the livestock sanitary conditions 
in the US from 30
th
 June to 4
th
 July 2007. The government said that experts who 
participated in the field investigation concluded that the likelihood of the influx of 
BSE to Korea and infection to human by importing US beef was negligible.
464
 The 
investigation team’s conclusion was:  
It does not seem that BSE was perfectly eradicated in the US, considering 
that US had no cattle traceability system and cross-contamination risk 
remains due to the use of non-ruminant animal protein. However as the US 
meets the requirements of the ‘Controlled BSE risk’ requested by OIE, and 
BSE-infected animals can be detected through surveillance and screening, 
the risk of human infection and introduction of the disease in Korea is 
negligible.
465
  
 
The grounding of the risk analysis conclusion by the government was that BSE 
risk was controlled by animal feed regulations and risk to humans was widely 
prevented by the removal of SRMs. BSE was not considered as an uncertain disease. 
A civil scientist at the NVRQS said that as the route of the infection of BSE – 
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contaminated animal feed - was already known, risk assessment regarding BSE was 
to check whether risk control measures in exporting countries were properly 
implemented properly.
466
 She also stated that import risk assessment for the meat 
produced in countries, whose risk-control measures were considered to provide the 
same or higher levels of safety than the regulatory measures of Korea, generally 
came to a positive conclusion. As presented by the principle of equivalence in the 
WTO SPS agreement, the international trade policy regime requests countries to take 
acceptable risk, not a zero-risk policy, as long as the risk control measures in 
exporting countries are equivalent to the level of the importing country. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, BSE regulation policy in Korea was based on the 
notion that Korea was a BSE-free country, and the regulatory measures was not strict 
compared to those of the EU, Japan, or even the US. While the US was identified as 
a ‘Controlled BSE risk state’ where the risk control measures have been 
appropriately implemented, Korea was an ‘Undetermined BSE risk’ state which did 
not satisfy the condition to be identified as ‘Controlled risk state’ by the OIE. 
Therefore, the conclusion of the risk assessment for US beef by the NVRQS was 
positive to the US.  
The MIFAFF held NLHCC meetings on 25
th
 July and on 31
st
 August, which was 
attended by producers’ and consumers’ representatives as well as scientists. The 
position of the MIFAFF was already set: risk of BSE from US beef was negligible, 
and therefore, there was no problem when it came to easing the beef import 
requirements. A matter of primary concern at the NLHCC meetings was whether or 
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not to allow the importation of bone and bone-in beef, because bone and bone-in 
beef originating from ‘Controlled BSE risk state’ countries and were considered safe 
according to the OIE Terrestrial animal health code. However, importation of bone-
in beef was a sensitive issue for domestic beef farmers due to short ribs, as 
mentioned in the previous section. The NLHCC meetings ended with no agreement 
reached due to strong opposition from producers’ representatives. The member 
organisations of the ‘Anti Korea-US FTA association’, for example, the ‘BSE 
Watchdog’ and the ‘Korean Beef Association’ demonstrated in front of the 
government complex, arguing ‘Stop deceptive NLHCC which aims to import bone-
in beef infected with BSE!’ Producers’ organizations argued that the government was 
promoting the importation of bone-in beef, following a previously settled schedule 
and conclusion.
467
  
The MIFAFF did not think that an agreement between the NLHCC members could 
be reached by convening the committee meeting again. Instead, in order to develop a 
strategy for the upcoming negotiation with the US, it convened meetings to which 
only scientists were invited. The MIFAFF often convened advisory meetings rather 
than the NLHCC, and the scientists who were invited to these meetings included 
both members of NLHCC and non-members. They sometimes attended bilateral 
meetings with the US or field inspection in the US. However, their names and the 
discussions were generally not published (although the two expert meetings referred 
to below, which took place in 2007, were exceptionally revealed during the 
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controversy in 2008). MIFAFF officials said that they were ‘true experts.’468 
The participants of the meeting chaired by the Director-General of Livestock 
Policy Bureau at MIFAFF on 11
th
 September 2007 were: 6 civil servants of the 
MIFAFF and NVRQS, and Yong-sun Kim (professor at Hallym University, 
virologist), Hee-jong Woo (professor at Seoul National University, veterinary 
immunologist), Su-hwan Ahn at Livestock Health Control Association (an executive 
quango of MIFAFF, a former NVRQS official), and Young-soo Chang (expert in 
meat processing).
469
 The number of experts from the government and the 
government-related quango was larger than that of scientists from academia. The aim 
of the meetings was to compile scientific data and information which could be 
presented as scientific evidence to minimise the importation of US beef at the 
forthcoming negotiations with the US.  
At the meeting on 11
th
 September, it was suggested to investigate research papers 
about BSE, which were published after the amendment of the OIE Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code in May 2005. The NVRQS took up the task. Indeed, the second 
meeting, held on 21
st
 September 2005, was only attended by officials of the MIFAFF 
and NVRQS, as well as Su-hwan Ahn (Livestock Health Control Association, 
MIFAFF-associated quango). The meeting was held to discuss the findings from the 
investigation of research papers. The participants expressed concern that it would be 
difficult to resist the request of the US with the research results achieved from 
                                                 
468
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experimental conditions using genetically modified mice not from real conditions.
470
 
As previously demonstrated, at the 73
rd
 OIE general session meeting in 2005, where 
the safety of muscle meat was discussed, many countries including the US opposed 
the consideration of experimental results obtained by using genetically modified 
animals as evidence which implicated risk of muscle meat to humans in real 
conditions. Thus, it did not seem that the studies examined by the NVRQS could be 
accepted as evidence with which to verify the risk in US beef at the coming 
negotiation meetings with the US. Nevertheless, the results were included in the list 
of counterclaims against the US.  
On 5
th
 October 2007, the MIFAFF held NLHCC meeting which was attended by 
consumers’ and producers’ representatives as well as external scientists. The aim of 
the meeting was to discuss the strategy for the upcoming negotiation with the US 
due to be held a week later. Counterclaims prepared against the US by MIFAFF 
included:    
As it is likely that additional BSE cases will occur in the US, the ban on 
beef from cattle older than 30 months should be maintained to secure the 
safety. 
The US inspects only high-risk animals, not normal ones to be slaughtered 
for human consumption. It is not enough to guarantee the safety of beef. 
Considering that abnormal prions were discovered in spinal cord of 
animals under 30 months, the vertebral column of animals under 30 
months should be banned (although the OIE does not define it as SRMs). 
Considering many violation cases of the current beef requirements by the 
US beef exporters, it is not likely that distal ileum, SRMs, will be 
removed perfectly in the US. Therefore, whole intestines should be banned 
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for Korean consumers’ safety. 
Considering the risk of bone marrow, preference of Korean people who 
enjoy broth made with bone and bone marrow, and the genetic 
vulnerability to vCJD of Korean people, hard bone should be banned.
471
  
(MIFAFF document on 5
th
 October 2007, my translation and summary) 
 
The MIFAFF’s ideal goal in beef negotiation with the US was to maintain the 
current level of regulation on beef or, a little more - to allow only for importation of 
bone in beef from animals under 30 months and to ban seven parts regardless of 
slaughtered animals’ age.472 Consequently, counterclaims were made with a focus on 
risk and uncertainty. Most of the counterclaims were those raised by civil 
organisations and refuted by the MIFAFF as not being scientifically grounded. 
Although the MIFAFF recognised the limitations of the claims, such as the 
applicability of the research results achieved from experimental conditions rather 
than from real conditions, it attempted to mobilise as much evidence as possible to 
use in negotiation with the US.
473
 
Producers’ organisations demanded that the government not proceed in beef 
negotiations with the US, and requested that the government take a strict position 
against the violations of the US on the beef import requirements. Despite the 
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opposition, however, the MIFAFF announced the next step, the negotiation meeting 
with the US. As was the case in 2005 when making the decision to resume boneless 
muscle meat from animals younger than 30 months, the conclusion of the NLHCC 
was not significant to the MIFAFF. Even if NLHCC members did not reach a 
consensus, the MIFAFF promoted a policy decision which had been already settled 
within the government. Opposition from the producers’ representatives was an ever-
present concern, and MIFAFF officials thought that the representatives of the beef 
industry stuck to only the interests of the domestic beef industry.
474
 Although 
representatives of producers’ and consumers’ organisations were invited to the 
NLHCC, they were not considered as experts. A director of the MIFAFF stated that 
the representatives from producers’ and consumers’ organisations were invited ‘to be 
informed’, not to provide expertise to the government475 Scientists who attended the 
NLHCC had the same attitude as the government officials with respect to the 
representatives of the interest groups. They stated that there was nothing for the 
representatives of the industry to contribute in terms of expertise.
476
 
The situation faced by external scientists was not very different from that of the 
representatives of producers and consumers. A scientist recollected: “Advisory 
meetings at MIFAFF were generally not to seek experts’ advice, but to explain the 
government’s decisions to experts and to request experts to accept the decisions.”477 
He stated that only summary reports organised by MIFAFF and NVRQS officials 
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were provided to scientist members of NLHCC and full documents of risk 
assessment and on-site inspections of US beef plants were not open as the 
negotiation was in progress. Therefore, the role of the scientists in the NLHCC was 
limited to admitting policy and evidence which had been set by bureaucrats. The 
report of the NLHCC meeting on 5
th
 October 2007 by the MIFAFF said: “Experts 
‘recognized’ that the government’s counterclaims were made well …”  
 
 
5.3.4 Agony of the government on beef over 30 months  
While the government prepared for the negotiation with the US, bones continued 
to be detected in beef boxes. As whole rib and vertebral columns were found in beef 
boxes from the US in July and August 2007, the quarantine process for all US beef 
was stopped. Quarantine was resumed on 24
th
 August, but a vertebral column was 
discovered again on 5
th
 October and quarantine inspections were stopped again. The 
MIFAFF stated that the suspension would continue until new import conditions (yet 
to be discussed with the US) were established, and as a result, beef importation from 
the US was actually stopped.
478
 According to the report submitted by the MIFAFF 
to the National Assembly, there were 47 violation cases of the import requirements, 
and bone fragments were detected more than 28 times. Repetitive bone detection 
following the suspension of beef import painted the US as shameless and 
unreflecting and also prompted distrust in the safety of US beef.
479
 In surveys, 
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housewives said that the first image which came to mind when they thought of US 
beef was ‘mad cow disease’ (35%) while 70% of respondents said that they would 
not purchase US beef (Chosun Daily, 7 January 2007). People who thought that ‘US 
beef is not safe (75.9%)’ were far more numerous than people who answered that 
‘US beef is safe (7.9%)’ (Chosun Daily, 19 October, 2007). The Korean media 
criticised that the government, despite the repetitive violations of US exporters and 
no betterment, accepted the request of the US to amend the beef requirements for the 
ratification of the FTA by the US Congress.
480
 The Korean media requested that the 
government not submit to the pressure from the US in dealing with public health 
issues, however important their relationship with the US was.  
The US still demanded beef imports of all ages and all cuts in accordance with the 
‘Controlled BSE risk’ status of the US, identified by the OIE guideline, although 
Korea opposed this. Beef negotiation between Korea and the US on 12
th
 October 
2007 ended without success, and it did not seem that both countries’ standpoints 
would be narrowed. To close the gap, the Korean government suggested a two-
phased approach. The first phase was to keep the age restriction and import bone-in 
beef from cattle under 30 months of age. The second phase was to accept the OIE 
guideline entirely when the US implemented ‘the enhanced feed ban.’  
The US government had, since 1998, prohibited some mammalian tissues-derived 
protein for ruminant feed, while the feed policy was criticised, with many saying that 
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it could not remove cross-contamination.
481
 In October 2006, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) proposed to amend the regulation. The proposal made by the 
FDA included a ban on brain and spinal cords of cattle at the age or older than 30 
months and of all cattle which were unfit for human consumption (regardless of the 
age) for animal feed.
482
 It was also the OIE’s recommendation to exclude SRMs 
from all animal feed to prevent cross-contamination.
483
 However, the US rendering 
industry opposed the proposal, claiming that the current level of regulation was 
enough to prevent BSE and the benefit from the proposed feed ban would not 
outweigh the cost.  
As the enhanced feed ban proposed by the US FDA had already been delayed for 
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more than two years, the US government did not accept the two-phased proposal of 
the Korean government. The US government said that it was difficult to persuade US 
congress to ratify the Korea-US FTA with the proposal, because it would take more 
than one year for the enhanced feed ban to be implemented. The US government 
argued that Korea should accept the OIE standard entirely and beef from animals 
over 30 months of age should be allowed when the US ‘announced’, not 
‘implemented’, the enhanced feed ban.  
Beef negotiations with the US were deadlocked, and it was a serious obstacle to 
the FTA which the two governments were waiting to be ratified by each parliament. 
The US pressured the Korean government, arguing ‘no FTA without beef.’ The 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) which took overall 
responsibility for the FTA, argued that Korea should urge the US to ratify the FTA as 
soon as possible by backing down from the ban on beef from animals older than 30 
months.
 484
 The dominant view about the safety of US beef within the Korean 
government was:  
Even if 100% of safety could not be guaranteed, as long as the condition in 
the US was in accordance with the international standards [the OIE 
guideline], there would not be a serious problem in the safety of US beef. 
In addition, as beef imported from the US before 2003 was generally prime 
level of meat from cattle under 30 months, it was unlikely for beef from 
old animals to be imported even if beef from cattle older than 30 months 
was allowed. In terms of the effect on the Korean beef industry, as US beef 
was actually in competition with Australian or New Zealand beef rather 
than Korean beef, the impact on the Korean beef market would not be 
huge.
485
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The major concern of the MIFAFF was inconsistency in beef policy and the public 
sentiment against US beef which had been exacerbated during the conflict with the 
US over bone detection.
486
 Japan still imported only bone-in-beef from cattle under 
20 months and Taiwan imported deboned muscle meat from cattle under 30 months. 
Korea did not need to go faster than its neighbour countries. Opposition from the 
agriculture sector was obvious. Another concern of the MIFAFF was that it could 
have no more excuses to justify maintaining its ban on beef from countries which 
had indigenous BSE incidences within the border such as most European countries 
and Canada, if it accepted the OIE standards without reservation in importing US 
beef. With this in mind, the MIFAFF wanted to procrastinate lifting the ban on beef 
from animals older than 30 months.  
The economic ministerial meeting was held on 17 December to manage the 
conflicting positions among the ministries. The conclusion of the meeting chaired by 
the Vice Prime Minister for Economy was to allow the import of bone-in beef from 
animals younger than 30 months as the first step, and then to allow beef from 
animals older than 30 months with the ‘announcement’ of the enhanced feed ban by 
the US government. The decision was to accept the request of the US.  
However, this conclusion of the economic ministerial meeting was rejected by 
President Roh, and beef negotiation with the US was stopped. With regard to the 
veto of president Roh, his opponents argued that he, who had lost the presidential 
election in December 2007 and was due to pass his power to Myung-bak Lee in 
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February 2008, broke the promise he made to President Bush in April 2007 in order 
to gain political popularity for his party in the upcoming general election in April 
2008. However, his secretaries claimed that it was because he had not expected the 
US Congress to ratify the FTA, even if the Korean government eased the beef import 
requirements.
 
Following this, the US Democratic Party, which was dissatisfied with 
the way in which the car industry was treated in the FTA, won the general election, 
became the major party in the US Congress, and demanded re-negotiation of the 
KORUS FTA. Moreover, according to them, Roh thought that if the government 
allowed the beef imports as the US demanded, the ratification of the FTA in the 
Korean National Assembly would be difficult due to exacerbated public opinion. He 
was known to have advised the president-elect Myung-bak Lee that the beef market 
should be exchanged with the ratification of the FTA at the US Congress. Whichever 
claim is true, it seems clear that the safety concerns over US beef were not central to 
the government’s position.487  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has described the regulatory policy-making process for US beef from 
2003 to 2008. The US beef issue was constructed within the complex political and 
economic interests between Korea and the US.  
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Korea, which was the third largest beef market of the US in 2003, imposed a total 
ban on US beef in 2003 when a BSE infected animal was discovered in the US, and 
lifted the ban partially by allowing boneless muscle meat from cattle under 30 
months of age in 2006. However, the beef import conditions agreed between the two 
countries in 2006 caused serious conflict over bone fragments in beef, and the 
Korean government struggled to resolve the conflict with the US.  
The regulations on US beef were presented as a sanitary and health issue, although 
the safety concerns of the Korean government were always mixed with consideration 
of the domestic beef industry. Moreover, the beef issue took on a more complex 
nature, as it became interrelated with the FTA under negotiation between the US and 
Korea. The Korean government used uncertainty and risk concern regarding beef to 
further its objectives, namely the protection of the domestic beef market and 
retaining the significant bargaining chip in the FTA deal with the US. Therefore, the 
attitude of the government regarding the BSE safety of beef was dual. Whereas the 
government took very precautionary positions on the international stage, with a focus 
on the uncertain knowledge regarding BSE, the government refuted the same claims 
as those of itself at the OIE meetings, which were raised by civil organisations, 
stating that they were not scientifically grounded. 
The MIFAFF advisory body, NLHCC, was comprised of scientists, representatives 
of producers’ and consumers’ organisations, and MIFAFF and NVRQS officials. 
Though the scientific members of the NLHCC were leading scientists in their fields, 
most of them were not active researchers in the TSE field, due, to some extent, to a 
lack of research base in Korea. In terms of policy-making about beef and BSE risk, 
 209 
MIFAFF officials did not depend heavily on the advisory members. Even if NLHCC 
meetings did not result in conclusions, the MIFAFF promoted policy decisions which 
had already been settled within the government. Representatives of producers’ and 
consumers’ organisations for the NLHCC were not considered as experts on a par 
with scientist members. The NLHCC meeting was viewed by MIFAFF officials as a 
procedural formality rather than consensus making or a process to seek expertise.  
The following chapter, detailing the second part of the Korean BSE controversy, 
will describe the public protests against the newly agreed beef import requirements 
in 2008 and the disputes among the government, civil activists, scientists and the 
public.    
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6 The Chronology of the BSE controversy in 
Korea (2): new beef requirements and public 
protests in 2008  
6.1 Introduction  
The last chapter provided an insight into the policy-making process adopted by the 
Korean government until 2008 to address concerns surrounding beef. The ‘Import 
Health Requirements for US beef and Beef products’ was newly settled between 
Korea and the US on 18
th
 April 2008. The new requirements for US beef were 
relaxed compared to the previous beef import requirements made in 2006, and it 
leading to serious public controversy over the potential risk of the BSE epidemic in 
Korea from the import of beef. Conflicting claims regarding BSE and beef safety 
were raised by the government as well as government opponents, while ‘scientific 
truth’ was represented as a solution to the controversy.  
Thep present chapter, detailing the second phase of the Korean BSE controversy, 
will focus on the public protest against the new beef requirements agreed in April 
2008. In the first section, I will show how the public protests against US beef were 
formed. In the second section, I will provide a description of disputes over the new 
beef import sanitary requirements, whilst in the third section, I will discuss the 
government’s response to the protests and the policy shift taken to pacify the public.  
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6.2 New beef requirements and public protests  
In this section, I will show how the public protests were formed and how the 
Korean public made sense of the threats from US beef. Public concern sparked by a 
TV program led to massive public protests and a series of events bred public distrust 
of the government. 
 
6.2.1 Conclusion of the new ‘Import Health Requirements 
for US beef and Beef products’ 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Korea hold a presidential election and Myung-bak Lee 
from the Hannara Party (major conservative party) was elected after appealing to the 
peoples’ hopes for economic growth. New president Lee was a former CEO of 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction. Indeed, he used his inaugural address on 25
th
 
February 2008 to stress the significance and urgency of market opening and the FTA 
with the US as keys to revitalising the national economy, and also highlighted the 
necessity to strengthen relations with the US. As stated in Chapter 4, maintaining the 
US-Korea alliance has always been one of the most important tasks for the Korean 
government. The conservative new ruling party was more concerned with the 
relationship with the US than its left wing predecessor.  
By then, beef import from the US had been stopped for six months, and the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) pointed out that the beef ban of Korea was one 
of the “significant barriers to US trade and investment.”488 Beef was regarded as a 
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 USTR, 2008 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, n.d. 
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key factor in improving the relationship with the US and in bringing forward the 
FTA which would open the largest export market for Korea. According to the US 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report,   
South Korea’s aim was to improve prospects that the Bush Administration 
would send the KORUS FTA to Congress before the end of 2008. The 
Bush White House had for some time signalled that Korea had to reopen 
its market to US beef – a step necessary to secure the votes of Members of 
Congress who represent cattle production and beef processing states and 
whose support for the KORUS FTA is viewed as critical.
489
  
 
Likewise, Dong-suk Min, the head negotiator of the 2008 beef negotiation with 
the US, recollected in his reminiscence: 
With only resolving beef issue, the newly launched Korean government 
could recover the trust of the US. … The relationship between two 
countries was at dead end due to beef conflict. … I was sure that the US 
market was one of the important lifelines for the Korean economy. I 
believed that I had to engage myself in my job in terms of national 
interests.
490
   
 
The beef safety issue regarding BSE was rarely discussed within the government, 
and the new MIFAFF minister, Un-cheon Chung, a former CEO of agricultural 
business, shared recognition about the beef issue with MOFAT and President Lee.  
Beef was the most serious issue between two countries which had been 
                                                                                                                                          
The lost value of beef exports of the US to Korea due to BSE-related restrictions during 2004–2007 
was estimated about $3 billion. United States International Trade Commission, Effects of Animal 
Health, Sanitary, Food Safety, and Other Measures on U.S. Beef Exports, September 2008.  
489
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490
 Min, To Live as Public Servant in Korea. pp.91-92, my translation (He was a trade official at 
MOFAT and dispatched to MIFAFF for the FTA negotiation in agriculture part).  
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pending for more than one year. To recover the trust of the US, which was 
seriously damaged due to the bone fragment conflicts, and to promote the 
ratification of the KORUS FTA at the US Congress, beef issue should be 
resolved. If beef negotiation breaks down again, it must be a heavy burden 
to the Korean government as well as the US.
491
  
The instruction for the Korean beef negotiation team was to confirm the two-
phased position which had been agreed at the economic ministers’ meeting in 
December 2007.
492
 The first step was to allow imports of both boneless and bone-in 
beef from cattle younger than 30 months. The second step was to permit imports of 
beef from animals older than 30 months, as long as SRMs were removed in 
accordance with the OIE’s standards, and that the US government implements 
(preferred proposal) or announces the enhanced feed ban. Other issues were within 
the discretion of the head negotiator, presuming acceptance of the OIE standard. 
Rather than beef safety concerns regarding BSE, the government focussed on 
developing policy measures to support livestock farmers who were expected to 
suffer a loss due to the beef market opening. The main agenda at the ministers’ 
meeting on 1 April, which was held for the final check for the upcoming beef 
negotiation meeting with the US, was concerned with the policy measures to support 
the domestic livestock industry and to expand the Beef Origin Labeling System 
which could keep foreign beef from being sold as Korean beef.
 493
 Although the lift 
of the ban on bone-in beef and beef from cattle older than 30 months had been 
seriously conflicting issues, expert meetings, including the NLHCC, were not held to 
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discuss the instruction for the beef negotiation team.  
 
6.2.2 The new “Import Health Requirements for US beef 
and Beef products” 
Main changes in beef import requirements 
The Korean and US governments started their beef negotiation meeting on 11
th
 
April 2008. The beef negotiation represented the first Korea-US summit of the Lee 
government. As such, there was an overriding prediction that the conflicts over beef 
between the two countries thus far would be resolved somehow by the beef 
negotiation meeting, signalling a successful start to the Lee government in 
improving the Korea-US relationship. As expected, the ‘Import Health Requirements 
for US beef and Beef products’ was newly settled between the two countries on 18th 
April 2008.  
The new beef requirement was relaxed in comparison to the previous condition 
agreed in 2006. Firstly, one of the most important changes was to allow beef from 
cattle older than 30 months. As discussed in the last chapter, whether or when to 
allow beef from animals older than 30 months was the most controversial point 
during the beef negotiations. The new beef import condition allowed the import of 
beef from animals older than 30 months, which had been totally banned in the 2006 
beef requirements, with the condition that the US government announce the 
enhanced feed ban.  
 215 
When the United States publicly announces its enhanced feed ban, Article 1 
[beef and beef products excluding beef from cattle older than 30 months] shall 
be modified to read as follows: “beef or beef products” includes all edible 
parts.
494
  
The US FDA announced on 28
th
 April 2008 that its enhanced animal feed ban would 
be implemented from April 2009. Korea was required to import beef from cattle over 
30 months immediately.  
Secondly, the new beef requirements narrowed the scope of items which should be 
banned. The items prohibited to be imported from the US were:  
(a) tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and  
(b) brain, eye, spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia and vertebral column 
(excluding vertebrae of the tail, transverse processes and spinos 
processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, median crest 
and wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the 
time of slaughter.
495
 
 
Contrary to the beef import requirements in 2006 which had allowed only 
boneless muscle meat, the new condition expanded the scope of cuts which could 
be imported. Offal and bones which had been banned in the previous requirements 
could now be imported (Table 8). The new definition of SRMs was based on the 
definitions of the prohibited items which were applied to the Controlled BSE risk 
state in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.  
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 216 
Table 8 Comparison between the requirements in 2006 and in 2008 
 2006 2008 
Beef products 
which can be 
imported 
only deboned skeletal muscle 
meat from carcasses under 30 
months. (SRM, diaphragm, 
trimmings, tongue, cheek meat, 
ground meat, mechanically 
recovered / separated meat and 
products from advanced meat 
recovery, offals, and processed 
meat products cannot be 
imported.) 
All parts except SRMs 
SRMs 
(Specified Risk 
Materials) 
brain, eye, spinal cord, skull, 
vertebral column, tonsil, distal 
ileum and protein products 
produced from these 
tonsils and distal ileum from 
cattle of all ages 
brain, eye, spinal cord, skull, 
dorsal root ganglia and vertebral 
column (excluding vertebrae of 
the tail, transverse processes and 
spinos processes of the cervical, 
thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, 
median crest and wings of the 
sacrum) from cattle 30 months 
of age and over at the time of 
slaughter. 
 
Thirdly, the new condition limited the right of the Korean government to suspend 
the importation of US beef. Under the 2006 beef import requirements, the Korean 
government could suspend beef import from the US in cases where violation of the 
requirements was deemed to be serious, where BSE risk in the US was considered to 
be exacerbated, or where BSE occurred in animals born after the feed ban of April 
1998. These conditions were the grounds on which the Korean government could 
suspend importation of beef from the US when bone chips and vertebral columns 
were detected in beef boxes in 2006 and 2007. However, under the new beef 
requirements, the Korean government could not stop importing beef as long as the 
BSE risk status of the US classified by OIE had not changed.  
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In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United States 
……The Korean government will suspend the importation of beef and beef 
products if the additional case(s) results in the OIE recognizing an adverse 
change in the classification of the US BSE status.
496
 
In sum, the new import health requirements for US beef were in full accordance 
with the OIE guidelines and it accepted what the US had requested.  
 
Benefit to consumers  
The Korean government announced the conclusion of the beef agreement one day 
before the Korea-US Summit scheduled on 19
th 
April. In reference to the meaning of 
the beef deal, President Lee stated: “Now, Korean people will be able to eat beef 
with good quality at cheap price.”497 Korean Farmers’ associations argued that 
unsafe US beef would cause serious damage to Korean cattle-farming households 
and consumers. However, the government regarded the opposition as the usual 
resistance from the agricultural sector to global market opening. President Lee said 
that the beef market should be open to the world, not only to the US, as widely as 
possible and that the choice rested with consumers. In addition, he said that the 
Korean beef industry should produce expensive and high-quality beef which could 
compete against beef from any other country.
498
  
The government announced policy measures to support the livestock industry, 
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including subsidies for beef farmers to produce high quality Korean beef. In addition, 
the Beef Origin Labeling System, which had been applied only to grill restaurants 
with a floor space of 300 m
2 
or larger, was applied to all eating establishments 
including small restaurants and catering facilities at schools, firms, or military. The 
government viewed the new beef deal with the US as a solely economic issue, 
confronting interests between consumers and beef farmers. No concern over BSE 
risk appeared in the government’s statements. Though there were some reports which 
expressed concerns about the increasing risk of beef by the easing of conditions, the 
main interest of the mass media in this period was the economic impact of the beef 
deal and the damage to livestock farmers.
499
  
 
6.2.3 The beginning of the public protests  
The beef negotiation changed from an economic issue affecting beef farmers to a 
public health issue with a TV programme. On 29
th
 April 2008, MBC, a broadcasting 
company in Korea, televised an episode of its current affairs programme PD 
notebook, entitled “Urgent report: US beef, is it safe from Mad Cow Disease?”500 
The programme argued that US beef with BSE risk would be imported to Korea as a 
result of the newly agreed import sanitary requirements. Firstly, it argued that the 
beef inspection system in the US was too loose to prevent BSE-infected cattle from 
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 Ji-bum Jung and Jong-hun Chae, The Politicization of Risk and an Effective Response Strategy 
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 “PD Notebook (Producer’s Notebook)” is a current affairs documentary TV programme of 
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South Korea, First broadcast in May 1990, it has dealt with social problematic issues and is famous 
for raising suspicion first on Hwang’s stem cell research fraud in 2005. 
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entering the food chain, showing the video of downer cows which were forced to 
stand by abattoir workers (Figure 5) and presenting the recent beef recall case in the 
US.
501
 It argued that violations of SRM rules occurred frequently in the US, and 
animal feed policy in the US was potentially at risk of cross-contamination, and that 
even the American people were very concerned about the safety of US beef. 
Secondly, the programme raised suspicions over the case of 22 year old Aretha 
Vinson in Virginia who died on 9
th
 April 2008 perhaps infected with vCJD, and said 
that the same tragedy might occur in Korea.
 
It warned of the potential risk of US beef, 
citing the comment of Michael Hanson from the US Consumer’s Union:  
… folks that eat this beef are being guinea-pigs and hoping that there’s not 
a problem in the US. So, if Korea decides to import meat from these 
animals then they share the same risk.  
 
 
Figure 5 A worker tries to make a downer cattle stand up by shocking it with a water hose. 
(“Up or die! Up or die!”) 
                                                 
501
 Downer (non-ambulatory) is one of the symptoms of BSE-infected animals and downer animals’ 
are considered to have much higher likelihood of BSE-infection than normal animals. However, as 
there are more than 50 causes of downer symptom such as fracture, it cannot be said that downer was 
definitely BSE-infected animal. 
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Thirdly, the programme said that vCJD could be infected by 0.1g of SRMs, could not 
be prevented or cured, and would lead to death with 100% certainty. It also stated 
that as vCJD was a disease regarding which much was unknown, it was horrible and 
scary. It also said that the Korean people were more likely to be infected with vCJD 
due to their genetic characteristics. It said that as every vCJD case had MM type 
gene in Codon 129 and as 94% of Korean people had the MM type gene, the Korean 
people were likely to be infected with vCJD with 94% probability when consuming 
BSE-contaminated beef. Indeed, this was twice the chance of Americans and three 
times more than the UK people. This claim was based on the frequencies of MM 
type in the population (Table 9). Moreover, the programme argued that vCJD risk 
could not be escaped by avoiding beef because of powdered soup bases in instant 
noodles, and cosmetics and gelatin capsules in medication made with cow-derived 
materials.  
Table 9 Relations between vCJD and Gene type
502
 
Genotype 
of Prion protein  
vCJD cases 
Genotype frequencies in population 
UK (%) Korea (%) US (%) 
MM 159 36.8 94.3 50.0 
MV 0 50.9 5.5 41.6 
VV 0 12.3 0.2 8.4 
 
The programme raised doubts that the government was not fully aware of the 
horrendous conditions of the US beef production system or whitewashed the risk, 
and that the government agreed the beef deal for the success of the summit. The 
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programme pointed out that the government made a decision on the relaxed beef 
conditions “which was directly linked with the nations’ life” without holding 
NLHCC meetings to listen to experts’ opinion.503 One of the presenters said: “The 
problem is that [the beef deal] was made suddenly. …. It is an important issue for 
public health and life, but nobody did have the opportunity to say their opinion.”504 
The programme gave the image that BSE was spreading in the US, while the US 
government hid the risk, and the Korean government decided to import hazardous 
beef with or without knowing the truth for political aims. The second series of PD 
Notebook on May 13 argued that, whereas beef from cattle under 24 months of age 
was mainly consumed in the US, beef from old cattle which was avoided by the US 
people would be rushed into Korea.  
After the first series of PD Notebook aired, the BSE story occupied public media 
and opposition to the beef deal spread through online discussion boards. Candlelight 
vigils calling for the beef agreement to be abrogated started in downtown Seoul on 
2
nd
 May. Candlelight vigils represented a new form of public demonstrations in 
Korea. Indeed, they had grown in popularity since the candlelight vigils in 
November 2002, which mourned the girls who were killed by an armored US army 
vehicle in June.
505
 Candlelight vigils were generally organised as cultural events in 
order to avoid the violation of the law on assembly and demonstration, because the 
law prohibited assembly and demonstration after sunset except for cultural events.
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Accordingly, candlelight vigils took on a peaceful character, contrary to militant 
student and labour anti-government (pro-democracy) movements under the 
authoritarian regime in the 1980s.  
 The main participants of candlelight rallies on US beef in the initial period were 
teenagers who had held ‘candle festivals’ to oppose the competition-oriented 
education policy of the government. They expressed their anxiety about school meals 
which were likely to use cheap beef products, holding candles in one hand and 
banners and boards saying “I have only lived 15 years!” in the other hand.506 With 
teenagers participating actively in the protest, the high school student who proposed 
the campaign for the impeachment of President Lee said in an interview with internet 
news media:  
Students consider the beef issue to be serious because it is a problem 
which directly affects them. The fact that the incubation period of BSE is 
at least 10 to 40 years worries students and brings about anger. When US 
beef is imported, the people who will consume most will be probably 
students, because they cannot but eat relatively cheap food due to small 
allowances. In other words, students, who are the poorest, are exposed to 
the risks of US beef. It is most likely that cheap foreign beef will be used 
for school meals. Rich adults can eat safe beef, but we, students, cannot 
help eating US beef even though we do not want.  
 
Figure 6 Teenage girls with banners and boards 
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President,” Oh My News, May 4, 2008., my translation 
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During the initial period, the atmosphere of the protests was festival-like with 
participants singing and dancing. Participants included general citizens such as 
families with children, office workers, and housewives. The number in attendance 
increased and discussions in cyber space became more heated as time went by. 
Online boards on Internet communities and mobile phones were the main tools with 
which people shared information and organised vigils. Almost daily candlelight 
rallies to demand the scrapping of the beef deal started to be held in downtown Seoul.  
The Grand Nation Party (the major political party) and the conservative press 
suggested that a politically-impure group maneuvered from behind the scenes. They 
claimed that anti-FTA groups used the mad cow disease panic as an anti-American 
campaign, or that a left group or pro-North Korea group incited students and the 
public with an absurd story for their political objectives.
507
 These responses 
offended the public. Then, the Lee administration was criticised due to certain 
policies which were perceived as beneficial only to the wealthy such as competition-
oriented education policy, privatisation of public service, and the choice of the 
cabinet members, most of whom were very wealthy. There were also allegations of 
illegal real-estate speculation. The number of people who joined the cyber-campaign 
for impeachment against President Lee surpassed 1 million.  
On 6th May 2008, nearly 1,500 NGOs held a ‘National Convention to oppose the 
import of US beef with BSE risk.’508 The dissenting organiaations included political 
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parties whose supporters were mainly labours and farmers, NGOs for environment 
and ecology movement, consumers’ cooperative organisations, farmers’ associations, 
and labours’ unions. They belonged to anti-FTA groups, and their claims about US 
beef and BSE mostly depended on the two activists Sang-pyo Park and Seok-kyun 
Woo, who were the representatives of the ‘Veterinarians’ Solidarity for Public Health’ 
and the ‘Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights’ respectively. 
Indeed, they had raised an alternative account of BSE risk regarding US beef since 
2005. The claims of PD Notebook, for example, relied on their theories. They argued 
that US beef was not safe from BSE risk and that the government did not secure 
sufficient safeguards against BSE risk in US beef. In their claims, the government 
was blamed for selling the nation’s health for the ambiguous benefits of the FTA. 
Activists argued that the beef deal should be scrapped and renegotiated.
509
  
With hindsight, PD Notebook was accused distorting some information and 
intentionally translating inaccurately some excerpts of sources in the US to 
exaggerate the risk of US beef, which could have misled the audience.
510
 For 
example, the video of a downer animal filmed by a civil organization for animal 
welfare in the US in order to denounce cruelty to animals, and the recall was due to 
mistreatment of cattle, irrelevant to BSE. The non-ambulatory animals in the film 
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were dairy cows, which are likely to be downers due to lack of calcium. The cause of 
death of Aretha Vinson, attributed to vCJD without clear evidence, was revealed as 
Wernicke encephalopathy, not vCJD by the US National Prion Disease Pathology 
Surveillance Center in June 2008. The claim that Korean people had a 94% 
probability of being infected with vCJD was a far-fetched interpretation of the 
research, since it presented the gene as the only factor causing vCJD by presenting 
frequencies of genotype in the population as the incidence of the disease. The 
MIFAFF requested that PD Notebook correct its report, and the Korean Press 
Arbitration Commission raised doubts about the neutrality and objectivity of the 
report of PD Notebook and ordered MBC, the broadcasting company, to report 
clearly that not all downers were BSE-infected, that Aretha Vinson did not die from 
vCJD, and genotype frequency was not the only factor of vCJD infection. MBC was 
also ordered to apologise to viewers in July 2008, the heaviest disciplinary action by 
the Korea Communications Standards Commission.  
 
6.2.4 The government’s untrustworthiness  
The new administration, which had been in power less than 100 days, was 
criticised for foregoing public health for economic interests, in contrast with the 
previous government which had taken a strict stance on even bone fragments in beef. 
Responses of the press media diverged according to their political orientation. While 
the conservative press such as Chosun Daily and Dong-a Daily criticised PD 
Notebook for exaggerating BSE risk, progressive press such as Hankyureh and 
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Ohmynews opposed the import of US beef.
511
 The government tried to block rallies 
by exercising its power. The prime minister stated that spreading false information 
and illegal assemblies would be punished, saying that most claims by PD Notebook 
were not scientifically verified, nor were they in accordance with international 
standards.  
In the meantime, there were a series of events which rendered public doubts about 
the competence and credibility of the government, as shown below.  
On 4
th
 May, some documents which had been prepared by the MIFAFF were 
revealed by politicians of opposing parties. Reports written in September and 
October 2007 for the negotiations with the US included information emphasising the 
risk in beef such as detection of prions in muscle tissue and animals under 30 months 
age, as well as genetic susceptibility of the Korean people to vCJD (see Chapter 
5.3.3). In addition, the report, written by MIFAFF officials after the OIE general 
session meeting in 2005, showed that the Korean delegates had raised the risk in 
blood and muscle tissue at the OIE meeting; moreover, another report by the 
MIFAFF in 2007 showed that the Korean government had opposed the preliminary 
assessment of the OIE which classified the US as being in a ‘Controlled BSE risk 
state’, addressing the incomplete cattle traceability system and animal feed policy 
which could not prevent cross-contamination in the US. Dissenters criticised the 
government for ignoring scientists’ opinions, and argued that these documents 
represented evidence showing that the government hid the truth and lied to the public, 
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ignoring the scientific advice.    
MIFAFF officials explained that all available scientific evidence, regardless of 
whether or not it had been confirmed scientifically and internationally, had been 
collected in order to take advantageous positions in international negotiations and to 
defend the beef market.
512
 In fact, as presented in the previous chapter, NVRQS 
officials who attended the meeting on 21
st
 September 2007 expressed concerns about 
the limitation of the research results which had been achieved from experimental 
conditions. At the OIE meeting in 2005, in which boneless muscle meat from 
animals under 30 months was defined as a safe commodity for trade, claims of the 
existence of abnormal prions in muscle tissue and the risk of muscle meat, which 
referred to the experimental result using genetically modified animals, were not 
accepted. The government officials repeated that the Korean beef negotiation team 
could not present sufficient scientific evidence to negate the OIE’s guideline and the 
Controlled-risk status of the US. However, the government’s explanation was not 
enough to convince public.  
On 10
th
 May, activists raised the suspicion that the enhanced feed ban announced 
by the US FDA on 25
th
 April was different from the initially proposed ban. The 
original version of the enhanced feed ban which had been proposed by the US FDA 
since October 2005 was known to exclude brain and spinal cords originating ‘from 
animals of all age’ from animal feed, and it was the most significant ground for 
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allowing the importation of beef from cattle older than 30 months age, according to 
the Korean government’s announcement. However, the feed ban, which was actually 
announced by the US government approximately 10 days after the new beef 
requirements were agreed, was to ban only brain and spinal cords ‘from cattle over 
30 months.’ In other words, it was to allow entire carcasses including brains and 
spinal cords from cattle under 30 months to be used for animal feed.
513
 The 
government was accused of hiding intentionally the fact that the US government 
revised its feed ban. 
The government admitted that there were some errors in translating the FDA’s ban 
from English to Korean. However, it said that as brains and spinal cords of cattle 
under 30 months originating from ‘Controlled BSE risk state’ of the OIE were not 
defined as SRMs, it was not problematic for them to be included in animal feed, 
although it was indeed a more relaxed regulation than the initially proposed one. 
Nevertheless, the government could not escape criticism that it entrusted the US with 
full power by not clearly defining the condition of ‘the enhanced feed ban’ which 
represented the most significant reason for permitting beef from old cattle.  
These series of events (strict stance to public protests, revealed documents, and the 
mistranslation of the enhanced feed ban of the US) cultivated the image of an 
‘incompetent untrustworthy government.’ Even conservative newspapers which had 
supported the government criticised its insensibility and incompetence. Suspicions 
about poorly-managed beef negotiation and criticism that the government conceded 
the beef market to the US without benefit were raised. The legitimacy of the beef 
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deal was damaged, regardless of the safety of US beef.  
 
6.3 Disputes over the new beef requirements    
The last section has described the way in which the public protests were formed. 
The newly agreed beef import requirements changed from being an economic issue 
affecting beef farmers to a public health issue regarding BSE risk in US beef. Public 
protests sparked by a TV program dominated the country and a series of scandals 
which revealed poor management of beef negotiations damaged the trustworthiness 
of the government.   
In this section, disputes over the new beef import sanitary requirements will be 
shown in detail. Contradictory claims regarding BSE and beef safety were raised by 
the government as well as government opponents, while ‘scientific truth’ was 
represented as a solution to the controversy. In the first part, claims of the 
government and the counterclaims of the civil organisations regarding the new 
import sanitary requirements for US beef will be presented. Following this, I will 
show how the Korean government responded to the alternate accounts relating to the 
uncertainty and the risk of BSE. Lastly, discussions by the Korean scientific 
community will be shown. Through an examination of the conflicting claims and 
accounts, I will show how the Korean government’s safety claims were challenged 
and why scientific claims about beef failed to calm the controversy. 
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6.3.1 The government’s claims and the counterclaims  
As shown in the previous section, the ‘Import Health Requirements for US beef 
and Beef products’ agreed in April 2008 were less strict than the beef import 
requirements of 2006. The new beef import conditions allowed the import of beef 
from animals older than 30 months and offal and bone which had previously been 
banned. Moreover, it limited conditions under which the Korean government could 
ban US beef.  
Civil organisations (the ‘Veterinarians’ Solidarity for Public Health’ and the 
‘Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights’) argued that new beef 
requirements could not secure enough safeguards against the BSE risk in US beef. 
They warned of the BSE risk associated with US beef since 2005 and most of their 
claims were overlapped with the claims which had been raised by themselves since 
2005.  
Firstly, civil organisations argued that the safety of beef from animals older than 
30 months could not be trusted. Still, the EU, as well as major US beef importing 
countries Japan and Mexico, maintained the rule which allowed only beef from cattle 
under 30 months to be imported. They also argued that the enhanced animal feed ban 
proposed by the US FDA, which was the condition to lift ‘the 30 month age ban’, 
did not reach the safety level of the animal feed policy of the EU and Japan, which 
banned all animal protein for all farm animals to remove cross-contamination. They 
argued that as it would take time for the enhanced feed ban which was announced to 
be implemented and to produce an actual effect on beef safety, the announcement of 
the enhanced feed ban should not be seen as grounds to permit the importation of 
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beef from old cattle.   
The MIFAFF refuted the claims of the civil organisations. It said: only if SRMs 
were removed in accordance with the OIE standards, even beef from cattle over 30 
months originating from the US was safe to eat, and there was no vCJD patient who 
had been infected from eating beef in the US.
 
The government also said that there 
were few possibilities of BSE recurrence in the US even with the current level of 
animal feed ban, and the enhanced feed ban would decrease even the smallest risk 
from US beef.
514
  
Secondly, civil organisations argued that the new beef requirements allowed the 
importation of cuts which were banned in the EU and Japan. For example, the EU 
bans whole intestines of animals of all ages and Japan prohibits vertebral columns 
from cattle of all ages (see Table 5 in Chapter 4.3.3). They said that as the Korean 
people consumed various cuts of beef which are not used for food in the US, cuts 
with high BSE risk were likely to be imported for commercial profit. In addition, 
they argued that as there was no cattle traceability system in the US, it was not 
possible to distinguish animals older than 30 months, and thus, it would be 
impossible for the quarantine agency to assess them, even if SRMs from old animals 
were imported mixed with the same parts from young cattle.
515
  
The MIFAFF said that the new definitions of SRMs were based on the OIE 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code, and offal and bones originating from the Controlled 
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 MIFAFF, “Stenographic Record of Press Conference on 6 May 2008,” May 6, 2008. 
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 Woo, “US Beef Is Not Safe from BSE and the Beef Import Sanitary Conditions Cannot Protect 
Lives of People.” 
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BSE risk state US were safe excluding seven parts which were defined as SRMs by 
the OIE. 
Thirdly, civil organisations argued that the new beef requirements restricted the 
sovereignty in quarantine of Korea. According to the new beef requirements, as 
shown in Chapter 6.2.2, the Korean government could not suspend beef import from 
the US, even if SRMs are discovered or new BSE incidence occurs in the US, but 
could only stop importation of beef when there was an adverse change in the risk 
status of the US by the OIE. Activists argued that this actually meant that Korea 
could never ban US beef, because it was unlikely that a few additional BSE cases in 
the US would change the BSE risk status of the US. For example, Canada, where 
more than 10 cases of BSE had occurred since 2003, was classified as a ‘Controlled 
risk’ state by the OIE in May 2007 (and despite an additional case in 2008, there was 
no change in the BSE risk status).
516
 They argued that the government had agreed an 
‘unequal and humiliating’ beef deal giving up ‘sovereignty in quarantine.’ They 
blamed the government for neglecting the basic duty of the state to secure the health 
rights of the nation (Figure 7).  
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 The standards to assess BSE-risk status of countries and the background logic of the OIE were 
provided in Chapter 5.3.2.  
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.  
Figure 7 Cartoon on 3 May 2008, Kyunghyang Shinmun 
The US president Bush wearing a gown of the American flag sits with a paper 
‘Korean nation’s public health’ in his hands and the Korean president Lee in 
traditional red king’s gown bows in front of him (‘MB’ is the initial of President 
Myung-bak Lee). On the belly of a cow beside Bush, “inspection only for 0.1% of 
cattle, no record and traceability of 80% of cattle” is written. 
Bush: How does he believe (that US beef is safe), even though I who sell it 
cannot? 
 
Regarding the limited condition of banning US beef, the MIFAFF explained that it 
was the OIE’s recommendation that member countries should not ban importation of 
beef products even when new BSE cases are discovered in exporting countries. The 
OIE explained the reason why member countries should not disrupt trade even with a 
new BSE case, as follows:  
… Such situations penalise countries with a good and transparent 
surveillance system for animal diseases and zoonoses, and which have 
demonstrated their ability to control the risks identified through a risk 
assessment. This may result in a reluctance to report future cases and an 
increased likelihood of disease spread internationally. 
…. A continuing assessment of the importation policies of a trading 
partner (especially concerning live cattle, and meat and bone meal), its 
animal feed regulations for cattle, and its knowledge of the disease 
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situation within the country should be the basis for setting import policies 
for commodities at risk of introducing the BSE agent. If this assessment 
has been accurate, the announcement of a case of BSE by a trading 
partner should not lead to significant changes in these import policies, and 
should certainly not lead to bans on a broad range of imports.
517
  
 
When a BSE case was discovered in US 2003, the OIE and the US government 
argued that many countries’ bans on US beef broke the OIE standards. Indeed, at that 
time, it seemed to Korean people like an unreasonable measure which focussed more 
on economic profit than safety. The government said that as BSE was infected by 
contaminated animal feed not by bacteria or a virus like FMD or Avian Influenza, the 
risk could be controlled by the animal feed policy. Indeed, even with regard to BSE 
incidence in the Controlled BSE risk US, as surveillance systems would prevent the 
infected animal from entering the food chain and SRMs would be removed in 
accordance with the OIE guideline, the BSE incidence would not influence the safety 
of beef products.  
The grounds for the safety of US beef and the legitimacy of the regulatory policy, 
which were represented by the Korean government, were the international standards 
represented by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The OIE guideline provided 
the Korean government with the grounds to judge the safety of US beef and set 
sanitary requirements for imported beef. The partial lifting of the ban on boneless 
beef from animals under 30 months of age in 2006 was based on the OIE’s decision 
to designate deboned muscle meat from animals under 30 months of age as a safe 
commody which could be traded irrespective of exporting countries’ BSE risk status. 
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It was the ‘Controlled BSE risk state’ status of the US which had significant 
influence on the decision in 2008 to lift the ban on US beef from animals over 30 
months of age. The government argued that the OIE standard was based on objective 
science and should be observed as a global standard; they also argued that 95 
countries imported US beef under the same conditions which Korea agreed, and 
future beef agreements of the US with China, Taiwan and Japan would be the same 
as the agreement with Korea.  
Contrary to the government, which expressed trust in the scientific authority of the 
OIE standards, civil activists claimed that the OIE was just a political organisation, 
not a scientific one.
518
 They raised the suspicion that the US, whose beef had been 
banned from many countries after the detection of BSE-infected animals in 2003, 
pressured the OIE to ease the regulations on deboned muscle meat and to classify the 
US as Controlled BSE risk state’ despite its recent BSE cases.519 They argued that 
the OIE Terrestrial Code was not a scientific guideline to protect public health but 
just a minimum condition for trade. A scientist who supported activists argued that 
Korea should accept the regulation policy of the EU which was ‘more scientific’ than 
that of the OIE.
520
  
Compared to the regulations on SRMs in Europe and Japan, the US has 
very loose regulations. … We should follow the regulations of Europe 
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 Woo, “US Beef Is Not Safe from BSE and the Beef Import Sanitary Conditions Cannot Protect 
Lives of People.” (my summary and translation) 
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 It was also a claims raised by the US civil organizations. When the US was identified as 
‘Controlled risk’ state in 2007, a representative of US consumers’ organization ‘Food & Water Watch’ 
said at an interview with a Korean radio program that the ‘Controlled Risk’ status of the US was the 
outcome of powerful lobby by the US government and the livestock industry). “Sisa Jockey: Today 
and Tomorrow.”  
520
 Hee-jong Woo, “What a Shame, Shame, Shame!,” Pressian, May 26, 2008. 
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where more studies about BSE have been done.
521
  
Both the government and civil organisations blamed each other for being 
unscientific and political. While the government criticised the civil organisations for 
exaggerating negligible risk only to oppose US beef and the Korea-US FTA, the 
activists blamed the government for rendering the sanitary and quarantine issue 
which should be dealt with on the scientific and technical grounds a political issue. 
In addition, they criticised the government for ignoring scientists’ advice without 
holding NLHCC meetings. Both the government and civil organisations resorted to 
science as the source of authoritative, objective and universal knowledge, and as the 
unquestionable basis for policy making.  
 
6.3.2 Absurd stories and science 
Alternate accounts of BSE risk were disseminated rapidly in very simplified form 
through the Internet. In 2008, the information about BSE provided through the 
Internet increased 10 to 15 times more than in the previous years and personal blogs 
produced more information about BSE than public media during the controversy.
522
 
Online discussion boards of portal sites were the main places where demonstrations 
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 Ibid. (my translation) 
522
 < Information about BSE provided online > 
 News article video Blog 
2004 2,921 173 1,556 
2005 1,772 142 1,553 
2006 2,628 211 3,795 
2007 4,725 577 5,902 
2008 45,814 6,212 90,126 
  
Korean Rural Economic Institute, A Study on the Socio-economic Influence of Consumers’ Safety 
Concerns on Animal Products (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2010), p.173. 
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were organised and BSE-related information was disseminated; in addition, the 
information and claims were shared and disseminated through personal blogs or 
elsewhere through the online community. The BSE-related claims within the Internet 
generally repeated or integrated information from various sources such as PD 
Notebook, civil organisations’ statements, or books which had warned of BSE risk.523 
The accounts within the Internet focussed on the uncertainty of BSE and vCJD in 
common, and were usually based on the worst scenarios which were often mixed 
with rumours and hyperbole. 
The government argued that the accounts raised by PD Notebook and circulated 
within the Internet were ‘absurd stories’ which were scientifically unsound and 
ascribed the public protests against US beef to a public misinformed by ‘absurd 
stories.’ The Korean government argued that the new beef requirements were based 
on science, and made efforts to provide the public with ‘scientific truth’ about BSE 
in order to blockade spreading the ‘absurd stories.’  
On 2
nd
 and 6
th
 May, the government held press conferences on the new import 
sanitary requirements for US beef. In addition to civil scientists at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the NVRQS, representatives from the 
Korean Medical Association, (Dong-chun Shin, professor of Yonsei University, 
Environmental health epidemiology, and GI-hwa Yang, a researcher at the Medicine 
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 The representative books which often referred to as the evidence of the risk of BSE were: Richard 
Rodes, Deadly Feasts: Tracking The Secrets of A Terrifying New Plague (Simon & Schuster, 13 July, 
1999) (The Korean version of this book was published in October 2006); and Colm A. Kelleher, Brain 
Trust: The Hidden Connection Between Mad Cow and Misdiagnosed Alzheimer’s diseases (Simon & 
Schuster, 9, October, 2004) (The Korean version was published in February 2007) These books 
published in the late 1990s and the early 2000s when BSE swept the whole Europe assumed the 
worst-scenario of the epidemic and warned the risk of BSE. 
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policy research institute of the Korean Medical Association, pathology) were invited 
by the CDC. Advisory committee members of the MIFAFF were not invited. 
Government officials at the MIFAFF and the NVRQS thought that they themselves 
would be able to provide sufficient answers to the questions regarding veterinary 
issues without help from external scientists.
524
 At the conferences, MIFAFF officials 
explained that newly agreed beef requirements were effective in securing the safety 
of beef, because they were in accordance with the scientific and international 
standards of the OIE.  
In addition to the press conference, the Korean government ran advertisements for 
the general public on major daily newspapers and Internet portal sites from 5
th
 May 5. 
Joint advertisements of the MIFAFF and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) 
said: “Beef consumed by the US people is the same as the beef to be imported to 
Korea”; “300 million of US people and 96 countries are enjoying US beef”; and 
“there is no BSE-infected animal which was born in the US after 1997.” 525 The 
government tried to reassure the public by stressing that beef to be imported to Korea 
would be as safe as beef consumed in the US and other countries.  
Besides this, the government published a brochure entitled ‘Truth about Mad Cow 
Disease’ with the aim of correcting public misunderstanding of BSE. The items 
classified as ‘absurd stories’ by the government were mainly based on the claims 
which had been raised by PD Notebook or by civil organisations. The government’s 
explanation of the ‘absurd stories’ was refuted again by civil activists, while the 
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 MIFAFF and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) on newspapers, 5-8 May 2008  
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claims of the government and dissenting organisations were completely opposed to 
each other (Table 10). 
The claims of the government were not wrong from the perspective of mainstream 
BSE science, and it was true that many of the items which were defined as absurd 
stories were over the top. Nevertheless, the items of the ‘absurd stories’ could not be 
regarded as absolutely true or false, as shown by a survey of international scientists, 
which was carried out by a Korean TV program (Table 11).
526
 The counterclaims of 
civil organisations were more precautionary, placing greater emphasis on the areas of 
uncertainty. The government was blamed for glossing over the uncertainty of BSE 
risk, and the disputes over the absurd stories, despite the government’s intention to 
resolve the controversy by informing the public, could do nothing more than identify 
different positions on the uncertainty of BSE and vCJD.  
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 A TV program ‘Consumer report by Lee Young-don PD – Listen to international BSE experts ’ 
conducted a survey about the issues about BSE and vCJD to scientists who had published academic 
papers in international prion conference. Korea Broadcasting System, aired on 30 May 2008.  
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Table 10 Summary of the ‘absurd Stories’, and the claims and the refutation527 
‘Absurd Story’ The government Civil activists 
1. Around 600 cattle-derived 
products such as cosmetics, 
sanitary napkins, and diapers 
can infect humans with Mad 
Cow Disease. 
Abnormal prions have not 
been discovered in gelatin and 
collagen for medication and 
cosmetics which were made 
with the skin of cattle. 
US FDA recognised that cosmetics 
made with materials originating 
from BSE-infected cattle or SRMs 
can infect BSE via eyes or cut or 
abraded skin.   
2. Tap water can be 
contaminated by knives and 
chopping boards which were 
used for BSE-infected beef. 
As US beef will be imported 
with SRMs removed, BSE 
cannot spread by tap water. 
Infection from tap water is 
unlikely, but knives, chopping 
boards, and water used to wash 
them, are risky. This is the reason 
that tools for cattle over 30 months 
and those used for cattle under 30 
months should be kept separate in 
US abattoirs. 
3. 95% of Korean people 
have a genetic sensitivity to 
Mad Cow Disease [vCJD]. 
A particular gene cannot decide 
the likelihood of Mad Cow 
Disease [vCJD] occurrences. 
It was the government’s claim and 
the author was the advisory 
member of the government.   
4. Beef from animals above 
30 months of age, which is 
not used even for pet food in 
the US, will be exported to 
Korea for human 
consumption. 
In the US, beef from old cattle 
is used for food, after removal 
of SRMs. 300 billion US 
people and 2.5 million of 
Korean people in the US eat the 
same beef as that which will be 
exported to Korea.  
90-97% of slaughtered cattle in the 
US are under 20 months. The new 
beef deal allowed beef from old 
animals which is not consumed in 
the US to be imported.  
5. Out of 5 million patients 
with dementia in the US, 
250 – 650 thousand are 
suspected to be vCJD 
patients. 
Dementia and vCJD are 
different, and the suspected 
vCJD case in Virginia was 
confirmed to not be vCJD. 
As the US government has 
regulated BSE risk by the 
animal protein feed ban for 
cattle and removal of SRMs, 
beef produced in the US now is 
safe. 
As there is no national medical 
care system in the US, statistics on 
vCJD or dementia in the US are 
not confident.  
The ruminant feed ban cannot 
eliminate BSE due to cross 
contamination. The OIE, Japan and 
even the Korean government 
recognised this. 
6. People can be infected 
with Mad Cow Disease 
[vCJD] even by eating 
muscle meat only. 
Abnormal prion which causes 
BSE cannot be transmitted by 
muscle meat. vCJD can be 
infected when eating SRMs of 
BSE-infected cattle.  
An academic article claiming that 
abnormal prion was discovered in 
a peripheral nerve of old cattle was 
cited by the government. Claiming 
that muscle meat is absolutely safe 
is not scientific.  
7. Mad Cow Disease [vCJD] 
can be transmitted by 
kissing. 
Mad Cow Disease [vCJD] 
cannot be transmitted by saliva, 
because abnormal prion is not 
discharged as saliva. 
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD), 
TSE of deer and elk, is known to 
be transmitted by saliva. In an 
experiment, abnormal prion of 
CWD-infected deer changed 
normal prion of human to 
abnormal prion. 
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for Public Health and Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights, “10 Questions & 
Answers about Mad Cow Disease,” May 9, 2008., my summary and translation 
 241 
Table 11 Answers regarding issues of ‘absurd stories’ by scientists (%)528  
 Yes No 
Is vCJD transmitted by kissing? 4 96 
Is vCJD transmitted by gelatin capsule? 23 77 
Is vCJD transmitted by diapers or sanitary napkin? 11 89 
Is vCJD transmitted by cosmetics? 10 90 
Is vCJD transmitted to people who come into contact 
with knives or chopping boards used for BSE-infected 
animals? 
26 74 
Is BSE transmitted between beef by knives or chopping 
boards used for BSE-infected animals? 
92 8 
Do the Korean people have a higher chance of being 
infected with vCJD than other ethnic groups due to the 
high proportion of M/M type gene among the population?  
Very high (19), high (35), 
Same (with other ethnic 
groups) (19), low (4), very 
low (4), don’t know (19) 
 
Most of all, the weakest point of the government to be attacked was the 
contradiction caused by the change in positions shown by the government with 
regard to BSE risk. Some of the claims that the government called ‘absurd stories’ 
overlapped with the claims that the government had raised in international settings to 
decrease beef import from the US. For example, as presented in the previous chapter, 
the Korean government raised possible BSE risk from muscle meat at the OIE 
meetings. The government’s reassurance about the safety of beef was inconsistent 
with the strict attitude about bone fragments in beef from the US. 
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http://office.kbs.co.kr/huragi844, 14 May 2008 
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6.3.3 Pursuit of scientific truth by scientists  
As ‘scientific truth’ was represented as a solution to the controversy, the Korean 
scientific community joined in disputes over BSE. Within the scientific community 
there were calls for scientists to contribute to resolving social conflicts with their 
scientific expertise. As Jae-seung Jung and Se-jung Oh have written: 
Though the BSE issue came to the fore as a serious social issue, scientists 
remained silent for a while. The Korean scientific community has 
neglected its role in science-involving social issues, though authoritative 
scientific bodies and scientists can contribute to resolving unnecessary and 
wasteful controversy by providing scientific facts … It should be regarded 
as the bounden duty of scientists who do research with nation’s tax.529  
 
Regrettably, scientists have not played a leading role in the recent 
controversy. … Now, scientists ought to provide objective scientific 
knowledge in order for lay people to make rational decisions on issues for 
which scientific knowledge is important. … When responding actively to 
social issues with their expertise, scientists will be able to have power and 
be respected as experts.
530
 
 
On 8
th
 May, the Korean Academy of Science and Technology (KAST), the most 
prestigious scientific organisation in Korea and composed of senior scientists, held a 
roundtable forum on ‘Mad Cow Disease and Safety of Beef.’ The KAST stated that 
the forum was held from a purely academic perspective in order to ‘provide the exact 
knowledge of BSE to the public and help them to make the right decision’ with 
regard to the beef and BSE issue.
531
 The speaker was Yong-soon Lee (Seoul 
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National University, veterinary pathology), and debaters included: Joong-bok Lee 
(Konkuk University, veterinary epidemiology), Hee-jong Woo (Seoul National 
University, veterinary immunology), Hae-gwan Cheong (Sungkyunkwan University, 
epidemiology), Gi-hwa Yang (Medical policy research institute of the Korean 
Medical Association, neuropathology), Sang-yoon Kim (Seoul National University, 
neurology), and Dong-chun Shin (professor at Yonsei University, prevention 
medicine). Yong-soon Lee was known to have provided advice regarding the new 
beef requirements to the MIFAFF minister. Gi-hwa Yang participated in translating 
the BSE inquiry report of the UK to Korean in the early 2000s. Yong-soon Lee and 
Gi-hwa Yang were said to be supporters of the government; Hee-jong Woo and Hae-
gwan Cheong were presented as dissenting experts after being cited by PD Notebook. 
The activist groups, which were primarily responsible for raising dissenting claims 
against the government, were not invited.  
Government Research Institutes including the Korea Institute of Science & 
Technology (KIST) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience & 
Bioengineering (KRIBB) also held press conferences to discuss the issue of Korean 
people’s genetic susceptibility on 8th and 9th May respectively. The conferences of 
KIST and KRIBB were attended by Hee-seob Shin, one of ‘the Supreme Scientists’ 
who was best honoured for his scientific achievement in neuroscience in Korea and 
Myeong-hee Yoo, a team leader of one of Korea’s biggest biotechnology research 
groups .  
The genetic susceptibility of the Korean people to vCJD was one of the most 
                                                                                                                                          
translation) 
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controversial issues, since PD Notebook reported that there was a 94% probability 
that the Korean people would be infected with vCJD by eating BSE-infected beef 
due to the high frequency of MM type Codon 129.
532
 The claim was based on 
studies by a Korean prion research team. According to the studies, polymorphism of 
the prion protein gene (PRNP) at Codon 129 affects susceptibility to sporadic, 
iatrogenic and variant CJD, while the distribution of the genotype in Korean people 
was 94.33% of Met/Met, 5.48% of Met/Val, and 0.19% of Val/Val.
533
 Considering 
that almost all vCJD patients in the UK have been reported as having the Met/Met 
genotype and 36.79% of the UK population have the Met/Met genotype, the studies 
suggested that the Korean people were more likely to be infected with vCJD when 
exposed to BSE-infected beef. The study attracted interest due to the fact that the 
team leader, Yong-sun Kim, was one of a few experts in prion research in Korea and 
a member of the government’s advisory committees for BSE and vCJD issues. 
Moreover, the claim that Korean people might be genetically susceptible to vCJD 
was one of the pieces of evidence to have been prepared by the MIFAFF with a view 
to defending the ban on beef from animals older than 30 months for the negotiations 
with the US.  
At the KAST forum, Gi-hwa Yang and Sang-yoon Kim said that the occurrence of 
a certain disease does not depend on a particular gene, and incidence of vCJD is 
related to the exposure level to abnormal prions and various factors such as dietary 
habit or incidence of BSE in the country affect it. Gi-hwa Yang stated that though 
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China and Japan showed similar distribution of MM type in their population to that 
of Korea, the incidence of vCJD or sCJD in China, Japan, and Korea is not higher 
than the world average. Therefore, he said that the high frequency of MM type 
Codon 129 in Korean people was unlikely to result in two or three times higher 
vCJD risk in Korean people than in UK people.  
The opinions of the scientists at KIST and KRIBB were identical. The 
controversial research of Yong-sun Kim who was regarded as the best expert of prion 
research in Korea was disparaged by the scientists, due to the fact that it surveyed 
sCJD patients rather than vCJD patients.
534
 They said that it was lamentable that the 
infinitesimal risk of BSE had become such a big issue, and that the vCJD issue 
should have been in the domain of scientists rather than that of the media and the 
general public.
535
 However, Hee-jong Woo and Hae-gwan Cheong focussed more on 
the fact that MM type had shown more susceptibility to vCJD than other genetic 
types. Hae-gwan Cheong warned astronomical costs to be invested with only one 
vCJD case for replacing surgical instruments with disposable ones and for importing 
blood in order to prevent infection during medical treatment.  
In fact, scientists’ basic understanding of BSE, whether they supported or opposed 
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the new beef import requirements, did not differ considerably. They agreed that 
vCJD risk by consuming beef was low, but showed differences in how they applied 
this scientific uncertainty to real conditions. For example, Young-soon Lee argued 
that the BSE incidence was decreasing and BSE was expected to disappear in the 
near future with a positive trend worldwide. On the contrary, Hee-Jong Woo and 
Hae-gwan Cheong took a more cautious stance, namely that no rash conclusions 
should be made regarding BSE and vCJD until a cycle of the disease had been 
completed. The official conclusions of the scientific discussions were skewed 
towards assuring the safety of beef rather than focussing on the uncertainty, as 
demonstrated by the below summary of the conclusion by the KAST forum. It was to 
some extent a reflection of the intention with which the scientific organizations held 
the forum and press conferences, a resolution of the controversy by offering true 
knowledge of BSE to the public. 
BSE has decreased since the animal feed ban in 1988, and in this trend, it 
may disappear in the near future;   
As 99.87% of abnormal prion protein is accumulated in SRMs, the chance 
of BSE infection by eating non-SRM cuts is very low and the probability 
of vCJD occurrence by using cosmetics and medicines from cattle 
originated materials is low; 
The probability of BSE is very low in cattle under 30 months and beef 
originating from cattle under 30 months with removing SRMs is 
considered safe; 
People with MM type Codon 129 gene were reported to be more likely to 
be infected with vCJD than people with MV or VV type of Codon 129. 
MM type is most common among Korean people. However, various genes 
play a role in diseases occurring, and the possibility of a certain disease 
occurrence cannot be judged only by a particular gene. 
The public and the media are forming extreme conclusions about the risk 
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of BSE, and fear was exaggerated excessively.
536
  
 
However, news reports regarding the scientific discussions were divided following 
the political tendency of each paper. Some conservative newspapers reported that 
BSE was a disappearing and controllable disease and the risk was seriously 
exaggerated (Dong-a Daily, Chosun Daily, Maeil Business Newspaper), but others 
reported that ‘Even experts did not agree with each other’ (Yeonhab news) or 
‘Koreans are susceptible to vCJD’ (Hankyoreh).537  
Online scientific discussions were organised by the Biological Research 
Information Center (BRIC), a Korean academic website for researchers in biology. It 
opened an online discussion board called ‘BSE controversy, Let’s discuss it 
scientifically!’ from 30th April 2008 to 10th May. Discussions at BRIC, whose main 
participants were junior scientists and research students, were expected to make 
more neutral and objective conclusions than the older and more established scientific 
organisations like KAST or KIST, which might not have wanted to present opinions 
which ran against the position of the government. Moreover, as junior scientists’ 
discussions in BRIC played an important role in unveiling Hwang’s stem cell fraud 
in 2005, the online discussion attracted attention from the media and the public. Like 
                                                 
536
 Korean Academy of Science and Technology, “The Report of the KAST Round-Table Forum on 8 
May 2008,” 2009, pp 13-25 (my translation and summary) 
537
 Heeje Bak argued that mass media in Korea constructed news reports which represented particular 
political positions even in reports about scientific knowledge. During the BSE controversy, he said, 
experts were mobilized as informants who represented particular political position not as information 
provider. For example, Yong-soon Lee and Gi-hwa Yang were cited mainly by conservative media 
which supported the government, and Hee-jong Woo and Hae-gwan Cheong were cited mainly by 
progressive media which opposed US beef import. Heeje Bak, “Scientists in the Media and 
Politicization of Science - The Case of BSE Controversy in 2008,” DAMRON (Discourse) 201 14, no. 
2 (2011): 27–51.  
 248 
the other scientific organisations, the manager of the online discussion board tried to 
confine disputes to scientific discussions and block disputes about political or social 
ones. Discussions on general online boards involved, for the most part, dissenting 
claims regarding the safety of US beef and BSE risk. In contrast, the majority 
opinion coming from BRIC discussion differed. The BRIC discussion consulted 
academic papers, statistics about BSE and vCJD, or calculations of the chances of 
vCJD infection from eating US beef. The conclusion was that vCJD risk from eating 
US beef was very low and that some media and activist groups exaggerated the risk 
and rendered the public panicked only for the purpose of opposing US beef import. 
This was the same conclusion reached following discussions by scientists at the 
KAST, KIST, and KRIBB.  
However, discussions at BRIC, which provided the lay public with a more relaxed 
atmosphere than the forum held by the established scientific organisations, showed 
clearly why science-focussed discussions of the scientific community could not 
resolve the controversy. For example, even though most of the debaters at BRIC 
agreed that eating US beef was not as risky as anti-US beef groups argued, it did not 
always result in support for the government’s decision, and they did not want their 
discussions to be referred to as evidence for the safety of US beef. One online 
contributor wrote: 
Many people on this board are concerned about exaggerated BSE risk, and 
I agree to some extent with the view. However, even if the risk of BSE was 
exaggerated, it cannot justify the current way of importing US beef. (…)   
 249 
(ID: gwangwoo, 30
th
 April 2008, my translation and emphasis)
538 
Moreover, debaters who identified themselves as lay people pointed out why 
scientists’ discussions reduced to scientific aspects of the beef issue were empty.  
If the low probability of risk was verified scientifically as you said, (…) 
why does Japan import only beef from cattle under 20 months and why 
dispose beef as waste when bone is detected? (…) It is reckless to say that 
US beef is not risky based on probability and a few articles, because the 
facts about BSE are not perfectly known. Whatever can probability do?  
(ID: keung, 1
st
 May 2008, my translation)
539
 
…  The public are not concerned about the possibility of infection 
without recognising the low incidence, but expresse discontent with the 
government which increased fear and did not leave the right tools to 
control the risk. This is not a subject for scientific discussion.  
(ID: simmian, 6
th
 May 2008, my translation and emphasis)
540
 
 
As shown by the above claims, disputes over BSE related to political issues 
regarding the government’s role and responsibility for protecting the public’s health 
rather than the issue of the possibility of a BSE outbreak. Conflicting issues over 
BSE and US beef could be separated abruptly into questions of the following 
categories: 1) questions about scientific uncertainty of BSE; 2) questions about how 
to guarantee effective enforcement of risk control measures in the US; and 3) 
questions about how much risk would be acceptable and whether the government’s 
decision to accept the risk by allowing beef from old cattle was legitimate. Whilst 
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scientists may provide answers regarding the first category at most, this will not be 
the case for the others. When scientists said that the risk from eating US beef was 
negligible, it was assumed that risk control measures in the US were properly 
implemented. Moreover, as presented in discussions at BRIC, even if the extremely 
low risk of beef was admitted in scientific terms, it did not mean that the risk should 
be accepted by the Korean public. Scientific claims such as ‘safety of beef after 
removing SRMs’ or ‘extremely low chance of vCJD infection from eating beef’ 
could not provide appropriate answers to the common questions of the public such as: 
‘(If the risk is negligible), Why does Japan and the EU maintain such strict 
regulations?’ or ‘Why do we have to import beef from the US, taking even negligible 
risk?’ The answers to these questions should be provided by the government with 
authority, and as such, the efforts of scientists who have attempted to resolve the 
controversy with scientific knowledge ended in failure.  
 
6.4 Closure of the controversy  
In the previous section, disputes over the beef import requirements agreed in April 
2008 were presented. The claims of the government and civil activists were 
conflicting, and both of them relied on scientific knowledge as conclusive grounds. 
However, scientific discussions aiming to provide knowledge of BSE and correcting 
the misunderstanding of public failed to resolve the controversy. This section will 
detail the process behind the government’s policy shift to pacify the public and the 
aftermath of the BSE controversy.  
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6.4.1 Modification of beef requirements  
As public protests continued, the government decided to postpone promulgating 
the beef import requirements, and looked for ways to defuse public concerns without 
scrapping the beef agreement. On 19
th
 May, a letter from the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) Susan C. Schwab was sent to Korea Trade Minister Jong-
hoon Kim and her statement was released. In her letter, Schwab said that the US 
recognised that “every government has the right to protect its citizens from health 
and safety risks in accordance with the GATT Article XX and the WTO SPS 
agreement” and “US regulations require SRMs, as defined under U.S regulations, be 
removed from all beef or beef products, whether they are intended to domestic 
consumption or export to another country.”541 This letter aimed to calm public 
dissatisfaction regarding the potential situation of Korea being unable to ban 
importation of US beef even when additional BSE cases occur in the US. It also put 
to bed the rumor that the US would export beef products which were not being used 
for human food in the US such as beef from animals older than 30 months and SRMs. 
The letter from the USTR, which guaranteed the equivalence of regulations on beef, 
regardless of whether it is destined for domestic consumption or exportation, did not 
reassure the public. The civil organisations argued that the government was trying to 
patch up affairs without amending crucial problems in the requirements such as 
import of beef from cattle older than 30 months and offal.  
On 22
nd
 May, President Lee addressed public talk of apologies on the beef issue. 
He admitted that the government had not paid enough attention to public concerns 
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and had not consulted with the public. He said that citizens’ health was more 
valuable than any other interests, and apologised for his failure to fathom the Korean 
citizens’ minds.542 However, public concern on mad cow disease was still described 
as an ‘absurd story’ and unscientific anxiety in his address. The position of the 
government that renegotiation was impossible was firm. The grounds were: ‘the 
government cannot destroy the beef deal just because of public emotion’; ‘there is no 
problem in scientific terms in the beef deal’; and ‘international standards should be 
respected.’ Moreover, as the number of participants increased, candlelight rallies 
became often violent demonstrations, and frequent conflicts between demonstrators 
and police brought back memories of the military crackdown during the military 
dictatorship. Now, the slogans which were the most frequently sung and shouted at 
street demonstrations were “The Republic of Korea shall be a Democratic Republic” 
and “all state authority shall emanate from people.”543 Here are some voices. 
The most important problem was not about food safety, but the response of 
the government and the decision making process. … (A student, cited in 
Lee, Jae-sin & Min-young Lee, 2008, p. 58-59, my translation and 
summary).   
The public opposed the fact that the government made the decision over 
the nation’s health without any consultation and the undemocratic process 
and the way of thinking of the government. Risk of BSE and US beef was 
a less important issue. (an office worker in the thirties, cited in Lee, Jae-sin 
& Min-young Lee, 2008, p. 63, my translation and summary).
544
 
 
The focus of the candlelight rallies was changing to the request for democracy and 
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communication between the government and the public.
545
 When the government 
announced the enforcement of the new import sanitary condition as of 3 June, more 
than 40,000 people gathered in downtown Seoul on May 31, 2008. Demonstrators 
blamed the government and President Lee for not stopping US beef import which the 
nation did not want. The Korean government decided to postpone enforcing beef 
requirements and requested that the US ban the export of beef from cattle over 30 
months on 2
nd
 June. However, public outrage was not appeased. The Grand Nation 
Party (the ruling political party) was beaten completely at the regional by-election on 
4
th
 June and the approval rate of President Lee plummeted. All senior presidential 
secretaries and all cabinet members including the prime minister offered to resign en 
masse to express regret for the beef issue. On 6
th
 June, a constitutional appeal, which 
claimed that the beef import requirements infringed on the right of the people’s 
health, was filed by a civil organisation (“Lawyers for Democratic Society”) with the 
signatures of nearly 100,000 people.  
Nevertheless, the government still refused to scrap the beef agreement, saying 
‘The effect will be huge, in case the cancellation of the beef deal leads to trade 
conflict with the US and it is harmful to the national interest.’546 The number of 
people who attended the street demonstration peaked with 80,000 protesters in Seoul 
and 140,000 throughout the country on June 10
th
. This was the 21
st
 anniversary of 
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democratic movement which eventually brought an end to the military dictatorship 
which had lasted since 1961.
547
  
Finally, President Lee made a second apology at a press conference on 19
th
 June. 
He said that he had thought that KORUS FTA, a shortcut to improve Korea’s 
economic competitiveness, could not be ratified without opening the beef market to 
the US and the relationship with the US should be recovered as soon as possible 
considering the military tension Korea faced with North Korea. The government, 
which had continuously denied the association between the beef deal and other 
political interests including the FTA, finally admitted that the political and economic 
consideration affected the beef issue. Though not cancelling the whole beef deal 
agreed in April, the government declared that beef from cattle older than 30 months 
would not be imported, as long as the Korean public did not want it.
548
 On 21
st
 June, 
the MIFAFF Minister and Trade Minister announced that both governments had 
agreed to introduce ‘Less than 30 Month Age-Verification Quality System 
Assessment Program’ (QSA) as a transitional step to improve Korean consumers’ 
confidence in US beef.
549
 It would verify that beef destined for Korea would be from 
cattle less than 30 months old by a ‘voluntary private sector’ arrangement.550 In 
addition, brains, eyes, skulls, or spinal cords from cattle less than 30 months of age, 
which had been banned by the beef requirements in 2006 but not banned by the beef 
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requirements in April, would be banned.
551
 These changes meant almost returning 
back to the beef import health requirements of 2006. Though the civil activist groups 
raised doubts about the credibility of the QSA Program which relied on voluntary 
observance of US exporters rather than on the US government’s verification, 
candlelight rallies petered out. However, surveys showed that public anxiety about 
US beef was not clearly resolved. Approximately 65% of people said that they were 
still concerned about the safety of US beef.
552
 
 
6.4.2 The aftermath 
The government announced the ‘Import Health Requirements for US beef and 
Beef products’ which was amended by the additional negotiations with the US on 
26
th
 June. On 29
th
 June 2008, the Korean government announced the ‘Plan for 
Hygiene and Safety Control of Livestock Products and Livestock Industry 
Development’: According to the plan, quarantine officers and special investigation 
teams would be dispatched to the US and beef products with more risk such as 
tongue and intestines would be investigated through defrosting and biopsy in the 
quarantine process. In addition, subsidies to produce high quality Korean beef would 
be provided for beef farmers. In July 2008, the Korean government enforced the 
expanded application of ‘Beef Origin Labeling’, which had been applied only to grill 
restaurants with a floor space of 300 m
2 
or larger, to all eating establishments 
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including small cafes and catering firms.
553
 It was announced that the Beef 
Traceability System would be implemented on a full scale from June 2009, affecting 
2 million domestic animals. US beef went on sale from 1
st
 July 2008.  
Nevertheless, there was no change in the government’s notion about science as 
authoritative, objective and universal knowledge even after the controversy. At the 
hearing on the beef negotiations by the Special Committee at the National Assembly 
in August 2008, government officials argued that there was no problem in the beef 
requirements agreed in the April, because it was based on the scientific OIE 
standards. They said that while the initial beef deal agreed in the April was based on 
‘science’, the amended beef requirements through additional talk with the US in June 
(the ban on beef from cattle over 30 months and brains, eyes, skulls and spinal cords) 
reflected ‘public emotion not science.’554  
The Korean National Assembly amended the Act on the Prevention of Contagious 
Animal Diseases (Act 9130, 11 September 2008) to resolve issues which had been 
raised during the BSE and US beef controversy. A definition of prohibited items 
which cannot be imported from other countries was newly included in the Act. 
Before the amendment, there was no general definition of SRMs in Korea, with the 
exception of import requirements for US beef. As Korea imported beef from 
Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico which had no BSE incidences, there were no 
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restrictions on the beef products produced and imported in the countries. The 
amendment not only designated the cuts which are normally defined as SRMs (e.g. 
brain, tonsil, and distal ileum) as prohibited items, but also granted the MIFAFF 
minister the authority to prohibit certain cuts of beef, considering ‘the national 
dietary habits.’  
Article 2 
6. The term "specific hazardous matters" means any of the following items 
of the tissue of cattle from a country where bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy has broken out: 
(a) Amygdala and distant parts of the ileum derived from cattle of all 
monthly ages; 
(b) Brain, eye, spinal cord, skull, spinal column derived from cattle older 
than 30 months; and 
(c) Matters separately designated and announced by the Minister for Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries by taking into consideration the 
conditions of outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy by country 
and national dietary habits, etc. (underlines added) 
 
These measures reflect the concern that Korean people who eat most of all parts of 
the cow are likely to be more susceptible to BSE than Western people who eat 
mainly muscle meat. Nevertheless, the newly made definitions of SRMs are not 
applied to beef produced and slaughtered in Korea. 
In addition, the amendment included the ban on ‘beef and beef products of cattle 
older than 30 months produced from countries where five years have not passed 
since the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy’ (Article 32). This ban was 
controversial due to a concern about potential trade conflict. It was more stringent 
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than the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. According to the global trade regime, 
more stringent regulation than international standards is required to be scientifically 
justified.    
Besides this, according to the amendment, in the event that the government 
intends to import beef from the above-mentioned countries, the decisions shall be 
subject to deliberation by the National Assembly (Article 34). This was done to 
restrict the government’s discretion to permit importation of foreign beef products. 
The deliberation of the national assembly was made as a compromise between the 
opposing party which claimed that the decision should be made with the consent of 
the National Assembly, and the government which claimed that the policy decision 
on beef import requirements was a technical issue which did not require the 
Assembly’s agreement. The Canadian beef resumption, discussed below, was the 
first case where concern about trade conflict was realised and the deliberation by the 
National Assembly was applied. 
Canada, whose beef had been banned since 2003 due to BSE cases, requested that 
the WTO settle the disputes over the Korean ban on Canadian beef in July 2009. 
Canada, which was identified as having reached a ‘Controlled BSE risk state’ by the 
OIE in 2007, had 15 BSE cases from 2003 to 2009, and new cases were discovered 
in 2010 and 2011. Canada argued that Korea should open its beef market to Canada 
with the same conditions as those applied to US beef. Korea made an agreement with 
Canada to import beef from cattle under 30 months in June 2011 before the WTO 
panel process started. This was because the Korean government thought that if Korea 
were to lose the case at the WTO panel, it should open its market to beef from cattle 
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older than 30 months from many Controlled BSE risk countries which had BSE 
incidence such as the UK and many European countries.  
The Committee for Agriculture at the National Assembly opposed the importation 
of Canadian beef, though it recognised that the beef import and sanitary 
requirements agreed by the two governments secured the acceptable conditions to 
protect public health. The grounds for the opposition were: new BSE case detected in 
Canada in February, and potential economic difficulty faced by Korean beef farmers 
as a result of Canadian beef import. The report was adopted at the plenary session of 
the National assembly, but the adoption of the report had procedural meaning and it 
did not have binding force to the government’s decision. The government pushed 
ahead with the process to import Canadian beef, regardless of the intent of the report. 
‘Deliberation in the national assembly’ did not mean ‘the assembly’s consent’, and it 
did not influence the government’s policy decision on Canadian beef 
Indeed, a potential source of conflict still existed in 2013. It is uncertain whether 
Korea will be able to maintain the ban on beef above 30 months of age. Firstly, the 
pressure from the US to open the Korean market to beef from cattle over 30 months 
continues. The CRS Report stated:    
The issue facing US negotiators is how and at what pace the United States 
can get South Korea to accept all US beef, irrespective of the age of the 
cattle when slaughtered.
555
   
 
Secondly, as the BSE incidence decreases and the positive trend continues, 
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regulations to reduce BSE risk are being relaxed world-wide. Therefore, 
harmonisation with the international standards could well be a cause of tension in the 
future. The OIE amended its Terrestrial Animal Health Code in May 2009 to 
designate deboned skeletal muscle meat as a commodity which can be safely traded 
‘regardless of the age of cattle and risk status of exporting countries.’ The European 
Commission, which started to examine easing BSE risk reducing measures and 
amendment of the list of SRMs ‘in line with the OIE recommendation’, increased the 
age of bovine cattle for BSE testing from 30 months to 72 months in September 
2009.
556
    
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter, detailing the second phase of the Korean BSE controversy, has 
presented the development of the public controversy in 2008. The newly formulated 
conditions for US beef allowed beef from cattle older than 30 months and offal. This 
was a more relaxed condition than the previous import health requirements for beef, 
and led to serious public controversy over the safety of beef and BSE. Public protests 
sparked by a TV program dominated the entire nation for more than two months. The 
government argued that as the new beef sanitary requirements were in accordance 
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with the OIE standards, beef safety would be guaranteed. Civil organisations raised 
alternate accounts about beef safety and BSE risk from a more precautionary 
perspective. Contradictory claims about BSE and beef safety were voiced by both 
the government and government opponents, while ‘scientific truth’ was represented 
as a solution to the controversy. However, there remained too much uncertainty 
surrounding BSE for conclusive answers to be provided, and disputes reduced to 
scientific issues could not calm the controversy which was combined with the issue 
of political legitimacy. Public protest ended when the government stepped back, 
reintroducing the ban on beef from cattle above 30 months age. However, there was 
no fundamental change in the Korean government’s policy approach. 
In the next chapter, I will analyse the Korean BSE controversy by pooling 
evidence presented in preceding chapters with a view to answering the research 
questions.  
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7 Analysis of the BSE controversy in Korea  
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the characteristics of the BSE controversy in Korea will be 
presented and discussed, with a focus on the overarching research questions 
presented in Chapter 1: ‘what caused the huge BSE controversy in Korea in 2008 
when the disease seemed to be controlled and not threatening?’; and ‘how was the 
risk and uncertainty of BSE addressed and what was the particularity of the Korean 
response?’ I will first summarise the Korean BSE controversy under the themes 
which were presented in Chapter 2, following which, I will compare and contrast the 
ways in which scientific knowledge were produced and presented in Korea and the 
UK policy process. Finally, I will suggest the particularity of the ways in which 
science was dealt with in the Korean policy process by using Jasanoff’s concept of 
‘civic epistemology.’ 
 
7.2 Summary of the Korean BSE controversy    
To the UK government in the 1980s, BSE was a totally unknown disease, and lack 
of knowledge represented one of the significant factors which instigated anxiety. 
Indeed, the origins of the disease were unknown, as was how it could be treated, or 
whether it would cause risks to human health. Since the tragic events in the UK, 
knowledge of BSE has been accumulated. As a result, BSE incidence decreased 
drastically as risk control measures were put in place widely, although the 
uncertainty of the disease was not completely resolved. Despite these conditions, 
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Korea was faced by massive public scare and panic over BSE risk in 2008 and the 
increase in scientific knowledge did not resolve the conflicts in Korea.  
Jasanoff has written that “… increasing knowledge is often likely to create new 
frontiers of uncertainty, where the evaluation of evidence depends primarily on the 
interpreter's individual judgment and institutional or personal values.” 557 
Accordingly, scientific uncertainty is likely to be mobilised as a resource by those 
who would like to affect or oppose regulatory policy.
558 
 For example, during the 
Korean controversy, the high frequency of MM type in Korean sCJD patients was 
interpreted as evidence suggesting a higher vCJD risk for Korean people by 
dissenters and by the government according to their interests. Simultaneously, it was 
presented by some scientists as evidence suggesting relatively low risk in 
comparison with the other countries which showed a similar sCJD incidence to 
Korea despite the low frequency of MM type in their population. The clear case that 
uncertainty was mobilised to affect regulatory policy marked the Korean 
government’s dual stance on BSE risk and uncertainty when responding to the 
international situation and the domestic situation. The risk and uncertainty claims 
which the Korean government raised in international settings boomeranged on the 
government later by the civil organisations which attacked the government’s decision 
to relax the beef conditions with the same claims. 
The mobilisation of uncertainty surrounding BSE was closely related with the 
complex interests related to US beef in Korea. The import of US beef was always a 
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politically sensitive issue in Korea, often represented as a threat to domestic 
agriculture. BSE had been linked to the US beef issue since the detection of BSE-
infected cattle in the US in 2003, while political and economic considerations of the 
Korean government regarding the domestic livestock industry and the relationship 
with the US complicated the beef issue. The complexity of the beef issue impeded 
the Korean government’s efforts to take a clear stance on BSE risk and beef safety. 
The Korean government stressed uncertainty regarding BSE risk in international 
settings to minimise beef import from the US and to secure more advantageous 
positions in beef negotiations with the US; simultaneously, it supported the safety of 
beef in the domestic arena in order to maintain stability in the home beef market and 
to prevent public anxiety about beef. The opening of the beef market in accordance 
with the OIE standards was magnified as the key matter to resolve the FTA with the 
US, the priority issue for the two countries. As such, BSE risk in US beef was 
presented as the main reason to oppose the FTA with the US by the anti-FTA group. 
Thus, the Korean government was put in a double bind. It could not officially admit 
the safety of beef processed in accordance with the OIE standards, nor could it fully 
support the risk claims about US beef, as the anti-FTA group argued.  
The Korean government, which imposed a total ban on US beef in 2003, permitted 
the import of boneless beef from cattle under 30 months of age in 2006, and finally 
made an agreement with the US to allow beef from cattle above 30 months of age, 
including beef-on-the-bone and some cuts which had previously been prohibited, in 
order to remove obstacles for the FTA in 2008. The decision resulted in massive 
public protests. BSE had specific features which meant that its risk was likely to be 
perceived by the public as serious, despite the minimal chance of infection. It was a 
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disease regarding which knowledge was not clear and with potentially irreversible 
and catastrophic damage capabilities. Besides this, public evaluation of risks 
depended on political and social factors such as the procedures for decision-making 
and trust in relevant institutions. The trustworthiness of official assurances about the 
safety of US beef was undermined by the earlier pressures from the US and the 
abrupt policy change ahead of the summit between Korea and the US. Moreover, 
neither the BSE risk control system in the US nor the enhanced Beef Origin Labeling 
System in Korea were trusted by the public due to earlier cases of the detection of 
prohibited bone in US beef boxes and frequent beef origin fraud in the Korean beef 
market.  
The Korean government presented the decision on the new beef sanitary 
requirements as having been made on scientific grounds. Further, it contrived to 
resolve the controversy by appealing to scientific knowledge, and the government’s 
safety claims were generally supported by scientists. However, they could not 
reassure the public. Guidelines for the safety of imported beef belonged to the 
domain of ‘policy-relevant science’ or ‘regulatory science’ which required the 
intervention of non-scientific factors, in the sense that the legitimacy and credibility 
of the policies relied not only on seeking better scientific knowledge but also on 
attaining political authority of the knowledge. 
Though the scientific claims of the government were supported by scientists, the 
beef import requirements agreed in April 2008 failed to secure its political authority. 
Contrary to the consistent claims of the opposition groups which had warned about 
the risk of US beef since 2005, the government’s arguments regarding the safety of 
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beef, which changed depending on the circumstances, were less credible. The dual 
positions of the Korean government about BSE risk and beef safety in international 
and domestic settings, which were disclosed by revealed documents during the 
controversy, raised doubts about the trustworthiness of the government. 
Misinterpretation of the US enhanced feed ban raised doubts about the government’s 
competence. Besides this, the government’s rejection of public demands to scrap the 
beef deal was regarded as the ignorance of public opinion and a retrograde step for 
democratic governance. 
Moreover, under the new beef requirements in April 2008, the safety of beef to be 
eaten by Korean consumers relied entirely on actions controlled by the US 
government. In 2006 and 2007, the government imposed strict stature on the breach 
of the beef requirements by the US exporters. It sent back entire beef containers 
which contained only small bone fragments and suspended import by stopping or 
postponing inspection of US beef when banned items such as bone were found. The 
strict measures of the government were supported by the public, regardless of the 
actual risk of bone. However, under the beef requirements in 2008, the Korean 
government could not force the US government to implement the enhanced feed ban, 
and it could not suspend or ban US beef import even in cases involving a breach of 
the beef requirements by the US or a new BSE case in the US. Moreover, it would 
not be possible for the Korean quarantine agency to identify beef items which were 
designated as SRMs in old cattle, unlike bone which could be detected X-ray using 
detectors. These conditions raised doubts as to whether the Korean government 
could take actual actions against the breach of the requirements by the US and secure 
the safety of beef. It was framed by dissenters as giving up of sovereignty to protect 
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a nation’s health and a dereliction of basic national duties. Therefore, the controversy 
became an issue of trust in the government beyond food safety, and it was this factor 
which primarily caused the long, and indeed sizeable public protest. As Sung-Chul 
Park has commented, it was; 
Not danger of BSE but the fact that there is no way to escape from the risk 
made the Korean public seized with fear. How do we entrust our food 
safety wholly on conscience and good will of multinational livestock 
capital and foreign government?
559
    
 
To summarise the cause of the Korean BSE controversy, firstly, BSE risk was 
amplified and mobilised under political and economic considerations; and, secondly, 
the government failed to recognise the political and social implications of the beef 
issue, and consequently failed to secure political authority for its beef policy.  
 
7.3 Comparison of the Korean ways to approach to 
scientific knowledge with those of the UK   
The Korean government had scientific advisory committees and defended its 
policies as having been based on science, just as the UK government had done in the 
1980-90s. In this section, the way in which scientific knowledge in the policy area 
was produced and presented during the Korean BSE controversy will be compared 
with that of the UK. Comparison with the UK will clarify the particularities of the 
ways in which knowledge is produced and presented in Korean policy processes.  
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Bureaucrats dominated the expert advisory system    
The uncertainty surrounding BSE and beef safety was a shared feature of the two 
controversies. The UK and the Korean government set up expert advisory 
committees for policy-making on BSE and beef safety issues. Korea and the UK 
showed similar strategy patterns whereby scientific uncertainty was dealt with in 
policy-making, as Jasanoff described in her analysis on the regulatory politics of 
carcinogens in the UK.
560
 Contrary to Germany where the resolution of scientific 
issues is delegated to technical experts and the interpretation of evidence and the 
criteria were explained by an expert group, she stated that scientific and 
administrative processes were mixed in the UK and the analysis of scientific and 
policy issues was not provided in its explicit detail by the government. In addition, 
the advisory committees of Korea and Britain looked similar in that they depended 
on bureaucrats for their operation: the selection of experts was at the discretion of 
bureaucrats; expert advisory members depended on bureaucrats for information and 
the creation of policy recommendation, whilst committees were not open to the 
public.  
However, compared to the UK, expert committees in Korea played a less visible 
role in the policy-making process and public relations. Contrary to the UK, MAFF 
officials who hid themselves behind their scientific advisors in representing their 
policy decision, Korean MIFAFF officials emphasised that decision making on US 
beef rested with the minister not experts. Of course, contrary to the UK in the 1980s, 
which experienced an enormous increase in BSE-infected cattle, only three BSE-
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infected animals were discovered in the US until 2006, and BSE looked controlled 
with international guidelines and information to control the risk made available to 
the public. The controlled situation of the disease was a significant difference 
between the UK and Korean cases. Nevertheless, the Korean government was also 
faced by a different kind of uncertainty regarding BSE. This uncertainty had resulted 
from increasing knowledge since the UK crisis; knowledge which the UK 
government did not confront, such as the genetic susceptibility of Korean people to 
BSE. Both governments used expert committees to respond to uncertainty, and the 
difference in both countries’ operating advisory committees cannot be explained only 
by the difference of the condition of the disease.  
In the UK, consultation with an expert advisory committee and gaining scientific 
advice was an ‘inherent part’ of the political culture.561 Under the tradition of 
economic liberalism and self-regulation of industry in the UK, where intervention of 
the government was likely to be only reluctantly adopted, a sound science rationale 
was important to legitimate new regulations. In light of this, policy decisions were 
represented as emerging from scientific experts.  
On the contrary, advisory committees were not considered as important during the 
Korean BSE controversy as they were in the UK. Korea has a tradition of active 
government and powerful bureaucracy which did not avoid aggressive intervention 
for economic growth. The authoritative development process and the lower profile of 
counter-groups which could challenge the government lessened the burden of 
bureaucrats to make explicit principles in policy-making. Though the advisory 
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committee system was used to respond to the increasing complexity of policy-
making, Korean civil servants exercised their power more directly than their UK 
counterparts. The NLHCC was chaired by high level officials of MIFAFF and a 
substantial number of the committee members were civil servants at the MIFAFF 
and the NVRQS. The government’s decision was made regardless of whether or not 
NLHCC members came to an agreement. Whereas the UK policy-makers stated, “we 
are just doing what our expert advisors tell us should be done”, the expert committee 
in Korea never represented the policy decision.
562
 The attitude of Korean civil 
servants could be summarised as, ‘as experts raised no opposition to the policy 
alternative of the government, there is no problem in the policy.’ The role of expert 
committees was to recognize the government’s policy preference.  
The British advisory committee members were chosen among the ‘great and the 
good’ people who had proven their capacity to define public good through their 
years of public service experience.
563
 The NLHCC of the Korean government 
consisted of scientists outside the government, representatives from producer and 
consumer organizations, and civil servants at MIFAFF and NVRQS. Like the UK 
advisory committee, most of the advisory scientists outside the MIFAFF and 
NVRQS were not active researchers in the BSE/vCJD field, because research in the 
field was not active in Korea. Scientist members of NLHCC generally had good 
scientific reputations, but none of them could be seen as counterparts to the ‘great 
and good’ in the British sense. Many of the scientific advisory members of the UK 
earned honours such as knighthoods by their contributions to the policy area, but it 
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was unlikely for Korean scientists to be honored by their service on governmental 
advisory committees.
564
 While there exist orders dedicated to scientists in Korea, 
they are to honor personal scientific achievement and do not have such an impact on 
public life. Unlike the UK where expertise was associated with a specific individual 
whose public standing was verified by his/her record of public service, 
trustworthiness or legitimacy of expertise did rely heavily on individual experts in 
Korea. Technical qualifications were of more importance and as such, individual 
experts could be replaced by others with similar levels of professional knowledge 
and standing. Moreover, as the process of appointment and dismissal of the 
government’s advisory members is an internal process within the government, it 
generally does not attract public interest and raises legitimacy issues. 
Unlike the UK advisory committees to which only scientists were invited, the 
Korean NLHCC included representatives from producers’ and consumers’ 
organizations as advisory members in addition to scientists. The participation of 
representatives from producers’ and consumers’ organisations in the NLHCC may be 
seen as a form of ‘extended peer group’ of Funtowicz and Ravetzs. However, the 
advisory members from the producers’ and consumers’ organisations were not 
recognised as experts, but simply considered as subjects to be informed by the 
MIFAFF officials.
565
 In this respect, it is important to look beyond a mere presence 
on advisory committees and to also pay careful attention to roles taken within them. 
These different features of expert committees in the UK and Korea shaped the 
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different responses to the BSE controversies in each country. The BSE controversy 
in the UK brought about criticism of the relationship between science and 
government, as well as a change in policy processes including the promotion of 
public engagement. A ‘Guidelines on the use of scientific and engineering advice in 
policy making' was issued to help secure transparency and openness in advisory 
processes and policy making, while two-way and dialogic forms of public 
consultation and engagement were encouraged to re-establish the credibility of 
scientific expertise for policy-making among the public.
566
 
However, calls for public debate were rarely heard in Korea, even though the 
massive public protests represented the most striking point of the Korean BSE 
controversy. Instead, independence of scientists from politics was suggested by civil 
organisations as a solution with which to create better policy. Dissenters criticised 
the government for ignoring experts’ advice and rendering a sanitary and quarantine 
issue, which should have been dealt with on scientific and technical grounds, a 
political issue instead. The NLHCC was often contrasted with the Food Safety 
Commission in Japan, which consisted of only scientists without bureaucratic 
involvement. At a forum in December 2008, held by the Korean Federation of 
Science and Technology Societies (KOFST), the biggest association of scientific 
organisations in Korea, participants including representatives from scientific 
organisations attributed the failure of the Korean scientific community in calming 
the controversy to public distrust caused by relatively low social status of the 
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scientific community in Korea, and called for a restoration of the impaired authority 
of science.
567
 In the Korean controversy, scientific knowledge was taken as an 
authoritative and indisputable basis for public policy by the government and 
dissenters, while scientific expertise was suggested as a way in which to restrain the 
power of bureaucracy.  
 
Dependence on international standards and foreign authority 
As discussed above, both the UK and the Korean government defended their 
policies as having been based on science, although the ways in which they relied on 
science differed. The UK government officials and politicians represented their 
policies as having been strongly guided by their scientific advisors.
568
 They used to 
say that they had had no alternative but to accept the advice of experts or they would 
do only as their advisors told. On the contrary, the Korean government did not rely 
on its expert committees or scientific advisors to defend its policies. Instead, the 
grounding of BSE regulatory policy presented by the Korean government was the 
international standards represented by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.  
The Korean government argued that the OIE guideline could guarantee the safety 
of beef and it should be observed as a global standard. Risk assessment of the 
Korean government regarding beef import from the US therefore involved assessing 
whether the BSE risk control measures in the US were in accordance with the OIE 
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standards. Even though the Korean government itself raised doubts about the safety 
of muscle meat and the BSE risk control system in the US, it took the stance that 
decisions by the international organisation were verified scientifically and should be 
followed as global standards. 
Stilgoe has called the dependence on established guidelines in scientific advice 
‘discourse of compliance.’ 569  In his study of the mobile phone health risk 
controversy in the UK, he stated that ‘discourse of compliance’ prevented lay people 
from raising doubts about the adequacy of safety guidelines on electromagnetic 
fields (EMFs) by demarcating the uncertainty as only experts’ concern. Likewise, the 
Korean government’s ‘discourse of compliance’ with the OIE standards hid the 
assumptions and conflicts behind the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code such as 
disputes over the safety of muscle meat which had been concluded by voting, or 
doubts about the risk control system in the US. Kim et al. conducted a study of the 
regulation on GM food in Korea and concluded that ‘discourse of compliance with 
global standards’ existed among the regulators.570 They said that Korean regulators 
had a firm notion that assessment of GM food based on ‘substantial equivalence’ 
could guarantee its safety. This was in direct contrast with the situation in Europe 
and the US, where laboratory tests were no longer regarded as the only way in which 
to guarantee the safety of GM food and the concept of ‘substantial equivalence’ had 
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been continuously challenged and changed.
571
  
In addition to the OIE standards, the claims of the Korean government and the 
opposing activists relied primarily on foreign references such as experimental studies 
carried out in the West. During the BSE controversy, many foreign scientists who 
were said to be eminent were presented by each party, and personal networks with 
foreign scientists were sometimes mobilised by scientists who wanted to exert the 
authority of their claims. Indeed, dependence on studies by foreign scientists was, to 
some extent, innevitable, as the research base for BSE in Korea was limited. The 
problem was that scientific results were only mobilised without discussion regarding 
the assumptions and limitations of the research. Evidence which was obtained in 
experimental conditions was not clearly distinguished from the evidence of risk in 
real conditions, while the different backgrounds and contexts of different regulatory 
policies in other countries were not seriously examined in disputes between the 
government and dissenters.  
The dependence on foreign authority and importing knowledge was a contrasting 
feature between the Korean BSE controversy and the UK case. Dressel stated in her 
comparative study of BSE controversy in the UK and Germany that the notion that ‘a 
British problem and British scientists are well able to cope with without support 
from abroad’ was the distinctive feature of British culture in the relationship with the 
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EU.
572
 Similarly, according to studies regarding risk assessment, domestic studies 
were preferred to foreign ones for health risk assessment in the UK and the US.
 573
 
On the contrary, in her study of the Portuguese BSE controversy, Gonqalves pointed 
out that foreign veterinary science was more deferred to by the policy makers than 
domestic science in Portugal, a semi-peripheral nation within the EU, which was not 
“a scientific innovator but rather a receptor of models and methods developed 
abroad.”574 Similarly, the external dependence of Korea could be explained from the 
point of the knowledge production structure in Korea which achieved development 
by importing knowledge and catching up, as shown by the fluoridation controversy 
in Chapter 4. A notion that ‘we (Korea) have only to follow the advanced countries’ 
precedents without throwing resources’ hindered research which might have 
supported indigenous safety guidelines.
575
 This resulted in a lack of indigenous data 
for risk assessment and a situation whereby guidelines for consumers’ safety were 
borrowed from foreign countries.
576
 The government responded by simply stressing 
that beef destined for Korea from the US was the same as beef consumed in the US, 
and thus safe for Korean people as well. Although the dietary habit of Korean people 
enjoying offal was a long-pending concern regarding BSE risk, no efforts to find an 
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appropriate level of regulation for Korean people were made. 
In this section, I have detailed the way in which scientific knowledge in Korea’s 
policy area was produced and presented regarding BSE risk and US beef, following 
which I have compared this with the UK. Although the Korean government defended 
its policies by appealing to science like the UK government, the advisory system was 
managed differently in Korea and the authority of scientific knowledge on which the 
policies were based was based on different grounds to that of the UK. This 
divergence cannot be explained by the usual ‘politicians’ evasion of responsibility’ or 
‘abuse of science for political aim’, but should be understood by considering 
particular ways in which science interacts with politics in Korea. In the next section, 
the particularity of the Korean knowledge ways will be summarized by using 
Jasanoff’s category of civic epistemology.  
 
7.4 Civic epistemology in Korea  
As shown in the last section, different political culture and policy making styles 
suggest specificities in the ways in which scientific knowledge in the public sphere is 
produced and presented for policy making. Civic epistemology is the way in which 
policy’s knowledge base is perceived as credible within a society. In this section, the 
features of civic epistemology in Korea will be presented according to the six 
interrelated dimensions provided by Jasanoff. 
Styles of public knowledge-making: The way in which scientific knowledge in the 
public sphere is made and presented depends on the ‘institutional routine’ as well as 
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the players in each country.
577
 For example, while knowledge production in the 
public sphere in the US relied on interested parties, primarily manufacturers, 
knowledge making in the UK relied on trustworthy experts.
578
  
In Korea, knowledge making depended primarily on the state’s involvement. As 
presented in Chapter 4, the Korean government led the national development project 
over all sectors by mobilising national resources and by introducing knowledge of 
the advanced Western countries. In a country deficient in human and material 
resources after colonial rule and the Korean War, the government was the only agent 
which could lead the nation’s development. Indeed, an underdeveloped civil society, 
the efficiency of the elite bureaucrats, aspirations of the public for economic growth, 
and the authority of imported knowledge from the advanced West provided a 
sheltered environment to the government, thus meaning that the government could 
monopolise the policy process. Therefore, the role of the government as knowledge 
provider is important. For example, with regard to chemicals management, the 
Korean Ministry of Environment says that while chemical industries in the US and 
European countries have the capability to produce information about chemicals 
which they make, the Korean chemical industry does not, and the government should 
provide basic information regarding toxicity and hazard.
579
 In terms of policy-
making related to BSE risk and US beef, there were few research institutions to rival 
the NVRQS in BSE research, and the government updated scientific knowledge of 
BSE and international regulatory changes through an international network. The 
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government did not need to rely on external advisors.  
However, as civil society has grown following political democratisation in the 
1980s, civil organisations have emerged as a powerful counter-group. Public 
controversies related to science and technology in Korea have increased after the 
democratic transition in the 1980s, and were likely to have been raised mainly by the 
civil sector due to the lack of a counter-scientist group.
580
 It was civil activists that 
mainly provided alternate accounts on BSE risk and beef safety in Korea (and the 
fluoridation controversy which was presented in Chapter 4 was started by an ecology 
activist). Indeed, it stood in stark contrast with the UK where counter-experts such as 
Richard Lacey and Helen Grant raised potential risk in beef and refuted the 
government’s reassurance. Moreover, the developed Internet provided more direct 
access to scientific expertise without depending on the government or scientists. As a 
result of this, and in the midst of the Korean controversy, BSE and vCJD became 
issues which everyone could easily learn about, unlike before when information was 
accessed only by experts. During the BSE controversy, civil activists formulated 
alternate accounts of BSE knowledge by mobilising scientific research papers and 
documents of international organisations open in online space. As a result, the 
authority of the government which represented the OIE as the absolute authority in 
BSE regulatory science was seriously injured. Though the role of civil organisations 
during the BSE controversy was constrained to introducing counter-knowledge from 
foreign countries, it was a clear case which showed the capability of civil society to 
challenge the monopoly of the government in public knowledge productions.  
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Methods of ensuring accountability: Knowledge in the policy area is essential with 
regard to showing that a policy has been created through use of the appropriate 
process or by appropriate representatives, and is this considered legitimate.
581
 
According to a study by Jasanoff, the credibility of public knowledge was achieved 
by adversary process represented as litigation in the US, and by trustworthy experts 
who proved their eligibility through their years of public service in the UK. In 
Germany, institutional affiliation of participants and balance of the interests, which 
were represented by the members of expert bodies, were crucial in terms of earning 
credibility and the trust of policy-relevant knowledge. 
As presented in Chapter 4, Korea has a tradition of active government and 
powerful bureaucracy which has never avoided aggressive intervention for economic 
growth. Elite bureaucracy represented public interest, and efficiency in decision-
making rather than a democratic process was emphasised for rapid economic growth. 
The lower profile of counter-groups lessened the burden of bureaucrats to make 
explicit principles in policy-making, and the policy process was insulated from 
public scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, with the increasing complexity of policy issues and democratisation, 
the participation of experts in the governmental committees is increasing and experts’ 
participation in the Korean policy process looks active.
 
As presented in Chapter 4, 
the committee system is recognised as having contributed to improving 
“professionalism, democracy, transparency, and fairness in policy process” by using 
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the expertise of external experts and gathering various opinions.
582 
Therefore, many 
Korean acts specify the expert committee as one of the most important procedural 
steps in securing public accountability and betterment of policy decision.  
However, the actual process of governmental committees depends primarily on 
bureaucrats, and thus experts’ contributions to the policy process are, in most cases, 
just procedural rather than practical or substantial.
583
 An expert committee tends to 
be used for procedural formality in the policy process rather than as an actual 
bilateral communication channel between the government and expert or civil society; 
and the completion of procedural steps was often regarded as sufficient to guarantee 
the legitimacy of policy decisions regardless of the content. In the case of the 
NLHCC, the government did not rely on the conclusion of the NLHCC in making 
judgments on potential BSE risk in US beef. Indeed, it instead made the decision to 
resume US beef import despite opposition from certain advisory members. MIFAFF 
officials emphasised that it was the minister rather than experts who had the 
authority when it came to decision making on US beef. The role of the scientist 
members was to concede that the government’s policy proposal was not problematic. 
The government officials argued that “the policy decision has no problem, because it 
went through deliberation process at the relevant committee as specified in the 
related act.” Another example was Canadian beef import, which was discussed in 
Chapter 6, and was resumed despite the opposing views in the report written by the 
Committee for Agriculture at the National Assembly. 
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Though the public has demanded increasingly practical and substantial 
participation in the policy process beyond procedural form, there does not seem to 
have been a fundamental change in the Korean government’s bureaucratic approach. 
As presented in Chapter 4, the Korean government, which introduced a local 
referendum to resolve the controversy surrounding the nuclear waste disposal facility, 
is reluctant to promote public deliberation to discuss spent fuel management and the 
building of a high risk nuclear waste disposal facility. Likewise, during the BSE 
controversy, calls for public debate were rarely raised and public concern about beef 
safety was disparaged as absurd stories. 
Practices of public demonstration: “Facts and things” in knowledge claims should 
be seen as credible “in the public eye.” 584  According to Jasanoff, a socio-
technological experiment was preferred in the US, while the UK and Germany relied 
on empirical evidence and experts’ rationality respectively.585  
Korea relied on foreign authority for the knowledge claims in the policy area to be 
seen as credible. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main strategy for Korea’s rapid 
modernisation was to ‘catch up’ with the advanced Western countries by importing 
and imitating their success, while the external dependence on knowledge production 
which had been settled during the development process was widespread. During the 
BSE controversy, the important grounding of the Korean government’s policy-
making was the OIE standards while the safety claims of the government relied 
primarily on the authority of the OIE. Although the Korean government took 
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different positions from those of the US which requested that Korea fully accept the 
OIE standards, both the lift of the ban on boneless muscle meat in 2006 and the lift 
of the ban on beef from cattle above 30 months of age in 2008 were based on the 
OIE’s definition of safe products for trade and the risk status of the US. Scientific 
knowledge claims authorised by the OIE were regarded as what were scientifically 
verified and what could not be refuted by domestic science.  
The government’s dependence on the OIE was refuted by the activists who relied 
on the BSE regulations of EU and Japan, and as a result, disputes often related to 
‘whose standards should be followed.’ As shown in Chapter 4, each country 
perceived differently the appropriate level of regulation for the safety of beef, and 
non-scientific considerations such as convenience. Moreover, cost in implementing 
regulations or the dietary habits of nations as well as scientific evidence affected the 
regulatory policies. However, the context-specific features of regulatory policies in 
the US, EU, and Japan were regarded as conclusive grounds on which to define beef 
safety in disputes between dissenters and the government. 
Objectivity: Objectivity refers to ways in which to show the independence of 
scientific knowledge from subjective bias or particular interests. For example, 
objectivity expressed in numbers and risk assessment was preferred in the US, 
although in the UK and Germany, the consensus was that risk assessment should be 
supplemented by consultation with influential individuals (UK) or expert bodies 
including all relevant parties (Germany).
586
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In Korea, expert committees are normally and frequently used and presented as a 
mechanism for balanced and better policy decision-making by putting expertise and 
various interests into the policy process.
587
 Generally speaking, important policy 
issues within the government should be subjected to discussion by expert committees 
according to the related law. For example, import risk assessment on US beef, which 
had been formulated by the NVRQS had to undergo discussion at the NLHCC before 
the final policy decision.  
Though the expert committee of the Korean government looked similar to the 
expert bodies of the UK and Germany, the difference was that the expert committee 
in Korea was dominated by bureaucrats. As shown in Chapter 4, Science and 
technology in Korean political culture was regarded as purely professional 
knowledge for economic growth, and dependence on knowledge imported from the 
advanced West left little room to raise doubt about the neutrality and objectivity of 
knowledge. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there was a notion shared amongst 
the Korean government officials that external members of the governmental 
committees were incompetent when it came to formulating policy alternatives and 
were likely to be biased to narrow interests, compared to bureaucrats.
588
 As a result, 
the government sector including civil servants and government-associated 
institutions (e.g. quangos) predominated in the governmental committees.
589
 With 
regard to the BSE issue, MIFAFF officials felt that the representatives from the beef 
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industry were keen to protect the interests of the domestic beef industry. Moreover, 
MIFAFF and NVRQS officials dominated the NLHCC with their power. Therefore, 
policy decisions were made following the government’s pre-set position, in spite of 
opposing views within the NLHCC.  
Although the objectivity of the government’s decision on US beef was seriously 
challenged during the controversy with the allegation that the beef requirements had 
been made to provide favorable conditions for the US, the bureaucratic approach did 
not change. When taking measures to pacify the public protest such as ‘Less than 30 
Month Age-Verification Quality System Assessment Program’ (QSA) or deciding to 
import Canadian beef in 2011, the Korean government made decisions on its own 
without involving the public and regardless of the opposing views raised by the 
National Assembly.  
Expertise: To be accepted as a legitimate expert in a society requires 
accountability as well as specialised knowledge.
590
 For example, unlike in the US 
where ‘formal qualifications’ and ‘impersonal test of intelligence’ are considered as 
the main constituents of legitimate expertise, expertise in the UK is tied to personal 
experience and integrity, while expertise in Germany presupposes the existence of a 
legitimate organisation and institutional support.
591
  
In selecting expert advisory members in Korea, experts’ professional skills and 
standing take precedence over the representation of institutions or socio-economical 
interests. Anyone with professional qualifications can become an expert, and an 
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individual expert’s public standing which is achieved through years of service to the 
UK’s common interests is of lesser consequence in Korea. Expertise is not tied to an 
individual person, but is represented by specific knowledge and qualifications. 
Indeed, the largest section of Korean governmental committees is comprised of 
professors. 
The Korean Act on the management of governmental committees does not clearly 
state the balance of views which committee members represent. Instead, the 
government encourages participation of various members such as civil organizations 
and minority groups. In the case of NLHCC, representatives of the beef industry and 
consumers’ organisations were invited to become members. However, they were not 
recognised as experts by the government officials, and participation of various 
groups in governmental committees was not guided by an all-inclusive concept that 
every stakeholder should be invited to the committees. Particularly, as presented in 
Chapter 4, the NGO sector in Korea was mainly characterised by the anti-
government position, and thus, it was likely to be excluded from the government’s 
invitation to advisory committees.
592
 Therefore, the civil activists who raised doubts 
about the safety of US beef from BSE risk were not invited as expert members to 
MIFAFF committees.  
Visibility of expert bodies: The activities of expert bodies were not transparent in 
Korea. Whilst there are broad guidelines about the operation of governmental 
committees, the specific activities of governmental committees are not generally 
under the public gaze. The Korean advisory committee left no report, and only a 
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summary of a meeting or a press release written by the government was open to the 
public without details of who said what. In the case of NLHCC, the MIFAFF did not 
make any open reports or minutes, but only short press releases written by civil 
servants were provided to the public.  
The particular features on six dimensions of civic epistemology which I have 
found in the Korean BSE controversy are summarised in Table 12. They commonly 
show an ‘authoritarian’ character in the sense that knowledge production, 
presentation and use in the policy area relied on the government’s involvement and 
the authority of foreign knowledge. The pattern of civic epistemology differs from 
that of the three European countries in Jasanoff’s study, and shows characteristics 
perhaps typical of a late-comer country which has achieved rapid economic growth 
and only recent political democratisation under the state’s power by catching up with 
the advanced West.  
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Table 12 Civic epistemology presented in the BSE controversy in Korea (added to the table by 
Jasanoff in ‘Designs on Nature’ for contrast)  
 Korea 
Authoritarian 
US 
Contentious 
UK 
Communitarian 
Germany 
Consensus-
seeking 
Styles of 
public 
knowledge-
making 
The government’s 
monopoly,  
Importation 
Pluralist, 
interest-based 
Embodied, 
service-based 
Corporatist, 
institution-
based 
Public 
accountability 
Assumptions of 
trust; 
Procedural, 
formal,  
Assumptions 
of distrust; 
Legal 
Assumptions 
of trust; 
Relational 
Assumptions 
of trust; Role-
based 
Demonstration 
Foreign 
authority  
Socio-
technical 
experiments 
Empirical 
science 
Expert 
rationality 
Objectivity 
Formally 
consultative but 
dominated by 
bureaucrats 
Formal, 
numerical, 
reasoned 
Consultative, 
negotiated 
Negotiated, 
reasoned 
Expertise 
Training, 
professional 
skills 
Professional 
skills 
Experience 
Training, 
skills, 
experience 
Visibility Nontransparent  Transparent Variable Nontransparent 
 
 
However, it is apparent that this authoritarian character has been faced by 
resistance. As shown above, the monopolistic status of the government in knowledge 
production is challenged by a growing civil society and the development of 
information technology. Public demand for practical participation in policy processes 
beyond formal and procedural accountability is increasing. Dependence on foreign 
authority is no longer sufficient to resolve controversy. Doubts regarding the 
objectivity of the policy process which is dominated by bureaucrats are raised and 
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the opaque policy process makes the government untrustworthy. In light of this, the 
BSE controversy in Korea could be defined as a symptom of tension caused by 
friction between the ingrained approach to policy-making and increasing public 
awareness of democracy, rather than a one-off phenomenon resulting from a media 
hyperbole, anti-Americanism, or an irrational public. It also suggests the possibility 
that plural civic epistemologies exist in a country and that they change over time. 
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8 Conclusion  
8.1 Summary of findings  
This thesis has examined the BSE controversy in Korea. I have detailed how the 
policy decision on potential BSE risk in US beef was made within the Korean 
government, how the risk issue developed into massive public controversy, and the 
particularity of the Korean approach to dealing with scientific knowledge in policy 
areas. 
The Korean BSE controversy occurred as the result of uncertainty over BSE being 
mobilised within complex political and economic contexts, particularly over the 
issue of the import of US beef after 2003. The complex set of interests over the beef 
issue impeded the Korean government from taking a clear and consistent position on 
BSE risk, and also undermined public trust in the government. Indeed, massive 
protests in 2008 occurred primarily as a result of the government’s failure to secure 
political authority over the policy for beef. Moreover, the presence of alternate 
accounts and interpretations offered by civil organisations undermined the 
epistemological authority of the government’s claims.  
The BSE controversy demonstrated what I have called an authoritarian character 
of civic epistemology in Korea, and simultaneously showed that this civic 
epistemology is challenged. The authoritarian character can be ascribed to the traces 
of the development process which had been led by active government and powerful 
bureaucracy and which relied on importing advanced countries’ knowledge and skills 
in order to secure strong and sustained economic growth. However, the authoritarian 
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way has recently been challenged by growing civil society and an increasing demand 
for public participation. This pattern of civic epistemology, I suggest, is a distinctive 
outcome of Korea’s status as a late-comer country which has achieved compressed 
economic growth and recent political democratisation under the state’s guidance by 
catching up with the advanced West. 
In order to review and summarise the key arguments made in each chapter, the 
introductory chapter set out why I chose the BSE controversy as a case study. The 
BSE controversy in Korea was unprecedented in terms of its scale and the extent of 
conflict among science-technology related controversies in Korea.  
Chapter 2 surveyed STS literature which made it possible to understand the 
relationship between science, politics, and the public. Scientific knowledge in the 
policy area is not value free and the ways in which it achieves legitimacy are subject 
to social commitment, thus reflecting the ways in which accountability is constituted 
in a society. Risk does not arise just from an objective lack of scientific knowledge, 
but is closely associated with various social and cultural factors. The public are not a 
passive recipient of scientific knowledge, and have shown their potential to 
contribute to knowledge production. The legitimacy and credibility of public 
knowledge relies on the shared public knowledge way in democracy, while each 
society has its own indigenous way in which credible knowledge should be shown, 
defended, and represented.  
Chapter 3 discussed scientific knowledge of BSE and presented a brief history of 
the BSE crisis in the UK. BSE is a progressive degenerative disease affecting the 
nervous system in bovine cattle, and is known to be transmitted by contaminated 
 292 
animal protein feed. BSE incidence peaked in the UK in the mid-1990s and 
decreased significantly after risk control measures and surveillance were in place, 
although uncertainties remain. The story of the BSE crisis in the UK showed that 
political and cultural factors of the British society, in addition to the lack of BSE 
knowledge, played a role in exacerbating the crisis. Though the policy decisions 
were always presented as having been made on purely scientific grounds by the UK 
government, non-scientific considerations such as financial constraints always 
directly or indirectly involved the recommendations of the scientific advisory bodies. 
The main factors affecting the crisis, according to scholars, were the policy 
orientation of the UK MAFF skewed towards the agricultural industry, structural 
arrangement surrounding the scientific advisory bodies, and the British political 
culture’s dependence on great and good people.  
Chapter 4 explored the broader context in order to understand the Korean BSE 
controversy. Firstly, Korea’s political and scientific culture was summarised, 
showing the authoritarian feature created during the compressed economic 
development process and due to the specific role of the powerful bureaucracy. 
Science and technology has been developed by the government, being mobilised as a 
tool for economic development. Secondly, the regulatory policy structure regarding 
BSE was provided. MIFAFF’s policy was production-oriented and the government 
side dominated BSE-related research in Korea. BSE policy was created under the 
OIE’s general guidelines whose authority was enhanced because of the WTO 
mechanism, even though countries have their own regulatory policies which 
reflected considerations on domestic regulatory conditions. 
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In Chapter 5, the Korean government’s policy process regarding potential BSE 
risk in US beef was examined. Beef import conditions were formulated under the 
complex considerations of the political and economic relations between Korea and 
the US. The beef issue became more complex since it was interrelated with the FTA 
between the US and Korea, while the uncertainty of BSE was also mobilised for 
political objectives. During the process, the role of the expert advisory body was 
primarily political.  
Chapter 6 explored public protests regarding the beef import requirements agreed 
in April 2008 and the subsequent public and scientific disputes over the safety of US 
beef and BSE risk. The newly formulated conditions for the import of US beef, 
which represented a relaxed version of the previous conditions, led to serious public 
controversy over the safety of beef. Contradictory claims were raised by the 
government and government opponents, while ‘scientific truth’ was represented as a 
solution to the controversy. However, there was remaining uncertainty regarding 
BSE, which left room for alternate accounts, and scientists’ discussions could not 
resolve the controversy, especially when combined with distrust in the government 
as well as concern about unknown risk. 
Chapter 7 explored the particularity of the Korean ways in which scientific 
knowledge was produced and used during the policy processes and the controversy. 
The comparison of the UK and Korean frameworks regarding scientific knowledge 
production and presentation showed the bureaucrat-dominant character of the 
advisory system and dependence on external authority in the Korean methods. Korea 
showed an authoritarian pattern of ‘civic epistemology’, to use and extend Jasanoff’s 
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term, which is characterised by a bureaucrats-dominant policy process and 
dependence on external authority. Moreover, the authoritarian civic epistemology has 
been challenged by the growth of civil society, and is in transition.  
This thesis has contributed to explaining the policy making style and identifying 
the particularity of the ways in which scientific knowledge is made and used within 
Korean policy-making. It has enabled an understanding of policy-making in Korea 
and can help to understand future science-based public controversies in Korea. 
 
8.2 Implication and further research  
8.2.1 Policy implication 
I have identified three areas which are derived from my research and which could 
result in the Korean government increasing efficiency when responding to public 
scientific controversy.  
Firstly, the public must be offered sufficient information at an earlier stage, before 
issues are politicised and polarised. Scientific uncertainty always leaves room for 
alternate accounts, with these alternate accounts influencing the way in which issues 
are framed. Once an issue is framed, stressing safety and certainty is likely to 
backfire. In the Korean BSE controversy, once the BSE issue was framed as a 
problem of incompetency of the government, scientific justification of the new beef 
conditions was helpless to calm public fear. In addition, the reasoning behind policy-
decisions, which involves the process in which scientific evidence is transformed to 
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policy, should be made explicit. This measure will increase transparency in policy-
making and facilitate a shared understanding of the issue. 
Secondly, adequate procedures through which the public can present their opinion 
should be put in place. In other words, there is room for increased public engagement. 
During the Korean BSE controversy, the Korean public did not have any official 
route via which to present their concerns, and as such public risk perception was 
disseminated mainly by informal routes such as via the Internet. Indeed, as a result, 
there was an unhelpful amplification of scare and protest. Nevertheless, there are 
other avenues which should be explored, with the Internet representing a positive 
tool for public engagement.  
Thirdly, simply widening participation cannot guarantee the practical engagement 
of public. Although the NLHCC included representatives from the livestock industry 
and consumer organisations, their participation was tokenistic. The government 
officials and scientists who I interviewed had a notion that there was nothing for the 
representatives from the livestock industry to contribute in terms of expertise. 
Therefore, with regard to the participation of lay members, greater consideration is 
necessary over the definition of expertise which lay members offer (for example, 
Collins and Evans’ contributory, interactional or procedural expertise) and how to 
promote meaningful interactions among scientists, civil servants, and lay members. 
Without this, the appointment of lay participants will end in a mere gesture. 
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8.2.2 Further research  
I have identified a number of areas for further research.  
My first suggestion for future research involves the analysis of other regulatory 
policy-making cases of the Korean government such as in the areas of food, 
pesticides, or chemicals. This would allow me to ascertain whether my findings 
regarding the Korean government's policy-making styles and the pattern of civic 
epistemology are replicated elsewhere. Due to the closed policy process, studies 
relating to the internal policy process of the Korean government about regulatory 
scientific issues are infrequent. Analysis and comparison with other regulatory issues 
will help draw out the particular features of each regulatory issue and provide an 
opportunity to explore the ways in which uncertainty and risk issues are dealt with in 
Korea in a more general manner. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to undertake a comparative study with countries 
which, like Korea, also import US beef. This would make it possible to explore how 
different risk assessment and regulatory policies on US beef are applied, and how the 
OIE standards were recognised and used. According to the MIFAFF, 117 countries 
imported US beef in 2008 including Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan and 
China, which are major US beef importing countries. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to explore how the Asian countries (or US beef importing countries) 
responded to potential BSE risk in US beef.  
Moreover, in the Korean BSE controversy, international harmonisation on BSE 
regulatory policies, which was represented by the OIE standards, has a significant 
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impact on the Korean government’s regulatory policies. Stricter regulation than the 
OIE guideline and the following potential trade conflict were ever-present concerns 
amongst Korean legislators. It would therefore be interesting to explore how the 
changes in international regulations on BSE (or other animal diseases) affected each 
country’s regulatory policy strategies. 
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Appendix1: List of interviewees  
 
Hae-gwan Cheong, Professor, Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, 
School of Medicine, Sungkyunkwan University – interviewed in October 2011 
Dong-soo Im, researcher at the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience & 
Bioengineering – interviewed in April 2012 
Yang-koo Kang, journalist, Pressian – interviewed in November 2011 
Joong-bok Lee, professor, Department of Infectious Disease, College of Veterinary 
Medicine, Konkuk University – interviewed in December 2012 
Yong-soon Lee, emeritus professor, College of Veterinary Medicine, Seoul National 
University – interviewed in November 2012 
Hee-jong Woo, professor, College of Veterinary Medicine, Seoul National 
University– interviewed in October 2011 
GI-hwa Yang, researcher at the Medicine policy research institute of the Korean 
Medical Association – interviewed in April 2012 
A, civil servant at the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, doctor 
of veterinary medicine – interviewed in November 2012 
B, civil servant at the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries – 
interviewed in October 2011 and November 2012 
C, civil servant at the Animal, Plant and Fisheries Quarantine and Inspection Agency 
(It was formerly the NVRQS) – interviewed in April 2012  
D, civil servant at the Animal, Plant and Fisheries Quarantine and Inspection Agency 
– interviewed in April 2012 
E, civil servant at the Animal, Plant and Fisheries Quarantine and Inspection Agency, 
 325 
doctor of veterinary medicine – interviewed in December 2012 
F, civil servant at the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology – interviewed 
in September 2011   
H, civil servant at the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology – interviewed 
in March 2012 
I, journalist – interviewed in September 2011 
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Appendix2: Interview questions 
 
< For the government officials of the MIFAFF and the NVRQS > 
1. Why is beef important in meat policy and trade? And what is the main concern in 
beef policy?  
2. Research fundamental on BSE and vCJD in Korea 
3. Was the detection of bone fragments by X-rays absurd? Was the aim to decrease beef 
imports?  
4. The reason that stricter condition for US beef could be set in 2006 than in 2008 
5. What is your opinion about the OIE guideline? Is it sufficient to protect public health?  
6. Do you think BSE is still uncertain?  
7. The aim, structure, selection of members, decision process, minutes, support for and 
influence of the decisions of the expert committee 
8. What do you think about the committee members who opposed to the government in 
BSE controversy?  
9. Did you expect the severity of the public protest? What is your opinion about that the 
government had to consult citizens about the beef import requirements? 
10. Why did you invite experts from medical association to the press conference not 
committee members?  
11. The head negotiator of the government said that the evidences Korean government 
presented was not accepted internationally. Why?  
12. What is your opinion about the conferences which were organized by Korean science 
communities? Was it helpful to assure the public?  
13. What is your opinion about the role of experts (committee members) in policy 
decision?  
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< For the government’s advisory committee members> 
1. What made you join the advisory committee?  
2. Are you satisfied with the operation of the committee? (eg. the atmosphere,  
decision process, openness, minutes, support for members, influence on policy …) 
3. Do you think BSE is still uncertain disease?  
4. What is your opinion about the head negotiator’s claim (‘the evidences Korean 
government presented (eg. genetic susceptibility of Korean people, prion in muscle 
meat under 20 months….) was not accepted internationally’)? 
5. What is your opinion about committee members who support/oppose the 
government?  
6. View on the research fundamental on BSE in Korea  
7. Were you pressured by the government or others (media, activist group……) to 
support / oppose the government?  
 
< For scientists who organized/attended conferences on BSE, civil servants of the 
MOST, and journalists > 
1. What made you organize/attend the conference?   
2. What is your opinion about scientists who support/oppose the government?  
3. Were you pressured by the government/media/activist group to support / oppose the 
government?  
4. Do you think the conferences were effective to resolve the controversy? If not, why? 
What do you think is necessary for Korean science community to play a proper role 
in public controversy? 
5. Do you think BSE is still uncertain disease?  
6. View on the research fundamental on BSE in Korea  
 
